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2Abstract
This thesis investigates the role of the United Nations in the area of peace 
enforcement. It studies the UN system for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in the face of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression. It assesses the Security Council attempts to employ 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in response to 
inter-state and intra-state conflicts, paying attention to the effect of the 
Council’s increasing involvement in internal situations, both on the 
development of the system and on the outcome of conflicts. It also takes 
account of changes in the nature of modem conflict and of the Security 
Council’s innovative rebuttals; these amount to a transforming of peace 
enforcement and necessitate its reconceptualisation.
The thesis examines challenges posed to the viability of peace 
enforcement by an increasing tendency to employ ‘interventionist’ methods 
such as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘new internationalism’. In this 
respect, the thesis examines the assumption that these new methods do not 
substitute for the UN system of peace enforcement, which retain the universal 
approval of member states. It further assesses the argument that a reformed 
peace enforcement system will serve the cause of peace better than these 
controversial methods.
The study of the Kuwait crisis as a central case in this thesis benefited 
from the release of authoritative accounts during the years 1995-99, by writers 
who had held official responsibilities during the crisis. The thesis also benefited 
from the study of peace enforcement cases that occurred after Kuwait in 
measuring claims raised after the Gulf war concerning the reactivation and 
viability of peace enforcement. These cases allowed the thesis to provide an 
account of peace enforcement during the first ten post-Cold War years, to 
contrast them to earlier cases, and to draw lessons for the future of the UN 
peace enforcement system.
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8Chapter 1 
Introduction
1- Rationale
The aim of this thesis is to study the role of the United Nations in the area of 
peace enforcement. It discusses the concept of peace enforcement, its 
development since the establishment of the United Nations, and its 
transformation in the 1990s. It investigates the practice of the Security Council 
in the adoption and implementation of peace enforcement measures and the 
political and constitutional problems arising from this practice.
The use of force by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter 
and the employment of mandatory sanctions will be examined in different 
cases to assess their impact on the outcome of conflicts and their effects on the 
credibility of the UN system for peace enforcement. The thesis pays particular 
attention to the influence of great powers on the decisions of the Security 
Council through systematic analysis of the roles of permanent members in 
imposing mandatory economic measures and taking military actions in 
international and internal conflicts.
The role of the United Nations in the area of peace enforcement received 
little attention during the Cold War. Studies in the area during the forty years 
between 1950 and 1990 concentrated on the only experience of explicitly 
authorised UN enforcement military action in Korea in 1950, and the only two
cases of UN mandatory sanctions in Rhodesia in 1967 and South Africa in 
1977. These cases were treated as isolated incidents as they did not provide 
precedents for the practice of the Security Council during the Cold War. 
Therefore, the paucity in practice was the main reason for the limited academic 
and intellectual interest in the area of peace enforcement. Brian Urquhart 
observed in 1986 that
we rarely hear much about Chapter VII -  Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression -  the once 
famous ‘teeth’ of the United Nations of which everyone was so proud at 
the Organisation’s birth. It seems as if the international body politic is 
now too weary, too distracted, too divided, too lacking in common 
purpose ever to decide to use its teeth.1
Scholarly literature paid more attention to the study of the use of force by states 
in the form of a unilateral action and military intervention where constitutional 
justification centred on the right of self-defence. With contrast to the only 
explicit incident of UN peace enforcement operation in Korea, the use of force 
in a unilateral manner was mobilised in many major conflicts. Sanctions were 
also imposed in many cases regionally and unilaterally beyond the authority of 
the Security Council. Consequently, academic writings continued to focus on 
these uses of force and sanctions outside the UN framework.
1 Brian Urquhart, ‘The role o f the United Nations in maintaining and improving international 
security’ (1986 Alastair Bunchan Memorial Lecture) Survival, vol. XXVIII, no. 5, p. 391.
This situation was created by the continuing confrontation between the 
East and West during the Cold War as well as by other political and economic 
factors. The struggle for the balance of power caused many military 
confrontations, and disagreement among the big powers impeded the Security 
Council from taking collective action. Within the UN a new consensual and 
impartial alternative system was established to help warring parties by 
observing cease-fire agreements and acting as a buffer force to keep the peace 
in areas of conflict. Peacekeeping was largely viewed as a relatively viable 
option in the face of the Council’s inability to enforce peace. Between 1947 
and 1988, the UN authorised 13 peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the 
emphasis shifted to the study of peacekeeping. Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye observed in 1987 that ‘Limited peacekeeping is worth considering, not the 
overly ambitious efforts reflected in Korea and the Congo.’
Changes in Soviet foreign policies and the new atmosphere of co­
operation between the East and West at the end of the 1980s allowed for 
unprecedented reactivation of the United Nations system for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. During the 1990s peace enforcement started 
to attract more attention. The Security Council was in several conflicts able to 
impose military and economic measures under Chapter VII. As a result of these 
actions, which had been made possible by the end of the Cold War, peace 
enforcement became an important subject in the study of international relations 
and international law. However, the majority of contemporary contributions
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Harper Collins 
Publishers, London, 2nd edition 1989, p. 280.
treated peace enforcement in a context of humanitarian intervention or 
peacekeeping. The comprehensive and integral study of the important political 
and constitutional aspects of peace enforcement within one framework is still 
missing. This thesis intends to fill this lacuna in contemporary literature by 
studying peace enforcement on its own and within an independent theoretical 
and empirical framework.
2- Summary of chapters
Part I of the thesis argues for the possibility and importance of theorising on 
peace enforcement as an independent concept distinguished from other systems 
of peace maintenance. It attempts to study the definition of peace enforcement 
by taking account of various scholarly attempts to define the term and notes 
that UN documents did not provide a conclusive definition. Part I undertakes a 
major task of reconceptualising peace enforcement. It argues that the increasing 
employment of enforcement measures in civil wars has significantly 
transformed the parameters of peace enforcement and has thereby necessitated 
its reconceptualisation.
Part II studies the case of Kuwait as the most systematic and explicit 
experience of the application of the UN scheme for peace enforcement. The 
provisions of Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 were systematically implemented 
during the period from August 1990 to January 1991. It also discusses the issue
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of how sanctions end, and the food for oil deal as a model of exceptions to the 
sanctions regime.
The thesis attaches special importance to the role of the United States in 
the authorisation and implementation of enforcement measures and for this 
reason Part III will be devoted to the role of the US. It attempts to clarify the 
relation between the US and UN over cases of peace enforcement especially 
during the Kuwait crisis. It addresses the nature of this relation and whether it 
is built on exploitation or co-operation. The study of the US role in relation to 
roles of the Security Council will help to explain not only the organisational 
aspects of the role of the Security Council but also the influence of national 
interests, the actual actors, and Realpolitik behind the Council resolutions.
Part IV examines four major constitutional problems and their effects on 
the process of authorisation in the Council and the practice of peace 
enforcement operations. It further contributes to the field by suggesting a four- 
point criterion for the measuring of adequacy and inadequacy of sanctions 
under Article 41 before the Council can move to authorise the undertaking of a 
military action.
Part V examines the innovative role of the Security Council in the area 
of international terrorism during the 1990s and the undertaking of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII to combat transnational terrorist activities.
Part VI reviews cases of peace enforcement during the Cold War and the 
post-Cold War period. It draws conclusions from each case for the study of 
peace enforcement.
The main argument of the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part 
is related to the situation during the Cold War and the second one is pertinent 
to the effect of the transformation caused by the end of the Cold War. The first 
part accepts the assertion made by most scholarly studies that the Cold War 
hindered the mobilisation of the UN peace enforcement system, but it refers to 
the danger of generalisation entailed in this assertion. Generalisation would 
obscure the role of some political dynamics which are not solely pertinent to 
the Cold War. For instance, the thesis argues that European colonialism and its 
legacy in Africa was responsible for the Security Council’s inability to invoke 
explicitly Chapter VII peace enforcement measures during the Congo crises in 
the early 1960s, even though ONUC embodied many characteristics of peace 
enforcement. It is widely held that the use of the veto by great powers was the 
main reason for the Council’s inability to undertake enforcement action to 
resolve conflicts during the Cold War. In its conclusion the thesis makes a 
contrary argument that most of the uses of the veto by permanent members 
were meant to protest against insufficient measures envisaged by Security 
Council draft resolutions. However, the thesis agrees that the right of veto 
reduced the chances of the UN to act as a centralised agency capable of taking 
effective action to enforce the peace. It further accepts that great powers used 
the veto in many situations to protect their interests and to prevent the 
authorisation of enforcement measures against their will.
The second part of the argument accepts the contention that the end of 
the Cold War enabled the Security Council to take effective enforcement
14
measures, largely allowing for the revival of the Charter system for peace 
enforcement, while some provisions of Chapter VII remained dormant. 
However, it observes that the impossibility to reactivate important provisions 
of Articles 43 and 47 including the role of the Military Staff Committee, 
provides an evidence that the Cold War rivalry was not the only reason for the 
latency of major portions of the UN Charter system.
The second main argument is derived from the Security Council 
attempts to resolve civil wars through peace enforcement arrangements. It 
asserts that the extensive employment of peace enforcement measures in intra­
state conflicts during the 1990s has transformed the practice of the UN in this 
area and necessitated the reconceptualisation of the term.
15
Chapter 2
The theory of peace enforcement
1- Terminological confusion
Peace enforcement has been constitutionally and operationally confused with 
other terms, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, preventive deployment, 
collective self-defence, and humanitarian intervention. Each of these terms 
was, on many occasions, used to mean or substitute for peace enforcement. In 
practice peace enforcement may interact with other kinds of international 
responses and the United Nations may find itself in a perilous situation by 
acting in gray areas between two or more of these mandates. N. D. White 
observed that ‘the divisions between observation, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement action are unclear, as there are grey areas in which one function 
merges into another.’3
Robert Oakley cited ‘several different definitions of both peacemaking 
and peacekeeping’ arguing that the ‘United Kingdom, for example, uses the 
former as the United States uses the term “peace enforcement”-the application 
of considerable military forces to bring about peace, by imposing it if need be.’ 
Oakley himself preferred to define peacemaking ‘as diplomacy, mediation, 
conflict prevention, or conflict resolution.’4 To understand what Oakley meant
3 N. D. White, Keeping the peace, the United Nations and the maintenance o f international 
peace and security, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1993, p. 187.
4 Robert B. Oakley, ‘Using the United Nations to Advance U.S. Interests’ in Ted Galen 
Carpenter, ed. Delusions o f  Grandeur, The United Nations and Global Intervention, Cato 
Institute, Washington, 1997, p. 79.
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by peacemaking, requires interpretation of each component of the terms 
included in his definition.
It is difficult to make an accurate distinction between various definitions 
on geographical or cultural bases, and differences between the UK and the US 
in defining peace operations are not so clear, but it is true that there is no 
universal agreement on the meaning of these terms. For instance, the following 
two examples provide evidence contrary to Oakley’s argument. The American 
Bar Association stated in its Report on Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace 
Enforcement that peace enforcement forces may be ‘referred to as 
“peacemaking” troops’5 while, a British diplomat and UN Under-Secretary- 
General until 1997 Sir Marrack Goulding asserted that ‘Peacemaking means 
attempts to negotiate peace settlements.’6
A former Netherlands representative at the Security Council, Hugo 
Scheltema used the term peacemaking to refer to peace enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. He stated that ‘The essence of peacekeeping is that it is not 
peace-making. There is no coercion and no enforcement under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. Any peacekeeping operation is based on consensus of all parties
n
concerned.’
Peace enforcement measures undertaken by the Security Council were 
divided according to their functions and mandates into different types:
5 American Bar Association, The United Nations at 50: Proposals fo r Improving Its 
Effectiveness, Section o f International Law and Practice, Washington D.C. 1997, p. 45.
6 Marrack Goulding, ‘The United Nations and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War’ African 
Affairs, vol. 98, no. 391, April 1999, p. 158.
7 Hugo Scheltema, ‘Transformations within the United Nations’ in Jeffrey Harrod and Nico 
Schrijver, The United Nations Under Attack, Gower, Aldershot and Brookfield, 1988, p. 4.
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decentralised, limited, selective, and subcontracted. However, there is no 
agreement among scholars on the use of these terms to describe certain 
enforcement measures. Furthermore, peace enforcement has been used in 
conjunction with other established methods of conflict resolution, such as 
humanitarian intervention, preventive deployment, and action in self-defence.
o
Examples of this are ‘Humanitarian enforcement’ ‘preventive enforcement’ 
and ‘self-enforcement’. It is also influenced by the use of the term 
‘enforcement’ in customary international law9 which reflect a limited legal 
scope compared with the UN system for peace enforcement.
Peace enforcement has been confused with terms related to 
peacekeeping. Scholars and practitioners have repeatedly referred to peace 
enforcement as ‘wider peacekeeping’ ‘third generation peacekeeping’ 
‘enlarged peacekeeping’ ‘peace keeping with muscles’. The terms ‘multi­
functional peacekeeping’10 or ‘multidimensional peacekeeping’11 were also 
used to describe operations which include peace enforcement mandates.
The prevalence of peacekeeping has had a strong impact on the 
understanding of peace enforcement. Writers tended to use the term 
‘operations’ originally applied on peacekeeping analogously to describe peace
8 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton, Managing International Conflict, From Theory 
To Policy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 85.
9 Antonio Cassese, International Law in A Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 
215.
10 Marrack Goulding, op. cit. note 4, p. 166.
11 A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory o f United Nations Peacekeeping, Macmillan Press and 
St. Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1994, pp. 23 -  44; Shashi Tharoor, ‘Foreword’ in 
Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, Macmillan, 
London, 1995, p. xvi.
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enforcement measures, but this understanding blurs the differences in function 
and mandate between the two methods and reduces peace enforcement to the 
act of ‘deployment’. ‘Peacekeeping operation’ is an accurate term for the 
description of the military and civilian personnel deployed under a 
peacekeeping mandate. However, the ‘enforcement operation’ does not cover 
the scope of peace enforcement as a system consisting of various measures and 
stages included in Articles 39 -  50 of the UN Charter. Many studies, in 
defining the term peace enforcement, did not refer to mandatory economic and 
diplomatic sanctions as components of the term. The frequent use of the term 
‘enforcement operation’ has therefore contributed to the confused 
understanding of peace enforcement.
The development of analysis and research on the issue of peacekeeping 
since the 1950s has influenced the study of peace operations. There is tendency
• i ^to consider all UN peace operations as essentially corresponding to 
peacekeeping. Scholars like Paul Diehl studied peace enforcement as one of the
• 13functions of peacekeeping. The use of such terms to describe what were 
clearly authorised enforcement actions reflects an intent, a propensity to 
persevere with the impartiality of UN peacekeeping. The UN tended not to 
declare its intention to undertake coercive measures with relation to internal 
conflicts in order to avoid provocation and internal resistance. Any of the local 
factions might think that the UN action was directed against its forces and
12 The term ‘peace operations’ refers in this thesis to any o f the UN military or civilian 
operations.
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might, therefore, initiate hostilities against the UN forces or intensify its attacks 
against other factions in the area.14 These practical necessities caused the UN to 
designate its forces in Bosnia and Somalia as peacekeeping forces despite the 
enforcement mandate sanctioned by the Security Council.
2- The concept of peace enforcement
Faced with conceptual imprecision, the thesis may instead examine the way in 
which, in practice, the usage of the term has evolved. This chapter illuminates 
the development of the concept of peace enforcement from its emergence in 
1945 to the present, with particular attention to the transformation of the 
concept during the 1990s. Since 1945, the practice of the United Nations in the 
area of peace maintenance and the subsequent theoretical discussion have made 
significant changes to the original system of the Charter. Many of these 
changes gained the approval of the Security Council and acquired general 
acceptability from the international community. This chapter will take account 
of these changes and attempt to assess the process of transformation and its 
effect on the concept of peace enforcement. However, the ultimate goal of the 
chapter is to reconceptualise the term ‘peace enforcement’ in the light of 
developments since the establishment of the United Nations.
13 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London, 1993, p. 163,
14 This happened in the Congo in 1960-61, despite that the UN did not announce peace 
enforcement measures, but local factions and authorities interpreted the deployment o f large 
UN forces in the country as a hostile action.
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Peace enforcement is a system of collective security. However, the 
identification of the UN peace enforcement system as identical to the concept 
of collective security is one of the flaws caused by ambiguity and 
generalisation in some of the present literature. Although collective security 
represents the underlying philosophy for the study of peace enforcement, at the 
end of the century the concept of peace enforcement has largely altered from 
the early twentieth century models and can not be defined only within the 
context of earlier conceptions of collective security. However, the coherent 
understanding of peace enforcement necessitates an overview of the conceptual 
background of the idea and its development before the establishment of the 
United Nations.
Conceptual background
The idea of collective security emerges after major international wars: victors 
usually set to establish a world order governed by principles which seek to 
prevent the outbreak of another war and to halt war if it erupts. During the three 
centuries which preceded the creation of the United Nations, major post-war 
settlements were concluded. The Westphalia settlement in 1648, the Utrecht 
treaty in 1713, the Vienna agreement in 1815, and the Versailles treaty in 1919 
were all perceived to have produced a constitution-like formation.15 Collective 
security is claimed to revive in such decisive moments.16 Hence, scholars argue
15 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Constitutional Politics in International Relations’ European Journal o f  
International Relations, vol. 4, no. 2, June 1998, p. 148.
16 We would argue here that the peaceful end of the Cold War revealed that peaceful world 
transformation, where no big power was coerced to abandon its power, may not lead to
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that elements of collective security have tended to emanate from post war 
treaties. Inis Claude indicated that ‘Adumbrations of the idea can be found in
IVsuch seventeenth-century documents as the Treaty of Osnabruck’.
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury also noted that the history of 
collective security has almost been a part of the history of the states systems 
‘and was aired for instance at the negotiations which led to the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia.’ However, most Western studies do not go beyond the Concert of 
Europe, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Peace of Westphalia and apply this
1 ftprinciple to the extra-European world. Furthermore, Joel Larus contended 
that
An examination of non-Westem political literature, that is, Chinese, 
Hindu, Islamic, and African, reveals that the collective security idea was 
never proposed by early writers from these civilisations. Other political 
concepts and schemes to maintain peace that are generally associated 
with Western statecraft can be found in ancient non-Westem political
international constitution-like reform or to the establishment o f alternative world organisation, 
although, it may lead to the resurgence of agreed dormant principles. For instance, the end of 
the Cold War did not allow for any amendment to the Charter or reform of the Security 
Council, but made it possible for member states largely to reactivate the UN system for peace 
enforcement.
17 Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares, the Problems and Progress o f  International 
Organisation, 4th edition, Random House, New York, 1984, p. 247.
18 Adam Watson explained how international societies adopted societal elements inherited 
from past systems recognising that the pattern of an international society ‘is not drawn up 
afresh for each society. It is to a large extent inherited from previous societies’. The Persian 
Empire inherited from Assyrian and Babylionian systems, the Macedonian Kingdoms and the 
Mauryas from the Persians, the Romans from the Macedonians, the Byzantine oikoumene and 
the Arab caliphate from the Romans, and the Europeans from the Romans and Greek. Adam
Watson, The evolution o f  international society, A comparative historical analysis, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1992 p. 318.
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writings. ... The collective security idea, however, is missing from the 
premodem political literature of the non-Westem world. ... Collective 
security must be considered as a uniquely indigenous Western political 
idea, one that in time was exported to Asia, the Middle East, and 
Africa.19
This is arguably a mistaken view: the idea of collective security is not an 
exclusively Western, or modem, idea. Although, it is true that the idea of 
collective security has been elaborated in the twentieth century by Western 
figures such as Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel House, Lord
9ftRobert Cecil, Lloyd George, and M. Bourgeois, the idea had its roots in 
agreements by non-Westem nations, more than thirteen centuries ago. In the 
fourth century, pre-Islamic Arabs concluded a treaty called Solh al-fudool 
according to which all Arab entities should come to the defence of any victim 
tribe, one attacked by another tribe. All tribes were under obligation to assist the
91victim and to act against the aggressor. Furthermore, Surat Al-Hujrat in the 
Qur’an can be read to contain almost the same meaning as Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter and the general spirit of the UN system for the 
maintenance of peace and security. Verse 9 of Surat Al-Hujrat reads:
19 Joel Larus, ‘The Myth Is Bom ’ in Joel Larus, ed. From Collective Security to Preventive 
Diplomacy, Readings in International Organisation and the Maintenance o f peace, John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, London, and Sydney, 1965, pp. 5 - 6 .
20 Many associations in the West contributed to the promotion o f the idea o f collective 
security organisations, these included the Fabian Society, the Association de la Paix par le 
Droit, Organisation Centrale, the British Peace Society, and the American League to Enforce 
Peace.
21 Ibn Husham, Sirat Ibn Husham, (Arabic text) Dar Al-Giel, Beirut, no date, pp. 1 2 2 -1 2 5 .
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If two parties among the believers fall into a fight, make ye peace 
between them: but if one of them transgress beyond bounds against the 
other, then fight ye all against the one that transgresses until it complies 
with the command of Allah. But if it complies, then make peace between
them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair and
• . 22 
JUSt.
The Verse embodies a collective security system based on consistency, fairness, 
and justice. Another argument against the historical reductionism practised by 
some Western scholars in considering the roots of the idea of collective security 
is the case of the blockade and economic sanctions imposed in the seventh 
century by most Arab tribes against the Bani Abd al Mutallib and Bani Hashim. 
The pact signed by the Quraish in this respect imposed a total ban on the 
delivery of commercial goods to these two tribes for three years.
However, earlier examples such as Solh al-fudool, or those of the last 
three centuries, like the Treaty of Osnabruk, the Utrecht Treaty, and the Vienna 
Agreement can be considered as forms of limited or regional collective security. 
In this sense, the twentieth century system of collective security is unique,
22 The Qur-an, King Fahd Complex For The Printing o f The Holly Qur-an, Al-Madina Al- 
Munawarah, S. 49, A-9-11, Juz 26, no date, pp. 1590 -  1591.
23 Mohamed Heikal, The Life o f  Muhammad, Shrouk International, London and Cairo, 1983, 
pp. 115 -  116. Heikal observed that the Arab tribes led by Quraysh ‘agreed among themselves 
to a written pact in which they resolved to boycott Bani Hashim and Bani Abd al Muttalib 
completely, prevent any intermarriage with them, and stop all commercial relations. The 
written pact itself was hung inside the Ka‘bah, as was then the practice, for record and 
sanctification.’
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because it has claimed universality or has at least attempted to be universal. 
Inis Claude observed that although the idea of collective security was not 
invented by Wilson, ‘nor was it expressed and elaborated solely by him’, the 
idea remained ‘a phenomenon of the opening decades of the twentieth century’. 
24 However, Wilson’s devotion to the project of the ‘League to Enforce Peace’ 
during World War I, and his contribution to the development of the idea of 
collective security, were remarkable.
Wilson’s doctrine presupposed an absolute ‘collectivity’ in the sense that 
all states should be ready to take action to defend the security of all states 
against any states that might use their force in a manner inconsistent with 
international rules. Three important elements could be drawn out of Wilson’s 
absolute ‘collectivity’. First it presupposes a system which could avoid the 
repetition of old systems of power alliance by envisaging that coercive action 
against an aggressor should be taken by all states; in this respect Wilson 
believed that neutrality must not be allowed; ‘Nobody can hereafter be neutral 
as respect the disturbance of the world’s peace’. However, this assertion never 
materialised. States continued to take neutral positions either by refusing to 
participate in the League of Nations and the United Nations, or by practising 
neutrality within the international organisation. Second, the system should 
maintain justice through the consistent application of its measures and all
24 Inis Claude, op. cit. note 16.
25 Cited in F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace, Theory and Practice in the History 
o f Relations Between States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963, p. 317.
26 Philip E. Jacob, Alexine L. Atherton, and Arthur M. Wallenstein, The Dynamics o f  
International Organisation, The Dorsey Press, Illinois and Georgetown, revised edition 1972, 
p. 57.
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countries should equally benefit from its merits. Third, it should ensure the 
applicability of collective measures against any state, including the great 
powers, which misuses its power in a way that may threaten international
27peace.
The contrast of collective security to the balance of power was always 
central in theoretical discussions. As Inis Claude noticed in 1962: ‘Advocates 
of collective security, from Wilson’s day to the present, have tended to define 
and characterise it in sharp contrast to the balance of power system.’ This 
feature was stressed by Roberts and Kingsbury who described collective 
security as ‘distinct from systems of alliance security, in which groups of states 
ally with each other, principally against possible external threats.’ Hedley Bull 
observed that the principle of collective security, as had been derived from the 
neo-Grotian ideas, ‘should rest not on a balance of power, but on a 
preponderance of power wielded by a combination of states acting as the agents 
of international society as a whole that will deter challenges to the system or 
deal with them if they occur.’30
Martin Wight gave an interpretation different from Claude, Bull, and 
Roberts and Kingsbury. He dismissed the sharp contrast between collective 
security and balance of power; instead, Wight considered it as a form of balance
27 For further discussion of Wilson’s ideas on collective security see F. H. Hinsley, op. cit. 
note 23 chapter 14; Inis Claude, op. cit. note 20, chapters 4 and 5.
28 Inis Claude, op. cit. note 16, p. 111.
29 Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and international security’ Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, 
Summer 1993, p. 23.
30 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study o f Order in World Politics, Macmillan Press, 
London, 2nd edition 1995, 15th print 1997, p. 231.
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of power. He referred to a similar disagreement between Wilson who wanted 
the collective security system of the Covenant to abolish the balance of power, 
and Lord Cecil and Churchill who saw the League of Nations as an attempt to
•5 i
institutionalise the balance of power. Wight himself defined collective 
security as follows: ‘Collective security means internationalised defence.’ 
Following this, when Wight discussed the Korean crisis of 1950 he agreed that 
Korea was an example of UN collective security, at the same time he contended 
that ‘The Korean War, however, was a crisis of simple balance of power.’
The difference between Wight and Bull on this issue is intentional and 
contingent on distinct definitional elements. Both used the term ‘combination of 
power’ to describe the preponderance of power required by collective security 
to overwhelm the aggressor.34 But, Wight further asserted that ‘The balance of 
power worked traditionally by ad hoc alliances against a known enemy; the 
League, as Sir Arthur Salter said, was to be a permanent potential alliance
o r
‘against the unknown enemy.’ In simple words, Wight considers the League of 
Nations and the UN systems of collective security as attempts to institutionalise 
the balance of power by turning the ‘ad hoc alliances’ against a known enemy, 
into ‘permanent alliances’ against unknown enemy.
For other scholars, including Quincy Wright, collective security is not 
distinct from the balance of power, but is, rather, ‘only a planned development
31 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Leicester University Press and the RIIA, Leicester, 2nd 
edition 1995, 2nd print, 1997, p. 207.
32 Ibid. p. 206.
33 Ibid. p. 227.
34 Hedley Bull, op. cit. Note 30; Ibid. p. 207.
35 Martin Whight, op. cit. note 31, p. 207.
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of the natural tendency of balance of power politics.’ The distinction between 
collective security and the balance of power was further blurred by the Cold 
War bloc politics.
Nevertheless, the stipulation of universality in collective security is a 
fundamental difference from the balance of power, but because it did not 
materialise in post war conflicts after 1919 and 1945, great doubts arose 
questioning its conceptual validity. Those who did not dismiss the Grotian 
discourse of internationalism but doubted its practicality in an international 
society dominated by the interests of great powers, tended to provide 
interpretations derived from the ideal of collective security but not in 
conformity with all its basic manifestations. Universality also distinguishes 
collective security from collective self-defence practised by alliances and 
regional defence organisation like NATO. These institutions were not designed 
to facilitate co-operation on a global basis; conversely, they seek to prevail, as 
alliances, in military and political conflicts.37 At the same time, regional 
organisations like the OAS and the OAU cannot be precluded from organising 
collective security among member states. According to LeRoy Bennett, a 
regional organisation could qualify for collective security if it incorporates most 
of the states in the region and if the terms of agreement for collective action are
36 Quincy Wright, The Study o f  International Relations, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 
1955, p. 240.
37 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’ in Friedrich Kratochwil 
and Edward D. Mansfield, eds. International Organisation, A Reader, Harper Collins College 
Publishers, 1994, p. 44.
38 Marina S. Finkelstein and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, eds. Collective Security, Chandler 
Publishing, San Francisco, 1966, p. 2.
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directed essentially against threats from within the region. However, 
universality remains an important proviso for achieving the objectives of 
collective security as a safeguard of world peace.
Reconceptualising peace enforcement
Efforts to identify and conceptualise collective security before the 
establishment of the United Nations and during the Cold War period provide 
the bases for understanding the United Nations scheme for collective security, 
but these attempts are not sufficient as a basis for understanding peace 
enforcement at the end of the century. Developments in the concept of peace 
enforcement are reinforced by the evolving global changes during the post- 
Cold War period which have presented the world with new challenges. 
Leaders, who inspired the ideal of collective security, including the framers of 
the UN Charter envisaged a system primarily concerned with wars between 
states. They did not envisage that a collective security system would be 
essentially concerned with internal wars and with the delivery of humanitarian 
aid to civilians. Peace enforcement has largely been conceived of in recent 
years as a system for dealing with civil wars. This has been dictated by the 
increasing number of intra-state conflicts since the 1940s, compared with inter­
state conflicts. Wiseman has noted that
39 A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organisations, Principles and Issues, Printice-Hall, New  
Jersey, 1984, 3rd edition, p. 135.
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‘data sets which deal with the characteristics of international conflict 
show that from 1900 to 1941, 80% of wars were between armed forces 
of two or more states, whereas from 1945 to 1976, 85% were on the 
territory of one state only and were internally oriented’40
In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Ghali updated in 1995 world accounts of the contrast between internal and 
international conflicts.
Of the five peace-keeping operations that existed in early 1988, four 
related to inter-state wars and only one (20 per cent of the total) to an 
intra-state conflict. Of the 21 operations established since then, only 8 
have related to inter-state wars, whereas 13 (62 per cent) related to intra­
state conflicts ... Of the 11 operations established since January 1992, 
all but 2 (82 per cent) related to intra-state conflicts.41
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explained that 79 out of 
the 82 armed conflicts that broke out in the five years following the fall of 
Berlin Wall in November 1989 were internal wars.42 The rapid acceleration of
40 H. Wiseman, ‘The United Nations and international peacekeeping: a comparative analysis’ 
in UNITAR, The United Nations and the Maintenance o f  International Peace and Security, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p. 265.
41 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda fo r  Peace, United Nations, New York, 
1993.
42 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 
47.
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internal conflicts and the complex character of civil wars have posed new 
challenges to peace enforcement. It was not anticipated that a peace 
enforcement system would be mobilised to restore democracy, combat 
international terrorism, and hunt down warlords as was attempted by the 
Security Council in the 1990s. All these responses have been deemed necessary 
to combat threats to international peace and security. In what follows here, a 
brief summary will be given of the evolution of thinking on peace enforcement 
during the 1990s. Chapters 8 and 9 will address the historical record.
The problem of refugees fleeing their homeland and taking shelter in 
neighbouring countries as a direct result of fierce fighting between antagonists 
is increasingly becoming a source of justification for mobilising measures 
under Chapter VII to avert humanitarian crisis. The issue of refugees has now 
repeatedly been considered to cause a threat to international peace and 
security.43 Measures to ensure the delivery of food to civilians and protection 
of minorities from ethnically motivated attacks are also now authorised under 
Chapter VII. To reduce the intensity of war the Council might attempt to 
restrict accessibility to weapons, by imposing an arms embargo and by taking 
steps to demobilise irregular forces.
Forces deployed to enforce any of these measures are different from 
peacekeeping forces. They do not necessarily obtain the consent of any of the 
warring parties and they may be instructed to abandon impartiality at a certain
43 Justin Morris, ‘The United Nations: collective security and individual rights’ in M. Jane 
Davis, Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and 
Brookfield, 1996, p. 130; Adam Roberts, ‘Willing the End But Not the Means’ The World 
Today, May 1999, p. 8.
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stage or to direct their weapons, from the outset, against one side. To be 
prepared for all possibilities, peace enforcement forces must retain superiority 
over the combined forces of all parties to the conflict.44 This would reduce 
forces’ vulnerability to attack, exploitation, or marginalisation by warring 
parties.45 Preponderance of power is essential in peace enforcement operations 
and serves as a deterrent to potential aggressors and war perpetrators.
Peace enforcement forces may be functioning within a multidimensional 
peace operation. In this case mandated forces will play the policing role to 
ensure the efficacy of other efforts, albeit that each operation may seek to 
preserve its distinct nature. The multidimensional approach will be necessitated 
by what scholars call ‘complex emergencies’, referring to the scope of crisis 
and the diverse requirements for its alleviation. These emergencies may range 
from continued fighting between combatants, absence of a central government, 
and the dismantling of essential infrastructure, to drought, famine, spread of 
killing diseases, and environmental problems.
In such situations, peace enforcement would constitute an integral part 
of a broad peace strategy aiming to provide responses to the wide diversity of 
emergencies. However, the success of such a strategy is contingent on many 
conditions. It also needs to be carefully formulated to avoid the negative effects 
which may result from the activities of one agency on other participating
44 William J. Durch, ‘Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons o f the 1990s’ in William J. 
Durch, ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars o f the 1990s, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p. 6.
45 Michael Wesley, Casualties o f  the New World Order, Causes o f  Failure o f UN Missions to 
Civil Wars, Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1997, p. 28.
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bodies and their plans, especially with respect to frequent overlap of military 
and civilian roles.46
However, the United Nations as an organisation consisting of various 
agencies operating in a context of a complex organisational system has its 
internal problems of coordination. Therefore, the UN is ill-prepared for the role 
of coordinating and harmonising the different aspects of multidimensional 
operations. Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General, stated that ‘As 
for the UN system, there are well-known jealousies and competition between 
its programmes, funds and agencies, each of which has its own inter­
governmental policy-making body, its own mandate, its own sources of 
funding and its own chain of command.’47 In his view, the only entity capable 
of designating a cooperative approach in multidimensional operations is the 
office of the Secretary-General, but all other UN bodies must provide support 
for the mission 48
The use of force represents the most controversial component of a 
multidimensional operation,49 one which usually raises disagreement between 
different functioning agencies. This reflects the paradox posed by the 
simultaneous need to pursue civilian missions in an unprovocative 
environment, and the necessity to protect these missions against possible
46 Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham and Oxford, 1999, pp. 7 -  30.
47 Marrack Goulding, ‘The United Nations and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War’ 
African Affairs, vol. 98, no. 391, April 1999, p. 166.
48 Ibid.
49 Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace, Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fall, United 
States Institute o f Peace Press, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 226.
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monopolisation and vandalism. The imposition of mandatory economic 
sanctions may also find opposition from aid agencies working to alleviate the 
suffering of civilians within the multidimensional operation.
Peace enforcement is assumed to achieve compliance with the strategic 
goals of the international community such as depriving a target of chemical and 
mass destruction weapons or to compel an aggressor to abandon threatening 
policies. This is what Lawrence Freedman called ‘strategic coercion’.50 The 
aim to apply justice towards aggressors and perpetrators of ethnic attacks has 
also emerged as UN policy following peace enforcement actions. This affects 
the way peace enforcement actions end. In this respect the chapter refers to the 
lessons learned from Churchill’s attitude toward Germany after World War I. 
Churchill’s proclamation, after the defeat of Germany in the war and the 
establishment of the League of Nations, to remove ‘the just grievances of the 
vanquished’ was soon regretted by the allies when Germany re-consolidated its 
power and started to threaten Europe once again.51 During the 1990s this lesson 
seems to have been learned by the great powers, especially Western countries; 
as they have tended to persevere in pressure on target states and in making 
those responsible for serious armed attacks accountable to the law of war. This 
is to be achieved through the continuous imposition of sanctions, obliging 
aggressors to compensate their victims for damages they inflicted upon them,
50 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’ in Lawrence Freedman, ed. Strategic Coercion, 
Cocepts and Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998, pp. 1 5 - 3 6 .
51 Harold Macmillan, Winds o f  Change, 1914 -1 9 3 9 , Macmillan, London, 1966, p. 389.
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and possibly making those responsible face indictment and trial before war 
crimes tribunals.
3- Definition
UN documents do not provide a definition of peace enforcement and it was 
only defined in contrast to peacekeeping. The Blue Helmets defines 
peacekeeping as
an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement 
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore 
international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations 
are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they 
involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not 
by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the ‘enforcement action’ of 
the United Nations under Article 42.52
This definition makes a distinction between peacekeeping operations and 
enforcement actions. It refers to the non-forcible nature of peacekeeping which 
stipulate the consent of concerned parties and their co-operation, contrasted to 
the enforcement powers under Article 42 which require no consent and operate 
on mandatory bases.
The American Bar Association defines peace enforcement as follows
52 The Blue Helmets, A Review o f United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations, New York, 
1990, pp. 4 - 5 .
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‘“Peace enforcement” forces refers to troops used to enforce or restore, 
sometimes without consent of the parties, observance of peace or cease-fire 
agreement; it also refers to troops used to deter or to stop aggression.’ This 
definition envisages situations where peace enforcement could be mobilised 
with consent of the target. It acknowledges a new fact, that an explicit peace 
enforcement action could be taken with the consent of one party to the conflict 
or of more than one party. This can be contrasted with the Charter system for 
peace enforcement which does not stipulate consent for the deployment of 
peace enforcement forces. The definition also refers to the observance of a 
cease-fire as a major task for peace enforcement forces. Observance of peace 
and cease-fire agreements was originally known as the main task of 
peacekeeping operations. However, the UN Secretary-General contended that 
in some situations peace enforcement units will be required to foresee and 
implement the cease-fire agreements. Boutros Ghali stated that
Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the 
United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore 
and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the 
mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping 
force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilisation 
of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with 
their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member
53 American Bar Association, op. cit. note 5, p. 45.
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States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have 
volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily 
armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive 
preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and 
operation of such forces would be under the authorisation of the 
Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be 
under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace- 
enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under 
Article 40 of the Charter.54
Ghali described these forces as more heavily armed compared with 
peacekeeping forces. They would be provisional measures and constitutionally 
based on Article 40 rather than Article 42 of Chapter VII. Ghali seemed to 
draw on Hammarskjold contention during the Congo crisis in 1960, that a large 
UN military operation could be mobilised by the Security Council under 
Article 40 with their control assigned to the Secretary-General.55 However, 
while Ghali calls the mobilisation of such military forces a peace enforcement 
operation, Hammarsjold insisted that such forces could not be categorised with 
peace enforcement, and they only represent impartial peacekeeping forces.56
Ghali stipulated that such peace enforcement units should be 
distinguished from forces constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of
54 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r Peace, United Nations, New York, 1992.
55 UN Documents S/P.V. 887th meeting, 20 July 1960, p. 17.
56 Security Council Official Records, 15th year, 920th meeting, paragraph 73.
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aggression ‘or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to 
keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.’ 
Ghali’s discussion of peace enforcement reflects the comprehensive approach 
undertaken by An Agenda for Peace to the UN peace operations. A UN envoy, 
Olara Otunnu, provided the following definition
Enforcement action may be defined as a forcible collective military 
operation, authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, for the purpose of restoring compliance with international 
norms following a major breach of the peace or an act of aggression. 
Although it involves war fighting, enforcement action should be viewed 
and conducted in a different way from a war waged primarily to achieve
cn
national objectives.
Otunnu distinguishes between an enforcement action under Chapter VII and 
war-fighting. He referred to one clear difference related to the objectives of the 
military action which are assumed to satisfy the interests of the international 
community and not necessarily the national interests of any country. However, 
in practice, it is difficult to verify the conduct of the military operation and to 
try to keep it within the limitations of the defined objectives. A UN official,
57 Olara A. Otunnu, ‘The Peace-and-Security Agenda of the United Nations: From Crossroads 
into the New Century’ in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping fo r  the New Century, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1998, p. 
305.
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Yasushi Akashi considered enforcement actions as ‘practically 
indistinguishable from war-fighting.’ On the other hand, Michael Howard drew 
an important distinction between war and peace enforcement in practice. He 
indicated the significance of the allies decision to end the Gulf war in 1991 at a 
specific point, rather than to enter Baghdad and ‘to install US General Norman
C O
Schwarzkopf as an imperial pro-consul’ in Iraq.
So far, these attempts adopt a narrow definition of peace enforcement 
within the context of military operations. Although decisions by the Security 
Council to undertake military action represent the ultimate resort to resolve the 
conflict, the Charter system includes other mandatory measures to be employed 
by the Council as necessary. For John Ruggie
Enforcement is easy to grasp, and it was the use of force that the UN’s 
architects envisaged. A specific act of aggression, or more general set of 
hostile actions, are collectively identified as a threat to international 
peace and security and the aggressor state is subjected to an array of 
sanctions until its violation is reversed. Ultimately, enforcement can 
involve flat-out war-fighting - the “all necessary means” of Resolution 
678, authorising what became Operation Desert Storm.59
58 Michael Howard, ‘When Are Wars Decisive?’ Survival, vol. 41, no. 1, Spring 1999, p. 134 
- 1 3 5 .
59 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International 
Institutionalisation, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p. 244.
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Ruggie’s definition explores the wide raging enforcement measures entailed in 
Chapter VII and their implementation according to the gravity of the situation. 
Lincoln Bloomfield provided another attempt to define peace enforcement as 
an escalating system for combating aggression and threat to international 
peace. ‘Enforcement means applying sanctions (the first steps under UN 
Chapter 7) and ultimately using force if necessary to punish aggressors and 
other transgressors of the community’s ground rules.’60
This study employs a broad definition of peace enforcement, one that includes 
all the binding and enforceable measures under Chapter VII as they constitute 
an integral UN system for peace enforcement. Many definitions of peace 
enforcement do not mention diplomatic and economic sanctions. They 
concentrate on distinguishing military operations under Chapter VII from other 
peace operations by explaining the mandatory and enforcement nature of peace 
enforcement operations which other operations lack. Thomas Weiss, for 
example, defined economic sanctions as ‘non-forcible enforcement action’. 
Claude, like Bloomfield and Ruggie, has described the UN peace enforcement 
system as a comprehensive system which include ‘collective measures, ranging 
from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to 
enforce the peace.’61 This is the approach followed here. In this study,
60 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton, Managing International Conflict, From Theory 
To Policy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 87.
61 For Michael Akehurst the enforcement measures included in Chapter VII are two pronged. 
He states that ‘Enforcement action stricto sensu (that is, action to deal with a threat to the 
peace, breach o f the peace, or act o f aggression) can take two forms; Article 41 provides for 
non-military enforcement action and Article 42 provides for military enforcement action.’
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therefore, peace enforcement refers to the employment by the Security Council 
of mandatory enforceable collective measures under Chapter VII including 
diplomatic and economic sanctions, air and maritime blockade, arms embargo, 
and the use of force. The consent of any party to the conflict would help the 
operation but it is not a prerequisite for military deployment.
4- The UN Charter system
The principle of peace enforcement is indicated in the first Article of the UN 
Charter. Article 1 provides for the maintenance of international peace and 
security and obligates member states to take ‘effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,’
The drafters of the UN Charter were keen to state their main objective 
clearly and to do so early in the Charter. They wanted to empower the 
organisation with effective instruments which its predecessor the League of 
Nations lacked: this eventually proved to be a terminal defect. The system of 
peace enforcement draws on the principle of non-use of force in interstate 
relations. Article 2(4) asks all member states to refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. 
Furthermore, any use of force inconsistent with the principles of the United 
Nations is prohibited and outlawed. Only the International Organisation is
Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, George Allen and Unwin, 
London, 4th edition 1982, p. 183.
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conferred upon to utilise the use or threat of force in order to uphold the
62norms and principles of the Charter.
Even the Organisation was impeded from intervening in matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states, a determination widely 
considered as a derivation from the Westphalian norm of sovereignty. 
However, Article 2(7), which include the principle of sovereignty, made one 
exception to the absolute sovereignty of member states, that is when the 
Security Council undertakes measures under Chapter VII.
The primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security is determined by Article 24. In carrying 
out this responsibility, members of the Security Council act on behalf of all 
member states and not only on behalf of their national governments. This 
principle is, however, contradicted in theory by the granting of special 
privileges to permanent members, such as the right of veto, often used to 
protect their particular interests, and is blurred in the practice by 
compromises between great powers, and with non-permanent members, to 
preserve limited national interests. Therefore, the system may allow for the 
authorisation of an action at the behest of a permanent member while such an 
action may not necessarily reflect the interests of the majority of member 
states in the UN as a whole.
However, all member states are obliged under Article 25 to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council. There is disagreement
62 Hedley Bull, op. cit. note 30.
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between scholars on what constitutes a binding measure and whether peaceful 
settlement measures under Chapter VI are recommendatory or could also be 
binding on member states. Approaches to the issue of recommendatory and 
binding nature of Security Council decisions range from a broad presumption, 
that every Security Council decision is binding, to a limited and prevailing 
view, that only enforcement measures under Chapter VII are mandatory.
It might be presumed that, before the Security Council starts to 
consider enforcement measures under Chapter VII, it should exhaust the 
procedures of peaceful settlement. Although this seems logical, in cases of 
clear aggression the Council may from the outset start to employ severe 
economic and military measures against the aggressor. In fact the pacific 
measures of settlement identified by Chapter VI are concerned with situations 
which are ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security’ but, when an action has already proved to pose a threat to 
international peace, the Council may authorise immediate enforcement 
measures, as was the case in Korea 1950 and in Kuwait 1990. However, 
peaceful attempts may resume at some point during the conflict 
notwithstanding the undertaking of enforcement measures by the Council.
Under Article 39 of Chapter VII the Security Council is empowered to 
determine whether a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression has taken place. Many scholars have observed that once such a
63 N. D. White, Keeping the peace, The United Nations and the maintenance o f  international 
peace and security, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1993, pp. 61 
66, 83 -  89.
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determination is made, the way is open, at least on the legal level, for the 
Security Council to take enforcement measures against the target. But, the 
determination of a threat to the peace alone does not provide enough ground 
for an automatic coercive response in the absence of further authorisation by 
the Security Council. Therefore, actions by member states cannot be justified 
on the ground that the Council has determined the occurrence of a threat to 
the peace as it was the case in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. It is also important 
that the Council may not necessarily follow such a determination with 
enforcement measures as in the situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo after 1997 and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea after 1998.
The Security Council may take provisional measures under Article 40 
‘as it deems necessary and desirable’ to prevent a situation from becoming 
further aggravated and to call upon parties to the conflict to comply with such 
measures. Acting under Article 41 the Security Council can employ 
mandatory economic sanctions, interruption of means of communications and 
the severance of diplomatic relations. The assumption is that the Council has 
issued decisions to resolve the conflict, but that decisions are not complied 
with by one party or more to the conflict and that, therefore, sanctions were 
employed to bring about compliance with these provisions.
If measures under Article 41 prove to be inadequate or 
incommensurate with the gravity of the situation, the Council may take a 
military action ‘by air, see, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.’ Articles 43 to 49 describe the
mechanisms for the undertaking of the United Nations military action. The 
action shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of 
them, as the Security Council may decide. All member states shall provide 
national military contingents and render necessary assistance and facilities as 
may be required by the Council and in accordance with special agreements to 
be reached by the Council and member states. These agreements shall be 
initiated by the Council which shall decide on the numbers and types of 
forces, the location of forces and their degree of readiness.
Article 47 provides for the establishment of a Military Staff 
Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members. 
The Committee should advice and assist the Council on the military 
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security. It 
should be responsible under the Security Council from the command and 
control of armed forces and their strategic direction.
Until the Security Council has taken necessary measures, member 
states retain the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under 
Article 51. Such actions should be immediately reported to the Council and 
they must not affect the Council’s authority and responsibility to take at any 
time enforcement measures in order to restore international peace and 
security.
The UN peace enforcement system differed from earlier envisaged 
systems of collective security by adopting a unique method of voting which 
give each of the five permanent members the right to nullify substantial
45
decisions and thereby block Security Council action. The Charter system does 
not agree with majority voting in the Security Council and great powers are 
not considered as equal to small countries in this respect. This was seen as a 
realistic departure from the Covenant’s provisions which give permanent 
membership for great powers but deny them the right to veto any decision. 
The adoption of the veto was considered as a practical necessity to include all 
great powers in the membership of the organisation. The underlying 
assumption was that the veto would help to avoid major confrontations 
between big powers by abandoning the authorisation of a military action 
against the will of a permanent member. However, in effect, this put great 
powers beyond the reach of Chapter VII enforcement measures and, 
therefore, threatened the UN’s ability to become a centralised enforcement 
agency. Furthermore, the use of the veto encouraged the recourse by vetoed 
states or states which anticipated a veto to decentralised, independent actions 
in the form of alliances of power or self-defence.64
5- Viability of Peace enforcement
Perspectives of optimism and pessimism 1982 - 1999
There is plenty of discussion on the viability of the system of collective 
security. Opponents and proponents have provided opposing arguments for and 
against the idea of collective security. In this introductory part the thesis does
64 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle For Power and Peace, Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1978, 5th edition, pp. 310 -  311.
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not intend to review classical discussions on this issue. It rather attempts to 
address the issue of the viability of peace enforcement through the illustration 
of three different perspectives prevailed in three different periods between 1984 
- 1999. The first existed from 1982 to 1989 and represented a pessimistic view, 
of the Cold War’s impact on the workability of the UN system for peace 
enforcement. The second one endured between 1990 and 1993 and reflected the 
most optimistic evaluation of UN practice in the area of peace enforcement. 
From 1994 to the end of the century a third pessimistic view about the viability 
of peace enforcement prevailed. Each of these notions requires examinations.
The first perspective
During the last years of the Cold War most scholars determined that the UN 
peace enforcement regime was likely to remain dormant. Pessimism was also 
evident during the Cold War years before 1982, but the uniqueness of the 
period between 1982 and 1989 is that pessimism continued despite the 
successes achieved by the United Nations in the area of peace maintenance 
during these years which had been marked by the awarding of the Noble Peace 
Prize to the UN Secretary-General. This notion was almost prevalent until the 
Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union decided to dissolve itself. Brian 
Urquhart, a former UN Under Secretary-General, observed in the mid 1980s 
that to wait for the UN collective security system to work was like attempting
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to get the souls of Shakespeare’s Henry IV to respond.65 He explained the 
political atmosphere in the world as follows
I hope very much that we are not going through the process that I grew 
up with in the 1930s. The laziness, the lack of persistence, the cynicism, 
the easy escape-goating that destroyed the League are all fatal 
tendencies. ... I wonder if we are not drifting into such disintegration 
now, in regard to the United Nations. If we are doing that, we run a very 
considerable risk of descending eventually into World War III, in a time 
of nuclear weaponry. After that - it seems likely that the experience will 
be fairly terminal - there will not be too many people around to set up a 
third world organisation.66
Despite some relative successes achieved by the United Nations late in the 
1980s, especially in Namibia, it was not expected that the international 
situation would allow for the reactivation of the provisions of Chapter VII. 
Urquhart’s view was shared by many other scholars. Oscar Schachter, for 
instance, found himself ‘bound to conclude’ that the collective security system 
of the UN Charter had been largely replaced by the fragmented actions of
65 Brian Urquhart, ‘The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping’ 
in Alan K. Henrikson, ed. Negotiating World Order, the Artisanship and Architecture o f  
Global Diplomacy, Scholarly Resources, Delaware, 1986, p. 59.
66 Ibid. p. 60.
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alliances. Nigel White stated in 1990 that ‘As we have seen, mandatory 
military action remains on paper only, so the ultimate weapon is mandatory 
economic action under Article 41 of the Charter (ignoring the recommendation 
of military measures as in Korea -  a situation which is unlikely to occur
£C%
again)’. One of the rare exceptions to this dominant conviction is Alan 
James’s observation in 1988 that ‘one should not assume that circumstances 
will never arise in which an appropriate coalition of members might want to act 
in accordance with Chapter VII.’69
International relations’ scholars and statesmen could not foresee the 
dramatic changes which took place in the world by the end of the 1980s and 
marked the end of the Cold War. As the functioning of the United Nations is 
dependent on co-operation of member states, the Charter system for peace 
enforcement was not expected to evolve. On the contrary, a fear of further 
disagreement and confrontation between the Superpowers in the absence of an 
effective International Organisation was anticipated to bring horrors and 
destruction beyond the scope of havoc caused by World War II.
67 Oscar Schachter, ‘The role o f International Law in Maintaining Peace’ in W. Scott 
Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds. Approaches to Peace, An Intellectual Map, United 
States Institute o f Peace, Washington, D.C. 1991, p. 113.
68 N. D. White, The United Nations and the maintenance o f  international p ea ce  and  
security, Manchester University Press, Manchester and N ew  York, 1990. P. 232
69 Alan M. James, ‘Unit Veto Dominance in United Nations Peace-Keeping’ in Lawrence S. 
Finkelstein, ed. Politics in the United Nations System, Duke University Press, Durham and 
London, 1988, p. 79.
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The second perspective
Between 1989 and 1991 a new optimism emerged. The agreement between the 
permanent members of the Security Council on more than 15 resolutions under 
Chapter VII in one year represented a remarkable change in the practice of the 
Council. In the aftermath of the Gulf war the leaders of the ‘Group of Seven’ 
(G7) declared at their summit in London on 16 July 1991 that
We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfil 
completely the promise and the vision of its founders. A revitalised 
United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international 
order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more effective 
in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all 
and to deter aggression. We will make preventive diplomacy a top 
priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential 
aggressors the consequences of their actions. The UN’s role in 
peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to support this 
strongly.70
George Bush proclaimed the birth of a New World Order and told the Congress 
in September 1990 that a new international system of justice and order is 
emerging. Bush’s proclamation was supported by the action to rebel the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the establishment of Operation Provide Hope to protect
70 Financial Times, 17 July 1991, page 4.
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the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Bush maintained this commitment until the end of 
his presidency and during his last few days in the White House he ordered 
American forces into Somalia under the UN mandate, in the largest peace 
operation in Africa since the Congo 1960. On the part of the Untied Nations the 
optimism of world political leaders was reiterated in Boutros Ghali’s An 
Agenda for Peace in January 1992:
In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and 
small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great 
objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining 
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights ... 
This opportunity must not be squandered. The Organisation must never
71again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.
An Agenda for Peace contained an ambitious plan for peace enforcement, 
anticipating the revival of Article 43, and an active role for the Military Staff 
Committee in peace enforcement operations.
On the scholarly level, many writers expected the beginning of a new 
era. Ernst Haas stated that ‘The waning of the Cold War seems to have brought 
with it a rebirth of collective security advocated and designed in 1945 by the 
victors in the World War II.’72 Schachter himself asserted in 1991 that ‘UN
71 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, op. cit. note 54.
72 Ernst B. Haas, ‘Collective conflict management’ in Friedrich Kratochwil Edward D. 
International Organisations, A reader, Mansfield Harper College Publishers, 1994, p. 237.
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enforcement action against an aggressor is presently the centre of world 
attention.’ Adam Roberts made a similar point in 1993 saying that ‘The issue 
of organising enforcement actions is central to almost every discussion on the 
United Nations’ future role.’74 Some writers borrowed Thomas Paine’s words 
in 1775 to describe the early days of the post-Cold War: ‘We have it in our 
power to begin the world all over again. A situation similar to the present hath 
not appeared since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is 
at hand.’75
However, scepticism did not cease during this period. Some scholars 
used Voltaire’s description of the Holy Roman Empire as neither Holly nor 
Roman nor empire analogously to describe the New World Order. Many 
continued to question the substance of these incidents as solid precedents or as 
providing an indication of a shift towards an effective role for the Security 
Council in the area of peace enforcement. In this sense, the identification of the 
Gulf crisis as a ‘defining moment’ or a ‘watershed in the history of the UN’ 
was rejected and doubts were raised about the endurance of agreement in the 
Security Council.
73 Oscar Schachter, ‘Authorised Uses o f Force by the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations’ in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, eds. Law and force in the new 
international order, Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford, 1991, p. 66.
74 Adam Roberts, op.cit. note 29, p. 15.
75 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, p. 120.
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The third perspective
Unsuccessful experiences encountered by the UN forces in some parts 
of the world in the years after the Gulf war and the rhetoric of statesmen, 
specially of the US Administration, in favour of national interests were 
interpreted as a retreat from the renewed commitment to a collective security 
system. A good example of this tendency is the Clinton Administration’s 
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, signed by the President in 
May 1994:
We would place our national interests and these of our friends 
uppermost. The US will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in 
coalition when our most significant interests and these of our friends are 
at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in
7proper perspectives among the instruments of US foreign policy.
Nevertheless, during the last eight years a tendency to mobilise Chapter VII in 
international conflicts as well as civil wars is evident. During the first three 
months of 1998 the Security Council passed 13 resolutions, eight of them 
adopted under Chapter VII. A balanced account of the UN record in the area of 
peace enforcement is provided by John Ruggie in 1998:
76 ‘The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operation’ Bureau of  
International Organisational Affairs, U.S. Department o f States, Publication No. 10161, 4 
May 1994. Also issued as: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, ‘Reforming Multilateral 
Peace Operations’ May 1994.
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The end of the cold war created new possibilities for UN peace 
operations, but they were not nearly as unproblematic or unlimited as 
the early post-cold war euphoria anticipated. After Somalia and Bosnia 
many observers question if any opportunity at all remains, but now the 
sense of limits seems exaggerated. The United Nations is severely 
constrained by systemic factors, to be sure. But it remains unclear 
whether these operations were inherently destined to be defeated by 
such constraints, because governments and the UN Secretariat also 
poorly understood and managed more volitional aspects of operations,
77over which they have greater control.
Ruggie believes that there are ‘areas in which some improvement is possible.’ 
These three perspectives are reflections of different political atmospheres that 
prevailed during the designated three periods. Although there are no clear 
dividing lines between these periods, the first was generally dictated by the 
limitations of the Cold War before 1990, the second notion stemmed from the 
extensive UN practice in the area of peace maintenance during the immediate 
years of the post-Cold War period, and the third reflects uncertainty about the 
future of peace enforcement. The abstracting of three different perspectives in 
this introduction illuminates the different periods through which the Security 
Council has operated and helps in shaping the historical framework for the 
development of peace enforcement.
77 John Gerard Ruggie, op. cit. note 53, p. 240.
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Chapter 3
The role of the Security Council in the crisis of
Kuwait
The purpose of this chapter is to study the application of peace enforcement 
measures adopted by the Security Council during the Kuwait crisis 1990 -  
1991. This will be done by systematic analysis of the United Nations response 
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.1 The chapter will assess the economic, 
political, and legal effects of the UN response to the crisis.
Kuwait is chosen to serve as a central case in this study because it 
represents the best case for the systematic study of the UN peace enforcement 
measures. In its initial reaction to the invasion, the Security Council determined 
the existence of a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of 
the Charter and called on Kuwait and Iraq to settle their dispute through 
peaceful negotiations pursuant to the provisional measures of Article 40. A few 
days later the Council employed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions 
against Iraq and the occupied territory of Kuwait under Article 41. In 
November 1990, the Council authorised the use of all necessary means to 
reverse the invasion in accordance with the provisions of Article 42.
In the case of Korea 1950, the Council did not employ mandatory 
sanctions against North Korea and the issue was permanently removed from the 
agenda of the Council in January 1951. Thus, Korea as the first attempt by the
1 For this purpose the chapter will concentrate, in the study of economic sanctions against 
Iraq, on the regime of sanctions imposed before the outbreak o f the Gulf war in January 1991.
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Security Council to mobilise enforcement measures, does not allow for the 
systematic study of the UN Charter system for peace enforcement as Kuwait 
does. However, a comparison between aspects of peace enforcement in Korea 
and Kuwait will be maintained in this chapter.
The chapter will discuss the situation in the UN during the time of the 
invasion, the Security Council’s initial response, the application of economic 
sanctions, and the authorisation of the use of force against Iraq. To affirm the 
assertion that the case of Kuwait is unique and to illuminate its significance for 
peace enforcement, the chapter will discuss special issues related to the use of 
force against Iraq including the relation with the host state, the concept of ‘all 
necessary means’, and the UN ultimatum. The chapter will also discuss the 
issue of ‘how sanctions end’ in order to evaluate the Security Council 
procedure and mechanism for the suspension and termination of sanctions.
1- The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 could be viewed in a historical 
context, as a culmination of Iraqi claims to Kuwait’s territory since the Anglo- 
Ottoman Agreement in 1913. Iraqi leaders made several attempts to annex 
Kuwaiti territories in 1933, 1961, and 1973.2 While Baghdad claims that 
Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq, the territorial dispute has mainly concentrated 
on the two Islands of Warba and Bubyan.
2 Amatzia Baram, ‘The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad’ in Amatizia 
Baram and Barry Rubin, Iraq’s Road to War, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 6.
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Although these historical claims contributed to the developments of 
the summer of 1990, the invasion was a direct result of the political and 
economic circumstances following the end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Iraq and 
the Gulf states interpreted their partnership in the war against Iran differently; 
while Iraq believed that it had defended the security of the Gulf states, these 
states claimed they had provided unprecedented support for Iraq’s war 
machinery. Between 1988 and 1990, Iraq demanded specific economic and 
territorial concessions from Kuwait. Iraq specifically accused Kuwait of using 
Iraqi oil reserves from the Rumayla oil field, which straddles the Iraq-Kuwait 
border, and demanded reimbursement. The UN Secretary-General Perez de 
Cuellar concluded from his two meetings with Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, in Amman on 31 August 1990 and Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on 
12 January 1991 that the immediate reason for the invasion ‘was the Iraqi anger 
over Kuwait’s oil pricing policy.’
In the middle of July 1990, Iraq started the build-up of its forces on 
the border with Kuwait. During the two weeks before the invasion, some Arab 
states mounted intense diplomatic efforts in an attempt to avert the Iraqi threat. 
Political leaders ruled out the possibility of an Iraqi military attack against 
Kuwait. President Husni Mubarak met with Tariq Aziz, on 22 July 1990 and a 
few days later he discussed the situation with Saddam Hussein. One week 
before the invasion Mubarak confirmed that Iraq had agreed to seek a peaceful
3 Javier Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage fo r Peace, A Secretary-General's Memoir, St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 1997, p. 242.
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settlement of its differences with Kuwait and the UAE.4 A few days before the 
invasion Kuwait cancelled a state of alert that it had declared earlier as a 
consequence of the dispute with Iraq, and a Kuwait source said: ‘It was all a 
summer cloud that has been blown away.’5 A Bush Administration official said 
on 20 July: ‘Our assessment is that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to take military 
action in the Gulf, at least in the short term.’6 Bush himself admitted in 1998 
that until 2 August 1990 his Administration ‘could not confirm anything more 
definitive about Iraqi intentions than the movements themselves.’
The confusing signals which came from Iraq, Kuwait, and other 
concerned parties during the course of diplomatic efforts before the invasion, 
did not help to clarify Iraqi intentions and, therefore, made it difficult for the 
world at large to predict the Iraqi action. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces 
crossed the border with Kuwait, occupying the territory of the neighbouring 
state and subjugating the whole country. The invasion posed a real challenge to 
the international community and particularly to its leading international 
organisation, the United Nations, which had been created mainly to maintain 
international peace and security by deterring armed attacks against the political 
and territorial integrity of any state and combating acts of aggression.
4 International Herald Tribune, 26 July 1990.
5 International Herald Tribune, 2 1 - 2 2  July 1990; Joseph Kostiner, ‘Kuwait: Confusing 
Friend and Foe’ in Baram and Rubin, op. cit. note 2, pp. 112-113 .
6 International Herald Tribune, Ibid.
7 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, Vintage Books, New York, 1999, 
p. 302.
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2- Situation in the UN
At the time of the invasion of Kuwait the United Nations had been encouraged 
by the successes it had achieved during its recent practice in the areas of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking. In Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, and the Iran 
- Iraq war, the United Nations had succeeded in helping to bring about peaceful 
settlements, and most of the provisions of the resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly and the Security Council were brought into effect. Although 
the deployment of UN operations in these four cases have been discussed in 
some recent writings, the intention was always to measure their effectiveness 
against their mandates and functions compared with other peacekeeping
o
operations. However, they were distinguished from other traditional 
peacekeeping operations and referred to by some scholars as United Nations 
breakthroughs.9 In this chapter, the four cases will be discussed from a different 
perspective to see the influence they had on the consideration of aspects of 
peace maintenance by the Security Council during the Kuwait crisis.
Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the Security 
Council was only able to call an emergency session of the General Assembly to 
consider the situation.10 The Council’s early attempt to adopt a resolution
8 Examples o f this analysis are Alan James, Peacekeeping in international politics, Macmillan 
and the ESS, London, 1990; Nigel White, The United Nations and the maintenance o f  
international peace and security, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990.
9 G. R. Berridge, Return to the UN, UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, Macmillan,
London, 1991, pp. 43 -  102.
10 Security Council resolution 462,9  January 1980.
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deploring the USSR armed intervention and demanding the withdrawal of the 
foreign troops from Afghanistan was blocked by a Soviet negative vote.11
During Gorbachev’s first years in power the Soviet Union showed less
19interest in maintaining its big military presence in Afghanistan, but the 
situation in Kabul remained unchanged. The breakthrough was later achieved 
in Geneva when the UN Under Secretary-General Diego Cordovez with 
representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, and US announced the 
conclusion of the Geneva Accords on 14 April 1988. However, the Soviet 
decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was crucial for bringing about the 
peaceful settlement. The withdrawal decision represented a clear example of 
Soviet intent to reform its foreign policy, contributing significantly to the 
atmospheres of co-operation in the UN. Vladimir Petrovisky, Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister, admitted that
bearing in mind the fact that our action was condemned by over one 
hundred members of the United Nations we came to realise eventually 
that we had set ourselves against the international community, violated
11 Security Council draft resolution, (S/13729) 7 January 1980.
12 Fred Halliday traced changes in Soviet policy towards Afghanistan since the arrival of 
Gorbachev in 1985. He mentioned several statements by Gorbachev which provided clear 
signals o f Soviet’s determination to withdraw from Afghanistan, despite noticeable opposition 
to the new policy in Moscow and Kabul. Fred Halliday, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy Making and 
the Afghan War: from “ Second Mongolia” to “ Bleeding Wound” Review o f International 
Studies, (forthcoming issue).
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rules of conduct and defied man’s universal interests. As a result we
1 ^have withdrawn our troops from Afghanistan,
Apart from determining the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which 
lasted for nine years, the agreement asked the UN to play a continuing role in 
monitoring the implementation of the Accords. Furthermore the Accords 
recommended in their supplementary Memorandum of Understanding the 
deployment of a UN staff to support the representative of the Secretary-General 
in his good offices mission. It took the Security Council about six months to 
approve the creation of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) when it adopted on 31 October 1988 
resolution 622 confirming its agreement to the measures envisaged by the 
Secretary-General including the arrangement for the temporary dispatch of fifty 
military UN officers to verify the parties’ compliance with the provisions of the 
agreement.
Iran-Iraq war. On 12 July 1982 the Security Council adopted a resolution 
pertaining to the war between Iran and Iraq calling for an immediate end to all 
military operations and a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognised 
boundaries. It decided to send a team of United Nations observers to verify and 
supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal.14 Resolutions 522, 582, and 588
13 Disarmament and Multilateralism, First Committee o f the 44th General Assembly o f the 
United Nations, 26 October 1989, p. 6.
14 Security Council resolution 514.
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reaffirmed, inter alia, the call for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. In 
1987, however, the Council adopted resolution 598 under Chapter VII of the 
Charter determining the existence of a threat to the peace and utilising 
measures provided for in Article 40. Although the provisions of resolution 598 
were constantly violated by both parties for 12 months, there were no 
enforcement measures taken until the two parties informed the Secretary- 
General in July 1988 of their formal acceptance of resolution 598. Despite the 
invoking of Chapter VII, the conduct of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military 
Observer Group (UNIIMOG) on the ground did not suggest any feature 
inconsistent with or exceeding the traditional duties of peacekeeping 
operations.
Angola. In a letter to the Security Council on 5 May 1978 Angola requested the 
adoption of measures to repulse the South African attacks against its territorial 
integrity. The letter was a response to the invasion of Angola by South African 
regular forces utilising the international territory of Namibia as a springboard 
for the invasion. One day after the receipt of the letter the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 428 in which, inter alia, it condemned South 
Africa’s aggression against the People’s Republic of Angola and demanded 
that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Angola. In resolution 566 (1985) the Security Council 
rejected ‘South Africa’s insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to 
irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with resolution 435 (1978)’.
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However, during the process of settlement, resolution 435 was constantly 
referred to as a point of departure for the joint peaceful negotiations which 
might bring peace and independence simultaneously to Angola and Namibia. In 
the course of mediation between the concerned parties, the US envoy Dr. 
Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, accepted to 
negotiate agreements pertaining to both situations in Namibia and Angola. On 
22 December 1988 two substantial agreements were signed at the Headquarters 
of the United Nations by the Foreign Ministers of Cuba, Angola, and South 
Africa. The Bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba came into effect on 
1 April 1989 when 3,000 Cuban troops started to move northwards as the first 
phase of the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban forces from Angola. The United 
Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was created five days before 
the signature of the two agreements at the request of Cuba and Angola to verify 
compliance with the bilateral agreement.15
Namibia. Namibia was one of the most complex situations the international 
community had ever dealt with, through the League of Nations and then the 
United Nations. It had remained on the United Nations agenda since 1946. In 
1966 the General Assembly decided to put the territory under the protection of 
the UN, terminating South Africa’s mandate to administer the region. A 
prolonged process to secure peace and freedom for the people of Namibia and 
to effectuate calls for the independence of their territory had eventually
15 Security Council resolution 626,20 December 1988.
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culminated in the signature of the Brazzaville Protocol by Cuba, Angola, and 
South Africa. The Protocol included the parties’ agreement to start on 1 April 
1989 the implementation of resolution 435, which stressed the ‘early 
independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and 
control of the United Nations.’ The creation of the United Nations Transition 
Assistant Group (UNTAG) was authorised by resolution 435 on 29 September 
1978, in order to assist the Secretary-General’s Representative to carry out the 
duties conferred upon him by the Security Council.16
Conclusion. In the four cases of Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Angola, and Namibia 
the United Nations achieved tangible successes through the utilisation of its 
Good Offices, peacekeeping operations, and even the explicit adoption of 
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, the Security Council did 
not take any enforcement action to resolve these conflicts. The four cases posed 
a real test to the ability of the United Nations to maintain international peace 
and security as they constituted some of the most serious situations that ever 
faced the UN. Yet, changes in world politics and particularly the declaration of 
new Soviet foreign policies by Mikhail Gorbachev played a crucial role in the 
bringing about of some peaceful settlements. In the case of Afghanistan, the 
willingness of the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces enabled the process of 
peaceful settlement and moved the problem of Afghanistan to the stage of what
16 The Blue Helmets, A Review o f  United Nations Peace-Keeping, United Nations, New York, 
1990, pp. 341 -388.
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1 7  —— •Zartman calls ‘ripe conflict’. The UN provided useful supervision and support 
for the peaceful negotiations initiated by the United States and the Soviet 
Union. However, the agreement between the two superpowers in the Security 
Council has relatively enhanced the Council’s ability to act.
For the purpose of this study, it is suggested here that the successes 
achieved by the UN in a short period before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, had 
significantly influenced the practice of the United Nations and, particularly, the 
Security Council during the Kuwait crisis.
3- The initial reaction of the Security Council
On 2 August 1990 Iraqi forces moved towards the southern border of Iraq, 
rolling their tanks into Kuwait and occupying the whole country. 
Representatives of the five permanent members and other members of the 
Security Council received the news of the invasion a few hours later and 
immediately met for an informal session at the Headquarters of the United 
Nations in New York. Seven of the Council members agreed on a draft 
resolution condemning the invasion and demanding an unconditional 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Two hours later the Council met 
formally and unanimously adopted resolution 660. Yemen, who represented the 
Arab states in the Council, was the only member who did not vote for the 
resolution by absenting itself from the meeting. The adoption of resolution 660
17 I. William Zartman, Ripe fo r Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1985; Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and
66
was followed by unilateral and partial application of sanctions by several 
member states against Iraq. The first reaction, in terms of economic sanctions, 
came from the United States and United Kingdom when they announced a 
freezing of Kuwait’s assets on the day of the invasion. The United States took 
even further measures by freezing Iraqi assets and suspending purchases of 
Iraqi oil. Similar terms were approved by the meeting of the European 
Community Foreign Ministers on 5 August, including a freeze on both Iraqi 
and Kuwaiti assets and an oil embargo against Iraq. These measures were 
followed by a declaration of an arms embargo by the Soviet Union against Iraq 
and a joint call from the US and the Soviet Union calling for a worldwide ban 
on arms sales to Iraq.
In anticipation of Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia and before the 
adoption of any Security Council resolution authorising member states to 
deploy military forces, the United States and the United Kingdom announced 
on 3 August 1990 that they were sending naval vessels to the Gulf. They 
argued that their acts were pursuant to the inherent right of collective self- 
defence under Article 51 of the Charter.18 Between the 2nd and 25th of August, 
the Security Council adopted five resolutions, 660, 661, 662, 664, and 665. The 
five initial resolutions asserted the following important decisions:
i) Condemnation of Iraqi action.
regional Disputes, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990, p. 27.
18 James A. Baker, HI, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f  Diplomacy, Revolution, War 
and Peace, 1 9 8 9 - 1992, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1995, pp. 278 -  279.
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ii) A call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait.
iii) Imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iraq.
iv) Regarding the annexation of Kuwait as null and void.
v) Demanding that Iraq permit the departure of third country nationals and not 
to jeopardise their safety.
vi) Requesting member states to take necessary measures to ensure the 
effective implementation of economic sanctions.
Two significant preambles, affirming the determination of the Council 
to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and to invoke measures of Chapter VII, 
were frequently repeated in the texts of the first twelve resolutions adopted by 
the Security Council between August and November 1990. In the first 
preamble of resolution 660, the Council expressed its determination to bring 
the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end. The texts of the resolutions 
indicated that the Security Council set itself the task of restoring the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait. The resolve was 
also affirmed by the UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, as he revealed in 
1997 that: ‘There was never a question in my mind that this aggression must be 
repelled.’19 However, it was clear that the cost of reversing the Iraqi invasion 
through the enforcement machinery would be high. If the statement of the 
Kuwaiti ambassador to the UN in the first formal Security Council meeting 
after the invasion was accurate and that the Amir and his government were
19 Javier Perez de Cuellar, op. cit. note 3, p. 237.
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resisting from inside Kuwait, the role of the Council could have been to render 
assistance to the legitimate government in order to defend its country. But, 
unable to withstand the Iraqi forces, which rated as one of the largest in the 
world, the Amir and members of his family sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. In 
the case of Korea in 1950, the government of South Korea had remained in the 
country after the invasion and retained partial power with forces resisting the 
advance of North Korean troops. In accordance with those circumstances, the 
intention of the Security Council was ‘to assist the Republic of Korea in 
defending itself against the armed attack and to restore international peace and 
security in the area.’ The Council determination to bring the Iraqi invasion to 
an end in the face of the full occupation of Kuwait and the capabilities of Iraqi 
forces had ultimately led to the largest foreign military deployment in the 
history of the region. The determination of the Council was supported by 
willingness among its members to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All 
the measures imposed by the Security Council against Iraq were adopted under 
the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter with an unusual tendency among 
member states to utilise the enforcement measures in order to terminate the 
Iraqi aggression.
20 Security Council resolution 84, 7 July 1950.
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4- Sanctions against Iraq 
The sanctions policy
On 6 August 1990 the Security Council imposed mandatory economic 
sanctions against Iraq in response to its military invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 
661 represented, hitherto, the most comprehensive sanctions policy in the 
history of the United Nations. It was explicitly adopted under Article 41 of the 
Charter, following the determination by the Council that the invasion 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, under Article 39, and 
the provisional measures of resolution 660 pursuant to Article 40.
Article 41 of the UN Charter states that
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use 
of armed force are to be employed to give effects to its decisions and it 
may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include the complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of air, sea, rail, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.
The experiment of imposing mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq has 
significantly added to the record of UN practice in the area of peace 
enforcement. Before the case of Kuwait, member states rarely utilised the UN 
collective machinery to combat aggression through the application of economic
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sanctions against an aggressor. Even when the Security Council was able to 
authorise such an action during the Korean Crisis (1950) particularly when the 
USSR boycotted the Council meetings, no mandatory sanctions were
91imposed. If such measures were taken against North Korea the controversy 
over the constitutionality of the use of force could have been extended to the 
adoption and implementation of economic sanctions. However, at least none of 
the states of the Eastern camp were expected to impose sanctions against North 
Korea.
Sanctions against Iraq were comprehensive and strict including the 
severance of economic and diplomatic relations, the imposition of a weapon 
embargo, and the interruption of other communications. The Security Council 
adopted on 6 August 1990 resolution 661 which include the following 
provisions:
all states shall prevent a) the import into their territories of all 
commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported 
therefrom after the date of the present resolution; b) any activities by 
their nationals or in their territories which would promote or calculated 
to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products 
from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag 
vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating 
in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present
21 Texts o f the Security Council resolutions 82, 83, and 84 (1950).
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resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait 
for the purposes of such activities or dealings; c) the sale or supply by 
their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any 
commodities or products, including weapons or any other military 
equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not 
including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in 
humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs to any person or body in Iraq or 
Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried 
on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their 
nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 
promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products.
The resolution obliged member states to take further financial measures 
against Iraq by stating that
all states shall not make available to the government of Iraq or to any 
commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, 
any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent 
their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing 
from their territories or otherwise making available to that government 
or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from 
remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait,
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except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian 
purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
Furthermore, resolution 661 called upon all states to act strictly in accordance 
with the subsequent provisions. In order to closely monitor the effective 
implementation of sanctions a committee was formed to examine the reports 
submitted by the Secretary-General on the progress of sanctions application
and to seek information from states concerning the steps they have taken to
00secure the strict implementation of the adopted measures. Moreover, states 
were requested to protect the assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait and 
not to interpret any provision as a prohibition of assistance to the government 
of Kuwait. The provisions of resolution 661 could be summarised in four main 
parts: a ban on imports from Iraq and the then occupied territory of Kuwait; a 
prohibition of activities which may help Iraq to export goods; prevention of 
provision of supplies to Iraq including weapons and military equipment; and a 
call for all states to denounce making available to persons within Iraq or 
Kuwait any funds or financial resources.
The precise wording of this resolution indicates that members of the 
Security Council utilised their experience of earlier attempts at imposing
22 The same committee was later entrusted by the Security Council in resolution 669 of 24 
September 1990, with the task o f examining requests for assistance in accordance with Article 
50 of the United Nations Charter and making recommendations for appropriate action.
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sanctions on countries they had targeted collectively or unilaterally. This 
helped substantially in avoiding the violation of sanctions and in filling 
anticipated loopholes.
Use of naval forces to interdict shipments
The Security Council in adopting resolution 661 during the early days of the 
invasion was uncertain about ways of combating possible breaches of 
sanctions.24 From the defiant speeches of the Iraqi Authorities it was deemed
n r
likely that Iraq would not stop the movement of its ships and oil tankers. The 
US Administration and the government of the UK were convinced that they 
had the right under Article 51 to stop and interdict any suspected ships without
9/£further authorisation from the Security Council. However, despite isolated 
incidents in which US Naval forces attempted to stop Iraqi ships, the US was 
reluctant to pursue more unilateral interdictions because China, France, and the 
USSR opposed, at least at that stage, any action outside the framework of the
97UN. The US was willing to secure international legitimacy for its acts, but it 
was uncertain about the intentions of the USSR and China towards the adoption
23 Cases o f international economic sanctions until 1985 are covered in Gary Clyde Hufbauer 
and Jeffery J. Schott, Economic sanctions reconsidered, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1985.
24 The target tactics to evade sanctions in various cases were traced by Jerrold D. Green, 
‘Strategies for evading economic sanctions’ in Miroslave Nancic, and Petre Wallensteen, eds. 
Dilemmas o f  economic coercion, sanctions in world politics, Praeger Publishers, New York, 
1983, pp. 61 -86 .
25 Mr. Anbari, representative o f Iraq in the Security Council said that his government regards 
resolution 661 as null and void. S/PV.2933, 6 August 1990.
26 Independent, 14 August 1990.
27 On 19 August 1990, American warships fired two shots across the bow of two Iraqi oil 
tankers. Independent, 20 August 1990.
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of further resolutions contemplating the right to inspect and verify shipments 
with the minimum use of force. Hitherto, the Soviet Union had called for a 
diplomatic solution, preferring no further action against Iraq, but under 
mounting pressure from America, Gorbachev wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein 
on 23 August asking him to immediately start withdrawing from Kuwait and to 
order the release of hostages. Otherwise, Gorbachev warned, the Security 
Council will ‘adopt corresponding extra measures.’ No positive reply was 
received from Saddam during the next two days and the Soviet Union went 
along with the United States in adopting further measures.
On 25 August 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 665 calling 
upon member states deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures 
as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order 
to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination. The formulation of 
resolution 665 had raised many objections within the Security Council, 
revealing controversy over its provisions and the meaning of its wording. The 
first draft was amended several times. A sentence referring to the ‘minimum 
use of force’ was deleted from the first text at the request of China.
China and Britain expressed their differing understanding of its contents. 
Mr. Li Daoyu, the representative of China, said that ‘we hold that measures 
must be taken within the framework of resolution 661 (1990), which does not 
provide for the use of force, and will naturally not allow force to be used for its
28 Exchange o f letters between the President o f USSR and Iraq were mentioned in a statement 
by Mr. Lozinsky, the representative o f the Soviet Union in the Security Council. S/PV.2938,
25 August 1990.
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implementation.’29 At the same meeting, Sir Crispin Tickell, the representative 
of Britain said ‘I must make it clear to the Council that those measures 
[referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 665. (1990)] include such minimum 
use of force as may be necessary to achieve the purposes of the paragraph I 
have cited.’30 Mr. Tickell reminded the Council that ‘sufficient legal authority 
to take action already exists under Article 51 of the Charter and the request 
which we and others have received from the government of Kuwait. If
l i
necessary, we will use it.’
However, during the course of voting, China concurred and the five 
permanent members voted in favour of resolution 665. The Soviet Union fully 
supported resolution 665, declaring its readiness to co-ordinate with other 
member states in taking any action, using the mechanism of the Military Staff 
Committee to facilitate the implementation of the resolution.
The economic effects of the crisis
The economic consequences of the crisis and particularly the impact of 
sanctions and war against Iraq had far-reaching and deep effects on many 
countries. The economies of the Gulf states, OPEC and non-OPEC countries, 
and other countries in the world were affected by the crisis. However these
29 Security Council meeting, S/PV. 2938, 25 August 1990.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 The possibility o f Soviet participation with allied forces was discussed in Lt-Col. Jeffrey 
McCausland, The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis, Adelphi Paper 282, ESS and Brassey's, 
London, November 1993, p.3; Lawrence Freedman, and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict
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effects varied from being seriously damaging in some places to being beneficial 
in others. This was noticeable even within the same country; for example, there 
were instances of one sector being badly affected while another sector attained 
growth. Syria is a case in point, in that it lost the annual remittance of about 
$200 million as a result of the expulsion of 100,000 Syrians from Kuwait. At 
the same time, the rising oil price had positively contributed to the Syrian
a /(A n A n „ l 33economy.
For Jordan, full compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 would 
have caused, according to its representative at the Security Council, an 
economic disaster. The economic difficulties suffered by Jordan were described 
by Elyahu Kanovsky:
The Gulf War seriously aggravated the already depressed economy, 
especially since Jordan made the costly mistake of siding with Saddam 
Hussein. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states cut off all aid to Jordan, 
which was nearly half a billion dollars in 1989. The US suspended its 
aid program, freezing over $100 million. The UN sanctions already 
reduced Jordan's trade (including transit trade) with Iraq. Though this 
trade had been diminishing since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, 
nonetheless it still was almost one fourth of total Jordanian exports in 
1989. The tourist industry, an important sector of Jordan's economy, was
1990 - 1991, Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Faber and Faber, London, 1993,
p .126.
33 Economist, 13 October 1990.
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adversely affected. But probably the most difficult blow was Kuwait's 
mass expulsion of Palestinian- Jordanian nationals. 300,000 people had 
returned to Jordan by the beginning of 1992.34
Jordan's total economic losses were estimated at SI.8 billion, according to a
- j c
study carried out by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) of Britain. Mr. 
Salah the UN representative of Jordan, in addressing the closed meeting of the 
committee which was established by resolution 661, said that ‘Jordan was 
committed to full implementation of the resolution, but no state should be 
asked to commit economic suicide.’ He told the committee that promises alone 
do not help and the remedies offered to Jordan should be ‘prompt, effective and 
complete.’ During the crisis, allegations were made several times that Jordan 
had continued to trade with Iraq and the allied forces later claimed that they 
had hit oil tankers travelling between Iraq and Jordan. Jordan responded to 
these allegations by explaining the difficulties it faced and the reality of 
maintaining services for 150,000 refugees already in the country, the high rates
34 Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Consequences o f the Persian Gulf War: Accelerating 
Opec's Demise, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Policy Papers Number 30, 
Washington, DC. 1992, p. 68.
35 The estimation included in a memorandum, The Economic Impact o f  the Gulf Crisis on 
Third World Countries, issued to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee by CAFOD, Christian 
Aid, CIIR, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, and World Development Movement, Overseas 
Development Institute, London, March 1991.
36 Security Council Committee established by resolution 661, 3rd meeting (closed) 27 August 
1990.
37 E. Lauterpacht and others, The Kuwait Crisis Basic Documents, Cambridge International 
Documents Series, Vol. 1, Cambridge Grotius Publications Limited 1990, pp. 245 - 256.
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of insurance which were making its main exports, namely potash and 
phosphate, unprofitable and the lack of alternative sources of energy.
For another neighbouring country, Iran, the application of sanctions 
against Iraq and the general effects of the crisis on oil prices was a boost for its 
economy. Iranian revenues from oil exports rose to $14.5 billion in 1991
- I Q
compared with $9 billion in 1988, in response to the rise in oil prices.
Conclusion
Scholarly discussion of sanctions impact
Discussions among scholars about how to make sanctions effective reflect 
varying arguments. For Kaempfer and Lowenberg, ‘to make trade sanctions 
effective in producing substantial economic damage in the target country, the 
sanctions must be comprehensive in coverage (i.e., include most trade flows 
between the target and the rest of the world).’40 Miroslav says that ‘The 
assumption is often that the more comprehensive the action, the more intense
38 Memorandum explains the economic and financial impact on Jordan resulting from the 
imposition o f restrictions on its economic relations with Iraq and Kuwait, in document 
S/AC.25/1990/CRP.3.
39 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 8 April 1991, p. 10. The economic effects o f the crises on 
Turkey were stated by Bruce Kuniholm: ‘Turkey commitment to the coalition’s cause 
came at substantial cost, both economic and political. Trukish financial losses from 
the war were difficult to calculate, but included lost trade with Iraq and Kuwait, lost 
tourism revenues, lost fees from transit trade, suspension on payment o f  Iraqi debts, 
lost fees for transit o f  Iraqi oil through the Turkish pipeline, suspended construction 
contracts, lost remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Kuwait, and increased oil 
prices.’ Bruce R. Kuniholm, ‘After the G ulf War: Turkey and the East’ in Herbert H. 
Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. The Persian G u lf War, Views from  the 
Social and  Behavioral Sciences, University Press o f  America, N ew  York, 1994, p. 
456.
40 William H. Kaempfer, and Anton D. Lowenberg, International Economic Sanctions: A 
Public Choice Perspective, Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford, 1992, p. 3.
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the pressure, and the more likely the compliance.’41 However, Miroslav and 
Wallensteen express an important reservation on this point: ‘The more total is 
the present punishment, the more one’s future capacity to apply such measures 
may be undermined ...Quite simply if almost all links are cut there is little left 
with which to inflict additional economic pain.’42
Many scholars and statesmen have observed that if sanctions against 
Iraq were not to succeed in bringing about compliance, it would be difficult to 
imagine any programme of economic sanctions attaining substantial success. In 
his speech to the NATO Council on 13 August 1990, James Baker, the US 
Secretary of State, stressed the importance of giving sanctions time to work, 
and subsequently giving the allies time to think about how to make them 
effective. In his view, if sanctions against Iraq were to fail the UN would suffer 
a mortal blow. The five-month period given for sanctions against Iraq to work 
before commencement of military operations is short compared with ten years 
or more allowed for sanctions against Rhodesia or South Africa.43 However, 
despite the wide acceptance of this argument, there are still some scholars who 
believe that a lengthy period of sanctions makes them less effective. A good 
example is Peter Wallensteen who states ‘Of course it could be argued that the 
impact would not be felt during the first year of sanctions, and that, if only the
41 Peter Wallensteen, ‘Economic Sanctions: Ten Modem Cases and Three Important Lessons’ 
in Nincic and Wallensteen, op. cit. note 24 p. 90.
42 Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, op. cit. 
note 20, p. 10.
43 For analysis o f Sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa see Margaret Doxey, 
International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, Macmillan, London, 1987; Zacklin, 
Ralph, The United Nations and Rhodesia: a study in international Law, Praeger, New York,
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sanctions continued over time, the impact would be greater. The relevant data 
suggest the opposite. The longer the sanctions are applied the more modest is
i  • i44their economic impact.
Another significant factor is the timing of the Security Council sanctions 
against an aggressor. If, for a long period, the international community uses the 
prospect of sanctions as a threat without imposing real penalties, the target 
country may be able to alter its trade routes and find alternative resources to 
those affected by sanctions. These anticipatory measures could moderate the 
impact of any subsequent sanctions on the target. In the case of Rhodesia, the 
white minority government benefited from the long period between the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the real application of sanctions. In 
this sense, the case of Kuwait was unique in that the comprehensive mandatory 
sanctions against Iraq were imposed within five days of the invasion.
Impact of sanctions on Iraq
In a discussion of sanctions against Rhodesia Robin Renwick concluded that: 
‘The idea of an automatic correlation between economic deprivation and the 
loss of the political will to resist is, to say the least, questionable.’ For 
Renwick, although sanctions are essentially punitive and although they can 
weaken the country to which they are applied, ‘more ambitious claims should
1974; M. S. Daoudi, and M. S. Dajani Economic Sanctions: Ideal and Experience, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1983.
44 Peter Wallensteen, Economic Sanctions: Ten Modern Cases, op. cit. note 24.
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not be made for a sanctions policy’.45 Renwick’s two points are relevant to the 
discussion on sanctions against Iraq. Despite the comprehensive and mandatory 
nature of sanctions against Iraq and despite Iraqi suffering, it could be 
concluded that in the time allotted, sanctions failed to push Saddam Hussein 
out of Kuwait.
A definitive answer to the question raised after the Gulf war by scholars 
such as Hugh Miall46 and Fred Halliday47 of whether sanctions, if they were 
given more time, could have succeeded in securing the compliance of Iraq was 
not possible. However, those who opposed the use of force, before the outbreak 
of the war in the Gulf, argued that comprehensive economic measures would 
convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. A memorandum 
presented to George Bush in October 1990 by eighty-one Democratic members 
of the Congress rejected the use of force and stated that ‘UN sponsored
A Oembargo must be given every opportunity to work’. Senator Sam Nunn, 
chairman of the Armed Service Committee, specifically called on the 
Administration to ‘stick to sanctions -  a couple of years if necessary’. 
However, those who supported the use of force were convinced that sanctions 
would not resolve the conflict. It is revealed that on 10 January 1991, CIA 
Director William Webster testified before the Congress arguing that ‘even if
45 Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, Harvard University, Centre For International Affairs, 
Cambridge, 1981, p. 92.
46 Hugh Miall, ‘Could the Gulf Conflict have been settled Peacefully’ in Oxford Research 
Group, Decision Making in the Gulf: Lessons to be learned, Current Decision Report no. 5, 
June 1991.
47 Fred Halliday, ‘The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the Study o f International Relations’ Review 
o f International Studies, vol. 20, May 1994, pp. 115-117 and 119.
48 Bush and Scowcroft, op. cit. note 7, pp. 389 and 417.
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the sanctions continue to be enforced for another six or twelve months, 
economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam Hussein to retreat from 
Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq.’49
The imposition of sanctions against Iraq for ten years after the invasion 
of Kuwait provided further evidence in support of the latter argument. 
However, the circumstances during the first five months of the crisis were 
different, and it is difficult to rule out the possibility of Iraqi compliance, if 
sanctions and political pressures were maintained for longer period. The same 
question will be discussed from a different perspective in Part IV of the thesis 
to see whether the measures taken against Iraq before 29 November 1990 had 
proved to be inadequate, as the Charter stipulates, and consequently justified 
the authorisation of military action against Iraq.
5- Authorisation of the use of force
Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the use of force had rarely been 
authorised. It happened only twice previously. However, it was the first time, in 
the case of Kuwait, that Chapter VII of the Charter was explicitly invoked.50 In 
1950, during the Korean war, the Security Council made the first attempt to 
fulfil its responsibility towards the enforcement of peace. Between 25 June and 
7 July 1950, the Council adopted three resolutions calling on North Korea to 
withdraw its forces to the 38th parallel, and empowered the unified command to
49 U.S. News, Triumph without Victory, The Unreported History o f  the Persian Gulf War, 
Times Books, New York, 1992, p. 207.
83
use the flag of the United Nations in the course of operations against North 
Korean forces.51 The only factor that enabled the adoption of these resolutions 
was the absence of the Soviet Union. In another incident in 1961, the 
peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) was authorised by the Security
CO
Council to use force as a last resort to prevent the spread of civil war.
Sixteen weeks after the adoption by the Security Council of economic 
sanctions against Iraq on 6 August 1990, the Council met to adopt a resolution 
authorising the use of force to restore international peace and security in the 
Gulf area.54 On 29 November 1990 twelve countries out of the fifteen members 
of the Security Council voted in favour of a resolution that
[authorises all member states co-operating with the government of 
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as 
set forth in paragraph 1 above the foregoing resolutions, to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 
660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.55
50 Security Council resolution 660,2 August 1990.
51 Sydney Bailey ‘The Korean Armistice’ Macmillan, London, 1992, pp. 209 - 210.
52 D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, Stevens and Sons, London, 1964.
53 Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1970.
54 The 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council during the period when the first 12 
resolutions related to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait were adopted, were Canada, 
Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Rumania, Yemen, and Zaire.
55 Security Council resolution 678, 29 November 1990.
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The Security Council decided to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a sign of 
good will, to withdraw from Kuwait and to comply with subsequent 
resolutions. The adoption of resolution 678 marked a shift from economic 
sanctions to military measures. It moved the agenda from the measures of 
Article 41 ‘not involving the use of force’ to Article 42 where the Charter 
authorises the Security Council whenever it deems the response of the 
aggressor, to the non-military measures, as unsatisfactory ‘to take such action 
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’.
The enabling of resolution 678
Thirteen members of the Security Council including the five permanent 
members were represented by their Foreign Ministers in the meeting during 
which resolution 678 was adopted.56 The Council rarely experienced such a 
presence of Foreign Ministers in the years before 1990 and that was apparently
cn
due to the importance of the drafted resolution under consideration. James 
Baker the US Secretary of State and the president of the Security Council 
started the meeting by quoting from the speech of Haile Selassie the Ethiopian 
emperor to the League of Nations in 1936:
56 Cote d’Ivoire and Yemen were represented by their permanent representatives to the United 
Nations.
57 S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990.
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There is no precedent for a people being the victim of such injustice and 
of being at present threatened by abandonment to an aggressor. Also, 
there has never before been an example of any government proceeding 
with the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means in 
violation of the most solemn promises made to all the nations of the 
Earth that there should be no resort to a war of conquest and that there 
should not be used against innocent human beings terrible poison and 
harmful gases.
Selassie himself anticipated in his speech to the League of Nations: ‘God and 
history will remember your judgement’.58 It is worth noting that Harry Truman 
also referred to Ethiopia in his main speech after the invasion of South Korea.59 
James Baker’s paraphrasing of the Ethiopian Emperor called to the attention of 
member states two significant points. First, the contrast of the situation in 
Kuwait to a clear case of conquer and subjugation of a Third World East 
African country by a Western colonial power.60 Second, he purported to remind 
the Council of the impotency of the League of Nations and its inability to face 
such a clear act of aggression and to affirm that member states ‘must not let the
58 Haile Selassie to the League o f Nations, League o f Nations Official Journal, Records o f the 
16th Ordinary Session of die Assembly, Special Supplement 151, Text o f Debates, Part II, pp. 
22 - 25, at p. 25.
59 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol. H, Doubleday, New York, 1956, pp. 
232 -2 3 3 .
60 Ethiopia was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in November 1990 and 
voted for resolution 678.
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United Nations go the way of the League of Nations.’61 James Baker concluded 
by saying: ‘If Iraq does not reverse its course peacefully, then other necessary 
measures, including the use of force should be authorised.’
It seems Baker had intentionally avoided mentioning the first attempt by 
the Security Council to authorise the use of force against North Korea in 1950, 
because that could have provoked a negative Russian or Chinese vote. The 
Russian foreign minister, Edward Shevardnadze, fully supported the adoption 
of resolution 678. However, Shevardnadze expressed his confidence that the 
international community would overcome the crisis peacefully: ‘I repeat 
peacefully and in a political way ... and to end it on a note of hope for a better 
future for all of us.’62
Mr. Dumas, the foreign minister of France, as well as the Russian 
foreign minister stipulated at the same meeting that the Security Council should 
not introduce any action to extend the scope or nature of the sanctions adopted 
in its resolutions 661, 665 and 670, or any new measures regarding Iraq during 
the period from 29 November 1990 up to the date in paragraph 2 of resolution 
678. Therefore, the position of France and the Soviet Union was a mixture of 
hope for peace, mainly motivated by their good relations with Iraq during the 
past years and intolerance of Iraq’s provocative actions since the invasion.
61 For comparison of the competence o f the League o f Nations and the United Nations see 
Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London, 1993, pp. 20 - 26.
62 The political reasons for the Soviet support for the US initiative were discussed in Ken 
Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, Routledge, London and New York, 
1993, pp. 79 -82 .
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France was particularly anxious about its nationals in Baghdad and Kuwait who 
were taken hostage with other Western nationals. The only permanent 
member which did not vote for the resolution was China.
The Chinese Government expressed its refusal to authorise the use of 
force which is implicitly contained in the draft of resolution 678, but it did not 
cast a negative vote because it supported, as the Chinese foreign minister 
explained, some other provisions of the resolution, namely the call on Iraq to 
fully comply with resolution 661 - which demanded the immediate withdrawal 
of Iraq from Kuwait - and the implementation of subsequent resolutions.64 
Cuba and Yemen, despite their agreement with China and other Security 
Council members on supporting the provisions of resolution 660, voted against 
resolution 678, in anticipation of a military confrontation on a large scale as a 
result of passing such a resolution, showing their reservation over the command 
of forces which would have nothing to do with the United Nations.65
Thus, the Chinese abstention gave rise to an old constitutional question 
about the legitimacy of the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council on 
non procedural matters when one or more of its permanent members is absent 
or abstaining.66 The question is, should China’s abstention have affected the 
legality of resolution 678? China itself did not claim that right and its behaviour
63 S/PV.2937, 18 August 1990, (Resolution 664); Jolyon Howorth, ‘French Policy in the 
Conflict’ in Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 
1990-91, Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1994, pp. 175 -  200; 
‘Vladimir Nosenko, Soviet Policy in the Conflict’ in Ibid. pp. 136 -  144.
64 Op. cit. note 59.
65 Op. cit. note 59.
66 Sydney Bailey, Voting In the Security Council, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1969.
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during the crisis suggested that China intended to permit the adoption of such a 
resolution by the Security Council.
Looking back to the Korean Crisis, the Soviet Union had absented itself 
from the meetings of the Security Council from 13 January to 30 July 1950, 
with no intention of hindering the passage of resolutions against North Korea. 
The Russians did not even directly relate their absence to the conflict in Korea, 
they rather objected to the representation of China at the Council. However, the 
Soviet Union continued to argue for the invalidity of resolutions 82, 83, and 84 
on the assumption that they did not receive the concurring votes of the five 
permanent members.67
The role of the Military Staff Committee
During the Kuwait crisis the Military Staff Committee did not function and it 
was only referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 665 concerning the co­
ordination of the actions of the states with regard to the implementation of 
economic sanctions.
The Soviet Union, China, and France had repeatedly stressed the 
importance of reactivating the Military Staff Committee. However, the US 
Administration expressed its unwillingness to give the Command of forces to 
the Military Staff Committee.68 The significance of reactivating the Committee 
was one of the main issues raised by Mikhail Gorbachev when he stated the
67 See Sydney Bailey, How Wars End. Vol. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
68 Excerpts from the statements made in Forty Seventh Session of the General Assembly on 
An Agenda fo r  Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, October 1992, p. 47.
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outlines of Soviet’s new foreign policy in 1987.69 From that time, the Soviet 
delegation to the UN insisted on establishing a UN Command to control its 
operations and showed readiness to make full use of the machinery of the 
Military Staff Committee. The Chinese have always been anxious not to allow 
any unilateral undertaking of UN forces command by the US. The Foreign 
Minister of China said that any authorisation of use of force against Iraq would
70simply lead to an initiation of war by some states against other member states. 
His comments reflected China's opposition to the dominance and control of the 
United States over the presence of forces in the Gulf.
On the academic level, a Russian international lawyer, Nikolai Krylov, 
stated that the Military Staff Committee is intended to render assistance to the 
Security Council in all the questions pertaining to military needs of the Council 
for the purposes of peace maintenance, including ‘preparation of plans for 
using military forces, exercising command responsibility, and undertaking 
strategic direction of the military forces available to the Security Council.’ 
Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the functioning of this body could be 
improved if certain proposals were to be taken into consideration: The sessions 
of the Committee should be held on the level of the chiefs of General Staffs 
because the participation of relatively low-ranking military officials in its 
meetings has been one of the evident defects in the work of the Military Staff 
Committee. Krylov added that ‘In order to manage the UN military forces more
69 Financial Times, 15 October 1987.
70 S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990.
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effectively, each member of the Military Staff Committee could take command
71of the forces for rotating periods of not more than three months each.’
An American international lawyer, David Scheffer, reacted to Krylov’s 
views by arguing that the Charter is a flexible document and that its provisions 
on the issue of the command of UN forces may not necessarily mean that the 
Military Staff Committee should take command of all the United Nations 
military enforcement operations. ‘Nikolai Krylov may be too optimistic in what 
he proposes for the Military Staff Committee...The Charter makes clear that the 
Committee - serves at the pleasure of the Security Council...In the three 
relevant articles - 45, 46, and 47 - the operative word (assistance) ... in the 
following sentence the Charter clarifies that, (Questions relating to the 
command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently).’ Scheffer 
concluded by saying that ‘The charter thus does not stipulate that the military 
command of a UN authorised enforcement action must be created within the 
Military Staff Committee. The Charter leaves the issue of operational command
79open for treatment on a case-by-case basis by the Security Council.’ The 
ideas put forward by Nikolai Kaylov and David Scheffer reflect to a large 
extent the opposing views of their two governments on the issue of the role and 
capacity of the Military Staff Committee.
71 Nikolai B. Krylov, ‘International Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions After the Cold 
War’ in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, Law and Force in the New International 
Order, Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford, 1991, pp. 94 - 100.
72 David J. Scheffer, ‘Commentary on Collective Security’ in Ibid.
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The relation with the host state
When Rosalyn Higgins discussed the relation with the ‘host state’ in the case of 
Korea she stated that ‘Although the UN was engaged in enforcement action 
against North Korea, with its main military command centre in Tokyo, it is 
none the less still reasonable for our purpose to designate the Republic of 
Korea as the “ host state” .’
Kuwait could not be designated, similarly to South Korea, as a host state 
at the time of deployment, as no part of the territory was free from the Iraqi 
occupation, despite the fact that allies’ forces obtained the consent of the 
Government of Kuwait. However, Saudi Arabia could be considered as the 
main host state, upon its consent the US forces were present on its territory 
from the early days of the crisis. The uniqueness of the case of Kuwait created 
the exceptional situation of a third party becoming a major ‘host state’ although 
it was claimed that Saudi Arabia was itself under threat of Iraqi invasion, and 
therefore, Americans were there to defend the country.
The Allies’ forces were deployed in the whole Gulf area and with the 
exception of Jordan, all neighbouring states and other states in the area 
provided facilities for the presence of the allies’ forces. Syria although did not 
host foreign forces its own forces formed part of the allies’ forces which fought 
against Iraq. In addition to the ground bases provided by states, the American 
warships were present on the high waters and on the shores of Gulf states. In 
the case of Kuwait it is more appropriate to talk about a ‘host area’ or a ‘host
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region’ rather than a ‘host state’ although consent was obtained from different 
sovereign states.
All necessary means
The phrase ‘to use all necessary means’ could be considered as the most 
important provision of the twelve resolutions adopted by the Council before the 
outbreak of the Gulf war. In the present chapter the ‘use of all necessary 
means’ will be comprehensively explored to see how it developed through the 
practice of the UN and its significance for peace enforcement operations as a 
provision of comprehensive authorisation.
Resolution 678 did not explicitly refer to the use of force, however it 
authorised all member states to ‘use all necessary means’ to implement the 
Security Council resolutions. The expression ‘all means’ may include the use 
of military power as one of the optional measures, but the confusion arises 
from the word 'necessary' which could be understood as a precondition to the 
use of any means under resolution 678, including military force. However the 
issue of whether there were adequate reasons to justify the use of force was left 
for UN member states to decide upon, and no form or machinery was set up by 
the Security Council to facilitate the undertaking of such a task. In the case of 
Rhodesia, General Assembly resolution 2022 requested the government of the 
United Kingdom, in an attempt to restore peace and democracy, to take various 
measures including the suspension of the 1961 constitution and to call 
immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political
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parties would take part. Furthermore, the resolution called upon the United 
Kingdom to employ ‘all necessary measures’ including military force to 
implement the subsequent provisions. If the resolution of the General Assembly 
was to be implemented against the white minority government of Ian Smith, 
there could have been no difficulty in understanding the phrase ‘all necessary 
means’ because it was clearly interpreted within the context of the resolution to 
include the use of force. The support of the majority of African countries in the 
General Assembly for the rights of the black people in Rhodesia, helped in 
adopting such clear terms in resolution 2022.
The phrase was also used in 1992 during the civil war in Somalia when 
the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution authorising the use of 
‘all necessary means’ and the sending of a military force led by the United 
States to protect the relief operations in Somalia.74 However, the United States 
did not understand the sentence ‘to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’ as a constraint. On 
the contrary it preferred to interpret the term as additional measures to the 
authority which was already secured by the phrase ‘all necessary means.’
Again, in Bosnia, the undertaking of ‘all necessary measures’ was 
authorised by the Security Council. However, this time the command of 
forces was led by European countries, namely Britain and France, which
73 Robin Renwick, op. cit. note 45, p. 89.
74 Security Council resolution 794, 3 December 1992.
75 Security Council resolution 770,1992.
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76provided the majority of forces on the ground until 1995. However, the 
British commander General Sir Michael Rose did not instruct his forces to the 
use of ‘all necessary means’ mandated by the Security Council. It was the 
second time that Britain showed unwillingness to mobilise the necessary 
measures as intended by the United Nations. For different reasons, Britain 
turned down a similar mandate in 1966 concerning the case of Rhodesia by
77refusing to use force to arrest oil tankers destined to Southern Rhodesia. In 
the Bosnian case, until 1995, necessary means were reduced to the scope of the 
function and mandate of peacekeeping operations due to the lack of will and 
adequate means to enforce the peace. With the exception of a few incidents, the 
use of force by UNPROFOR was limited to the self-defence.
The UN ultimatums
The expression ‘unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements ...
H O
the forgoing resolutions’ has no precedent in the history of the United 
Nations. It was the first time that the word ultimatum has come into the 
vocabulary used by the United Nations. A specific date was set, after which 
Iraq could face military action. The developments corroborated that it was a
76 General Sir Michael Rose, the commander o f forces, maintained close coordination with 
NATO’s Headquarters and his ministry of defence in London, but his official reports on the 
performance o f UNPROFOR went to the UN. By contrast, during the Korean crisis, the 
American commander o f the UN forces, General MacArthur, reported directly to Washington, 
not to New York, and the instructions to the forces also came from the US Defence 
Department.
77 Security Council resolution 221, 9 April 1966.
78 Security Council resolution 678, 29 November 1990.
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genuine ultimatum, for what was called by some critics the ‘Third World War’ 
started a few hours after the elapse of the deadline, involving over a million 
troops on the ground, armed with the most sophisticated machinery in the 
history of wars. In Bosnia, the Security Council was reluctant to act in 
accordance with the provisions of its resolution 770, which authorised the 
undertaking of necessary measures through regional organisations. The 
resolution was apparently referring to the Northern Atlantic Organisation 
(NATO) to act on behalf of the UN.79 Although the Bosnian Serbs had 
repeatedly breached the UN decisions, NATO did not react until February 1994 
when it issued an ultimatum for the Bosnian Serb forces to withdraw their 
heavy weapons from around the besieged town of Sarajevo. The ultimatum 
against the Bosnian Serbs was remarkably strict, short and limited in scope and 
time, as it was motivated by the gruesome attack on Sarajevo’s market-place a 
few weeks earlier. Bosnian Serb forces were only allowed ten days to meet 
NATO’s conditions. However, the possible consequences of non-compliance 
were clearly stated in the decision by the phrase ‘or face air strikes.’ So, if the 
Bosnian Serbs failed to comply with the NATO decision there was no reason to 
expect any action but limited air strikes. In another incident during the Bosnian 
Crisis the Security Council mobilised its authority to issue an ultimatum by 
giving the Bosnian Serbs until 7 March 1994 to lift their siege of Tuzla airport. 
Like NATO’s ultimatum, the Security Council was precise and limited in its
79 The issue o f UN capacity to deal with wars in Eastern Europe is discussed in Adam 
Roberts, ‘All the troubles o f the world on its shoulders’ Independent, 21 December 1992.
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final call to the Bosnian Serbs to hand over the airport of Tuzla. However, 
these two ultimatums were limited in their scope and consequences.
In Korea 1950, the resolutions of the Security Council did not issue 
any ultimatum and the unified command carried out its military action a few 
days after the invasion of South Korea, without serving Kim Il-sung with 
further notice.
The uniqueness of the Security Council ultimatum against Iraq is two 
- fold: first, it was related to an unconditional total withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. Second, the Council demanded the complete restoration of the 
situation hitherto prevailing and the return of the Iraqi contingents to their 
position before 2 August 1990. In this sense, the Iraqi ultimatum is the most 
comprehensive and precise the United Nations has ever issued. Furthermore, it 
is the only UN ultimatum that has been followed by military action. 
Nevertheless, the measuring of the periods allowed for the aggressors in these 
cases suggests that the time given to Iraq to comply with the Security Council 
resolutions was considerably longer than the time allowed in any other case.
6- How sanctions end
The provisions of Chapter VII did not refer to the termination of sanctions or 
explain when the measures of Article 41 could be terminated. This led to 
different experiences in the application of sanctions. A sharp contrast could be 
made in this respect between Iraq in 1990, and Korea in 1950. In the case of 
Iraq sanctions were imposed immediately after the invasion of Kuwait and
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continued more than eight years after the end of the Gulf war. In Korea, there 
were no sanctions imposed before, during, or after the war, and the whole 
matter was removed from the agenda of the United Nations immediately after 
the end of the war.
The severe consequences of sanctions on the people of Iraq raised 
questions about the mechanism of sanctions termination and the elastic nature 
of conditions for the lifting of sanctions. However, during the past years, the 
Security Council has exercised its authority to remove, suspend or loosen the
Q A
grip of sanctions on target states. It did so in Zimbabwe in 1979, South Africa 
in 1994, and Haiti in 1994; the most recent example of the total lifting of 
sanctions is the former Yugoslavia: the Security Council ended the arms 
embargo against all the former Yugoslav republics in June 1996 and lifted the 
trade sanctions against Serb-led Yugoslavia in October 1996. In the case of 
Haiti the Security Council promised to suspend the oil and arms embargo if the 
Secretary-General reported to the Council that the parties were willing to 
comply with the New York Pact. The Security Council adopted resolution 861 
of 27 August 1993 which declared the suspension, but 47 days later the 
Secretary-General gave a report calling attention to the ‘repeatedly observed 
lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to 
facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH’. On 18 October 1993 the 
Council re-imposed the embargo against Haiti.
80 Security Council resolution 460,21 December 1979.
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In December 1996, Iraq resumed oil exports through the Turkish port of 
Dortyol more than six years after mandatory sanctions were first imposed 
against Iraq in August 1990. The Security Council agreed on a plan which 
allows Iraq to export $2bn worth of oil every six months. According to the UN- 
monitored scheme, this income should be spent on food and medicine, 
compensation for the victims of the invasion of Kuwait and the UN operations 
in Iraq and Kuwait. Although the ‘Oil for Food’ deal is a significant step, it 
only represents a partial repeal of the comprehensive sanctions regime imposed
o  1
on Iraq. Sanctions against the territory of Kuwait under the Iraqi occupation 
were automatically lifted after the end of the Gulf war, and the Council did not 
need to make a formal announcement of this termination. As the application of 
sanctions is valid until an aggressor has complied with the Council’s 
conditions, a victim state need no confirmation of being freed from the 
restraints of sanctions since the conflict is resolved. However, this was not the 
case with Bosnia, as the arms embargo was applied against the Serbs and 
Bosnians intended to prevent the escalation of war, the lifting of sanctions 
against the victim state, namely Bosnia, required an explicit Security Council 
resolution.
On 24 February 1998 Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, stated that
81 It is worth noting that in the case of Korea in 1950, no mandatory economic sanctions were 
employed, and six months after the Security Council started to deal with the crisis the whole 
issue was lifted from the agenda of the Council. Resolution 90 o f 31 January 1951, which 
presented the shortest text o f a resolution ever adopted by the Security Council, reads: ‘The 
Security Council resolves to remove the item ‘Complaint o f aggression upon the Republic o f  
Korea’ from the list o f which the Council is seized’. Adopted unanimously.
82 Security Council resolution 1021,22 November 1995.
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I have made clear that when Saddam Hussein has complied fully with 
the Security Council resolutions, the UN inspectors have completed the 
disarmament stage of the work, and the threat from his mass destruction 
has gone, we can consider the lifting of sanctions. If Saddam had not 
blocked the implementation of UNSCOM’s work so systematically, this 
could have happened long ago. The long-suffering Iraqi people deserve 
our sympathy and our help. Our quarrel was never with them.
Blair repeated the same conditions stated in resolution 687 of 1991 and his 
speech showed no change or progress in the process of terminating sanctions 
against Iraq. In practice, the lifting of sanctions is not an easy decision. It is 
always subject to the approval of the five permanent members and at least four 
non-permanent members of the Council. It could take place following major 
transformations in the policies of the target country such as the adoption of a 
new political system, leading perhaps to a new constitution or some other 
significant change leading to the signing of peace accords and the cessation of 
hostilities between warring factions. However, consideration of humanitarian 
needs may allow for exceptions or partial suspensions in some cases.
The decision of the Security Council to suspend sanctions against Haiti 
before the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) had
83 A statement by Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, before the House o f Commons on 
24 February 1998.
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proved to be premature, and it did not last long before the Council decided to 
re-impose the course of sanctions. Learning from this experience and due to the 
seriousness of the case of Iraq, when the Council decided in April 1995 to 
make partial suspension of the embargo against Iraqi oil exports, it set that in
fid.veiy cautious terms. The comprehensive resolution which is consisted of 40 
paragraphs, sub-paragraphs and preambles, specified the amount, the route, the 
distribution of humanitarian imports, the route for the exporting of Iraqi oil and 
the pipelines it should go through, and the details of the administration of the 
deal. The Iraqi oil should be exported from Mina al-Bakr oil terminal, and from 
Iraq to Turkey through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline with the assistance of 
independent inspection agency appointed by the Secretary-General. The 
inspection agency should keep the Security Council Committee informed of the 
amount of petroleum exported from Iraq. The Secretary-General is instructed to 
establish an escrow account for the return of the Iraqi oil purchases. The funds 
in the escrow account, which is $1 billion every 3 month, will be used to meet 
the following needs:
a) To finance the export to Iraq of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and 
materials and supplies for essential needs, as referred to in paragraph 20 of 
resolution 687 (1991) provided that:
(i) exports are requested by Iraq, (ii) equitable distribution, (iii) authenticated 
confirmation that food arrived in Iraq.
84 Security Council resolution 986,14 April 1995.
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b) Provide between 130 to 150 million dollars every 90 days for United Nations 
Inter-Agency Humanitarian programme to guarantee the humanitarian supplies 
for the Govemorates of Dihouk, Arabil and Suleimaniyeh.
c) Transfer a percentage to the compensation fund according to paragraph 2 of 
resolution 705 of 15 August 1991.
d) To meet the costs of the independent inspection agents.
e) The costs of the Special Commission. Resolution 687 (1991).
f) Expenses of the export outside Iraq.
g) $10 m. every three month for the payments envisaged under paragraph 6 of 
resolution 788 of 2 October 1992.
The provisions of resolution 986 intended to provide humanitarian supplies to 
the people of Iraq, but they also entailed a principal contemplation that Iraq 
will continue to pay from its own resources to cover the economic 
consequences of the invasion of Kuwait. Iraq should also meet the 
administration costs of the bodies established by the UN to monitor the 
appropriation of the Oil for Food” deal. It is significant that Iraq should also 
pay for the peacekeeping operation deployed on its southern border.
The reactions of different countries to the ‘Oil for Food’ deal were described by 
Boutros Ghali in 1999 as follows
Among the five permanent member states on the Security Council, 
China, France, and Russia were disposed to compromise, each for its
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own reasons: the desire to sell goods to Iraq, the desire to by oil, the 
desire that Iraq be enabled to pay what it owed them. In contrast, the 
United States and Britain were suspicious of Saddam but willing to see 
if ‘Oil for Food’ could work. The Arab states, notably Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia were deeply hostile to any relaxation of sanctions but would 
never say so openly.85
Therefore, the ‘Oil for Food’ deal represented partial lifting of the oil embargo 
against Iraq which had been imposed by resolution 661 of August 1990. The 
deal was initiated by the Secretariat of the UN and adopted by the Security 
Council, however the approval of the United States and Britain was conditional 
and resulted in unprecedented restraints on the implementation of the 
agreement. When the work of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) started, 
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, head of UNSCOM, promised the lifting of sanctions 
if Iraq was to co-operate with the Commission. Boutros Ghali blamed these
Q /r
promises for the delay in the implementation of the ‘Oil for Food’ deal. 
However, with the disastrous suspension of the work of UNSCOM which led to 
the outbreak of Desert Fox operation in January 1999, the ‘Oil for Food’ 
remains the only prospect for the suspension of sanctions against Iraq.
85 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, A U.S. -  U.N. Saga, I. B. Tauris, London and New 
York, 1999, p. 210.
86 Ibid.
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Chapter 4
The role of the United States in peace enforcement
operations
The study of peace enforcement as a comprehensive and integral UN process 
for the resolution of serious conflicts has been increasingly challenged by the 
influence of the great powers. It is argued that most of the enforcement actions 
authorised by the Security Council were instigated by the United States. This 
argument is very common in the literature about the Korean war in 1950 and 
Kuwait crisis in 1990-91. During these crises the following questions are 
frequently asked: Is the enforcement action a UN or US action? Is the relation 
between the UN and US based on co-operation or exploitation? Can a UN 
which is dependent on the leadership of the US achieve the objectives of 
collective security? This chapter argues that the post-Cold War period poses a 
new challenge to peace enforcement due to the dominance of one great power 
in the world with incomparable capabilities. However, the reliance of the UN 
on the capabilities of the US in many cases represents an attempt to find an 
easy and quick way to reverse aggressive actions rather than representing the 
only viable option.
105
The chapter attempts to assess the relationship between the UN and the 
US and the effect of this relation on the UN scheme for peace enforcement. 
This assessment will be carried out in two parts. The first part provides a brief 
review of the history of relations between the UN and the US. Then it pursues 
a conceptual analysis of the ideas of US scholars and practitioners, 
distinguishing between isolationist and internationalist thinking towards the 
UN. The second part examines the relationship in practice. The Kuwait crisis 
will be used as an example for testing the influence of the US on the role of 
the Security Council in the area of peace enforcement, however, a continuous 
contrast with other cases is maintained through out the chapter.
1- The United States and the United Nations
Historical background
The invasion of Kuwait took place after decades of stagnation and very little 
co-operation between the US and UN, especially in the area of international 
peace and security.1 The outcomes of US attempts to utilise the UN during the 
Cold War were mostly discouraging for US policy makers. To identify the 
reasons that led to the creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust
1 Robert Gregg observed that: ‘In fact, By invading Kuwait in August o f 1990, Saddam 
Hussein had provided a dramatic and unexpected impetus to the further improvement of 
relations between the United States and the United Nations and to the reemergence o f the UN 
as a factor to be reckoned within the conduct o f world affairs.’ Gregg W. Robert, About face? 
The United States and the United Nations. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 
1993, p. 104.
106
among Americans towards the UN in the decades before 1990, two major 
elements need to be pointed out. First, the rivalry with the Soviet Union 
frustrated many of the United States’ proposals and draft resolutions in the 
Security Council. During the American hostage crisis in Tehran, despite the 
support of member states to the United States claims and the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)2 condemning the action, the United States 
failed to secure the adoption by the Security Council of financial measures 
against Iran. Such failure in this incident and similar situations was 
compound by attempts to adopt resolutions condemning unilateral actions by 
the US against Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama, and the imposition of 
measures against its allies in Israel, South Africa, and elsewhere. The only 
situation during which the United States was able to push forward proposed 
drafts for an authorised enforcement action was the Korean crisis in 1950, 
when the Soviet Union absented itself from the Security Council meetings in 
protest against the representation of China in the Council.4 During the Cold 
War the United States tended to act unilaterally because, in the view of Harold 
Jacobson ‘[i]n contrast to the original U.S. vision of the post-war order, the 
UN’s actual role in U.S. efforts to gain security was greatly diminished.’5
2 ICJ Report, Order o f  International Court o f  Justice, 15 December 1979.
3 Draft resolution (S/13735) Security Council meeting 2191,13 January 1980.
4 Security Council resolutions 81, 82, and 83 (1950).
5 Harold K. Jacobson, ‘U.S. Military Security Policies: The Role and influence o f IGOs’ in 
Margaret P. Kams and Karen A. Mingst, The United States and multilateral institutions:
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Second, the influx of newly independent countries and the wide expansion of 
the United Nations membership, from 50 in 1945 to 113 in 1964, created a 
new majority in the UN consisted of African and Asian countries. Despite the 
enthusiasm of post-war US foreign policy makers for de-colonisation, they did 
not seem to have expected or wanted the rapid accommodation of many new 
members by the United Nations, in a relatively short period. The African and 
Asian states constituted a majority in the General Assembly which remained, 
as a working body, generally more effective than the Security Council. Evan 
Luard states that ‘the increasing size of the Assembly, as well as the change in 
its composition (in which Afro Asian members came to hold two-thirds of the 
votes) meant that it came to be thought a less suitable instrument for use in 
such situations, by the US as much as by the Soviet Union.’6 However, Luard 
regarded this as one of the reasons which ‘encouraged the restoration of the 
Council’s supremacy in security questions.’
The new majority emphasised different diplomatic characteristics and 
worked for its own priorities which largely conflicted with those of the United 
States. For African and Asian developing countries, the highest priority was 
sustainable economic development. These new emphases collided with the
Patterns o f  changing instrumentality and influence, Routledge, London and New York, 1992,
p. 28.
6 Evan Luard, The United Nations, Hwo it Works and What it Does, Macmillan, London, 2nd 
edition 1994, p. 53; see also Clive Archer, International Organisations, Routledge, London 
and New York, 2nd edition 1995, pp. 136 -  137.
7 Ibid.
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supreme goals of the US and Western countries who had planned for a United 
Nations primarily concerned with issues of international security. 
Accordingly, ‘U.S. security policy had to be redefined; the UN could no
Q
longer be the centrepiece.’ William R. Frye argued in 1960 that
The Afro-Asians, still regard intervention in ‘Cold War’ issues as 
taking sides in a power struggle from which they prefer to remain 
aloof. They are ready to help prevent the Cold War from spreading to 
new areas, but are not yet ready to step in and help solve existing Cold 
War problems.9
A review of the political spheres in the UN during the Cold War shows a 
constant US - Third World discrepancy over such issues as southern African 
developments and the Middle-East conflict.
The effect of changes in Russia’s UN policy
Russian foreign policy makers started to express new optimism about the role 
of the United Nations from the mid-1980s. However, their hopes were not 
motivated this time by an old Cold War desire to dominate the United Nations
8 Harold Jacobson, op. cit. note 5, p. 26.
9 William R. Frye, ‘Afro-Asian block: centre stage at UN ’ Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. XL, 
no. 3, 15 October 1960, p. 17.
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through an anti- imperialist majority, but through co-operation with the major 
western powers. Mikhail Gorbachev stated in 1987 that the UN should play a 
central role in world politics.10 This declaration was followed by several 
Soviet proposals to make the UN more effective in the control of conflicts, to 
improve the capability of UN bodies, and to promote economic and 
humanitarian efforts.11 ‘Whatever the goal and merit of each of these new 
Soviet proposals’ one scholar argued ‘they present an opportunity for both the 
United Nations and the United States to close a particularly unproductive
19  _chapter in post war history.’ The readiness of Moscow to make the UN
stronger and to reactivate its machinery for peace maintenance was one of the
1 ^clearest early signs of the change in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy. 
Moscow affirmed these changes by supporting the establishment of UN 
military missions, including the observance of the Red Army’s withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, helping to secure the withdrawal of Cuban forces from 
Angola, supporting the Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia, and
10 Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Reality and the guarantee o f world security’ Pravda, 17 September 
1987.
11 Richard A. Falkenrath, Jr. and Edmund Piasecki, ‘Perestroika at the United Nations, A  
Summary o f Soviet Proposals and Positions’ in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds. Soviet 
American relations after the Cold War, Duke University Press, Duharm and London, 1991, pp 
218-223.
12 Toby Trister Gati, ‘The UN rediscovered: Soviet and American policy in the United Nations 
o f the 1990s’ in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds. Soviet American relations after the 
Cold War, Duke University Press, Duharm and London, 1991, p. 197.
13 Useful analysis o f early Soviet attitude towards the United Nations is found in Rupert 
Emerson and Inis L. Claude, ‘The Soviet Union and the United Nations: An Essay in 
Interpretation’ International Organisation, vol. vi, no. 1, February 1952, pp. 1 - 2 6 .
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persuading Cambodia and Vietnam to negotiate a peaceful settlement.14 
Hitherto, changes in Soviet policy towards the UN and its call for a revitalised 
UN with a central role in world politics and global security were cautiously 
received by US foreign policy makers. Although, the increasing Soviet 
engagement in UN efforts to resolve conflicts was emphatically evident, it was 
not until 1990 that the US appeared to be satisfied with new Soviet sobriety, 
especially with relation to the use of veto.
The US attitude towards the UN 
Conceptual approach
The American attitude towards the UN was dominated by the consideration of 
the viability of the UN as a tool for serving US foreign policy goals and as a 
means for restoring and maintaining international peace and security. Two 
different approaches can be pointed out in the assessment of scholarly debate 
in this area. The first approach is a normative prescriptive one, which tends to 
discuss the challenges facing the United Nations from within its system. It 
seeks to find ways of improving the services of the United Nations through 
reform schemes, it addresses problems entailed in the UN system, provides 
analysis of empirical issues related to UN practice, and responds to questions
14 Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, ‘Mosco’s U.N. Policy’ in Andrei G. Bochkarev,
and Don L. Mansfield, eds. The United States and the USSR in a Changing World, Westview
Press, Boulder, 1992, p. 188.
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of co-operation among member states. The second approach is fundamentally 
critical of the UN. It questions the solvency of the organisation and the very 
reason for its existence. In such a perspective, the world is assumed to 
function without the UN and the UN is, ostensibly, irrelevant in discussions 
on global security issues. These two approaches could be related to debates 
among classical schools of International Relations; between the realists who 
dispute the very existence of a global will or common global interests, and the 
idealists who believe in ‘collectivity’. Most significant to the present 
discussion are the opposing ideas of Hobbesians and Kantians on issues of 
international society, world order, and the possibility of preserving 
international peace over sustainable periods.15 Some writers indicated the 
plausibility of having an American approach which accepts global 
management as a tool of US foreign policy and provide answers for 
isolationists’ concerns. According to Patrick Morgan
The United States seems to have arrived at a working compromise. A 
neoliberal rhetorical posture is being combined with a neorealist 
concern about national capabilities, while both are augmented by a 
neoisolationist response to any regional situation that seems likely to 
involve a costly and difficult intervention. This fits the US response to
15 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study o f  Order in World Politics, Macmillan, 
London, 2nd edition 1995, pp. 23 -  26; Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations,
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Bosnia, the eventual response to Somalia, much of the response to 
Haiti, and the Clinton decision on China and human rights.16
The need for a sort of combination was also asserted by Henry Kissinger in 
1994:
In travelling along the road to world order for the third time in the 
modem era, American idealism remains as essential as ever perhaps 
even more so. But in the new world order ... traditional American 
idealism must combine with a thoughtful assessment of contemporary
17realities to bring about a usable definition of American interests.
Tendency to combine between the ideal of managing world order collectively
and practical realities acknowledges the importance of multilateralism which
should be flexibly utilised to secure American interests. It also reflects the
1 8inclination to accommodate hostile isolationist views. This imperative has 
been well established by Keohane and Nye who state: ‘The United States must 
support international institutions that facilitate decentralised enforcement of
Macmillan, London, 1994, pp. 8, 98 -99.
16 Morgan M. Patrick, ‘The United States’ in Kolodeziej A. Edward and Kanet E. Roger, 
Coping with conflict after the Cold War, eds. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London, 1996, p. 42.
17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 834.
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rules without naively believing that enforcement will be automatic or easy.’ 
They add ‘Such a combination of institutional strategy and tactical flexibility 
could be simultaneously visionary and realistic. It would be opportunistic in 
the best sense: ready to seize opportunities provided by crises to make regimes 
more consistent with America’s interest and values. It is a viable alternative to 
recurring fantasies of global unilateralism.’19
Although, there is a similarity between this and debates in classical IR 
theories that could help understand the US attitude towards the UN and 
multilateral approaches, these contemporary discussions do not necessarily 
reflect specific characteristics of traditional schools. Furthermore, most of the 
studies in the field do not claim a linkage with these theories and the 
distinction between two types of studies or scholars according to the above 
classification is not always possible. Nevertheless, the existence of two main 
streams in the process of forging American’s UN policy is apparent. They 
range from those who provide the US Administration with encouraging 
prospects for the exploitation of the UN, to sceptics who regard the 
mobilisation of the UN, in most cases, as a waste of time and resources. 
However, a ‘principled pragmatism’ as a US foreign policy approach towards
18 Martin Walker, ‘A New American Isolationism?’ International Journal, vol. 52, no.3, 
Summer 1997, pp. 394, 398,402 -  404,409.
19 Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ‘Two cheers for multilateralism’ Foreign Policy, 
no. 60, fall 1985, p. 167.
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the UN is proposed to serve as the ‘best counsel’ for the achievement of 
American foreign interests.20
Reasoning the embrace
American scholars and practitioners who support the use of the UN machinery 
in foreign policy, believe that it is in the interest of America to act within a 
multilateral framework. They mostly encourage the US Administration to 
resort to the United Nations mechanism, to seek authorisation from the UN 
when it is involved or intends to be involved in international conflicts and to 
refrain from unilateral actions, to participate in UN operations and to provide 
sufficient financial support for its missions. This attitude bases itself on 
strategic factors. Historically, the United States made strenuous efforts and 
provided substantial support for the establishment of the United Nations. 
During the wartime conferences and pre-negotiation in Tehran, Dumbarton 
Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco, the United States expressed willingness, 
provided various diplomatic initiatives, drafted important proposals, and 
secured considerable portions of the necessary funds for the creation of the 
United Nations. The United States has remained a permanent figure in the 
United Nations for a long time and has offered its leadership for the
20 James F. Leonard, ‘US Policy Toward the United Nations’ in Roger A. Coate, ed. US
policy and the future o f  the United Nations, The Twentieth Century Fund Press, New York,
1994, p. 219.
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organisation during major events and through sensitive periods in the past five 
decades.
Robert Strausz-Hupe claims: ‘It is no exaggeration to say that 
Americans, of all peoples, had wanted the United Nations most, had thought 
and debated about it most, and had contributed in ideas, diplomacy and money
91to the finished product than anyone else.’ For this group of American 
Scholars and strategists, to isolate the US from UN activities and to tend to act 
out of its framework is a denial of the US historical efforts in the 
establishment of the UN.22
2- The role of the United States in the Kuwait crisis 
The US attitude to the crisis
‘When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, it was the United States that 
galvanised the UN Security Council to act and then mobilised the successful 
coalition on the battlefield.’ George Bush 5 January 1993.
21 Robert Strausz-Hupe, Introduction, in Gross, Franz B. and others, eds.77te United States 
and the United Nations, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1964, p. 7; H. G. Nicholas, a 
British scholar, at the twentieth anniversary o f the UN acknowledged that: ‘American support, 
both official and private, for the UN has been strong and, in the main, consistent over the 
twenty years since San Francisco. That the organisation exists and functions at all is due more 
to the United States than to any single nation.’ H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations in Crisis, 
Chatham House: International Affairs, July 1965, p. 443.
22 Reference to the influence o f American scholars on US foreign policy making is supported 
by the fact that most o f the scholars referred to in this chapter have assumed official positions 
mostly as advisers on international and security affairs.
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On 2 August 1990, United Nations officials were informed by the United 
States Administration about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A joint call for an 
urgent Security Council meeting was issued by Kuwait and the US, a request 
which culminated into the adoption of resolution 660, calling for an 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The United States had 
repeatedly confirmed its firm stance against the invasion of Kuwait and 
promised to ‘stand shoulder to shoulder with Kuwait’. In carrying out this 
task, as well as other objectives of its own foreign policy in the crisis, the 
United States sought co-operation with members of the Security Council for 
the passing of necessary resolutions and securing international legitimacy for 
actions against Iraq. However, the United States had taken economic and 
military measures and performed diplomatic manoeuvres not under the 
auspices of the Security Council.
The immediate resort by the Administration to the machinery of the 
Security Council and willingness to use the Council as a site for decision 
making in a major international crisis over a sustained period was unparalleled 
in the history of the United States. The administration was confident that the 
occupation of Kuwait represented a clear case of aggression to be considered 
by the Security Council and the international changes would permit the
23 These include the US freezing o f Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets before the adoption of SC 
resolution 661, the early deployment o f US forces to the area, and diplomatic tours of US 
envoys.
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adoption of effective measures. The move to condemn Iraq and to call for the 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces was unlikely either to be blocked by the negative 
vote of a permanent member or to fail to secure the votes of nine members out 
of the fifteen members of the Council. This was mainly due to the new 
atmospheres in the Security Council created by the end of the Cold War and 
the subsequent Soviet’s willingness to cooperate with the United States.
This part of the study argues that during the Kuwait crisis, the United 
States administration acted simultaneously in multilateral and unilateral forms 
and in many instances, bilateral negotiations and deals took place between the 
administration and different states. The reason for such a comprehensive 
approach by the Bush Administration to the course of events in 1990-91 was 
the determination of the United States to reverse the Iraqi invasion through the 
exploitation of different means and methods and its readiness to explore 
various options to combat the aggression.
Although, the United States was able to act multilaterally and 
bilaterally with reasonable international consent, the unilateral route proved 
problematic. During the first months of the crisis, the US Administration had 
purported to reduce the risks of putting the matter into the hands of the 
Security Council, which could have restrained its ability to manoeuvre in a 
unilateral manner. The text of resolution 661 affirmed the right of individual 
states or a group of states to act in defence of the invaded country, within the
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context of Chapter VII.24 Article 51 stipulates that states should refrain from 
acting individually, since the Council has taken measures commensurate with 
the gravity of the situation. Another condition contemplated by Chapter VII 
provisions is the immediate reporting of measures taken by any state to 
implement the Council resolutions. In the second formal meeting of the 
Security Council on 9 August 1990, Mr. Pickering, the representative of the 
United States, while talking in support of resolution 662, reported to the 
Council military preparations already conducted by his government in the Gulf 
area. He said:
For our part, at the request of the governments in the region, the United 
States has increased its presence in the area. We are in the course of 
informing this Council officially by appropriate letter of our action taken 
under Article 51 of the Charter. As President Bush yesterday said, this is 
entirely defensive in purpose, to help protect Saudi Arabia, and is taken 
under Article 51 of the Charter and indeed in consistency with Article 41 
and resolution 661 (1990).25
24 Security Council resolution 661, 6 August 1990.
25 E. Lauterpacht and others The Kuwait crisis: basic documents, Cambridge International 
Documents Series, Vol. 1, Cambridge Grotius Publications, 1990, pp. 245-256.
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Mr. Lozinsky, the representative of the Soviet Union at the Security Council 
during the Kuwait crisis, did not accept the unilateral military moves pursued 
by the United States in the area. He responded to Mr. Pickering’s statement at 
the same meeting of the Council by saying: ‘We wish to remind everyone 
once again that the Soviet Union is against reliance on force and against 
unilateral decisions. ... We are prepared to undertake consultations 
immediately in the Security Council’s Military Staff Committee, which under 
the Charter of the United Nations, can perform very important functions.’
In the years before the Kuwait crisis, the United States had heavily 
relied on Article 51, in claiming legitimacy for its interventions in countries 
like Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. The advocates of its actions 
adopted a wide interpretation for the provisions of Article 51, a justification 
which was rejected by the International Court of Justice in the case of 
Nicaragua. Although the Kuwait crisis was different from the above cases, the 
United States still tended to put more emphasis, during the first weeks of the 
crises, on Article 51 to justify the early presence of American forces in the 
Gulf area.
The following discussion adopts a special analytical approach to 
explain the role of the US in the crisis and to assess the relationship between 
UN authority and American control and leadership. The subjects of this
26 Ibid.
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analysis are the military deployment and the campaign to meet the different 
costs of the crisis. First, the military deployment in the region will be 
evaluated on three levels according to the roles assigned to the forces on 
different stages and the actual conduct of power during these periods. Second, 
the extent to which the UN system for the maintenance of costs of 
international crisis has been utilised will be assessed in contrast to the fund­
raising system established by the US Administration during the Kuwait crisis. 
The examination of the issues of forces and costs as the most two crucial 
elements of the crisis will explain the nature of relationship between the US 
and UN and the influence of the US on peace enforcement operations.
US military deployment
The American military deployment in the area started from day one of the 
crisis. Instructions were simultaneously issued to the USS Eisenhower carrier 
to move east in the Mediterranean, and the USS Independence carrier to move 
north from the Indian Ocean towards the Persian Gulf. However, in terms of 
military planing and actual preparations, the pre confrontation stage was 
evident on both Iraqi and American sides even before the invasion of Kuwait. 
On the one hand, In the two weeks before 2 August 1990, the Iraqi build-up of 
forces on its borders with Kuwait was apparently suggesting the plausibility of
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77a military assault. On the other hand, in military and strategic terms, Iraq was 
defined by US strategists as an element of possible de-stabilisation in the Gulf 
area. Plans were designed and discussed at the military level a few months 
before the invasion of Kuwait on how US forces could respond to attacks on 
Gulf states. It was revealed by military sources that a plan called 1002-90 was 
forged before the invasion in anticipation of US confrontation with Iraq. 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Plan 1002-90 served as a starting 
point for operational planning for US forces. The US Central Command 
(CENTCOM) in Florida started airlifts and sealifts of forces and equipment to 
the Gulf during the first week of the crisis.
However, America was not alone and the early sending of US 
contingents to Saudi Arabia should not be interpreted as the embarking of a 
single state in the battlefield, since many states had decided to send troops. 
Their contributions ranged from air fighters and tanks to ambulances and 
drinking water. Britain was almost as swift and determined as the US in 
providing forces to combat Iraqi forces and resist its advance in the area. Sir 
Crispin Tickell, the UK ambassador to the UN during the crisis stated clearly
27 Anthony Parsons stressed the need for an active pre-emptive diplomacy and questioned the 
role o f the permanent members before the invasion of Kuwait. Parsons observed: ‘For a month 
before the Iraqi invasion, it was obvious that there was a risk o f aggression. The permanent 
members, with their intelligence capabilities must have known better or at least to have had 
strong suspicions.’
28 Lawrence Freedman and Effaim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991, Diplomacy and War 
in the New World Order, Faber and Faber, London and Boston, 2nd edition 1994, p. 85; U.S. 
News and World Report, Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History o f  the Persian 
Gulf War, Random House, New York and Toronto, 1992, p. 51.
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that ‘at the request of the government of Saudi Arabia, my government has 
agreed to contribute forces to multinational efforts for the collective defence 
of the territory of Saudi Arabia and other threatened states in the area.’29 Mr. 
Tickell explained to the Security Council the legal grounds in the British law 
which allow his government to undertake such a decision. The political 
grounds were set out earlier by Margaret Thatcher in Aspen on 5 August when 
she affirmed that the Iraqi invasion should not be allowed to succeed: ‘Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait defies every principle for which the United Nations stands. 
If we let it succeed, no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of 
jungle would take over from the rule of law.’ It was the first emphatic 
statement about the invasion of Kuwait to be declared by a western state, 
including the US.
States from different parts of the world also offered forces. King 
Hassan of Morocco offered to send troops to Saudi Arabia, and on 6 August,
q 1
King Fahd accepted the offer. On 10 August the League of Arab States asked 
its members to contribute forces for the defence of Saudi Arabia. However, 
the United States had urged most of these countries to send forces, though 
their participation was rather symbolic and the US remained the major
29 E. Lauterpacht and others. 1990, note 13.
30 Extracts from a speech given by Mrs Thatcher to the Aspen Institute on Sunday 5 August
1990, New York Times, 6 August 1990.
31 Independent, 1 August 1990.
32 Independent, 11 August 1990.
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contributor with an incomparable presence in the Gulf. Meanwhile, the 
military presence in the area was gradually taking the shape of an international 
force, led by the United States.
Functions of power
From an international law perspective the problem entailed in the issue of 
early military presence in the Gulf was whether the United States and other 
countries were legally allowed to deploy forces to the area even before the 
Security Council had adopted any military measures. Such an approach would 
question the validity of legal arguments raised by the United States and the 
United Kingdom which relied on the right of collective self defence. However, 
the present discussion concentrates on the analyses of political and military 
aspects to explore the functions of power and the actual roles of force during 
the crisis. The task of defining the functions of power had been eclipsed by 
divergent and confusing political and military agenda of contributing 
countries.
In this respect, three main roles will be pointed out to show the 
different tasks assigned to them over different stages of the then developing 
crisis. The first role was initiated by the anticipation of a possible attack by 
Iraqi forces on Saudi Arabia and the necessity of early movement to show the
32Independent, 11 August 1990.
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unacceptability of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This role remained the main 
feature of the military presence in the Gulf from 2 to 25 August 1990. 
Hitherto the Security Council had neither mandated these forces with any 
purposes nor officially recognised their deployment. In the four resolutions, 
adopted by the Council before 25 August, there was no reference to these 
forces. President Bush described the role of forces, a few days after the 
invasion, as ‘wholly defensive ... They will not initiate hostilities, but they will 
defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the 
Gulf.’ Military planers used the rhetoric ‘Desert Shield’ and continued to call 
it so until the outbreak of the war in January 1991. However in the period 
before that, despite its misgivings, the term ‘Desert Shield’ seems compatible 
with the ‘defensive’ role. The use of the military term ‘Desert Shield’ has 
obscured the role of the then existing forces in the area, especially after 25 
August. A viable concept the Americans did not use to justify their early 
presence in the Gulf is the Hammarskjold idea of ‘preventive deployment’.34 
Despite the immaturity and the lack of adequate bases for the idea, it is 
plausible that the concept ‘preventive deployment’ could have provided some 
ground to accommodate the consequences of American fears that Iraq might 
have attacked Saudi Arabia. However, Hammarskjold did not anticipate
33 N.Y. Times, Excerts from BushEs statement on US defense o f Saudis, 9 August 1990, p. 
A15
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situations where preventive deployment could be mobilised on the borders of a 
third country, as there were no tensions on Iraqi-Saudi borders. American 
forces were deployed on the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
In the second stage the role of forces started to become more offensive. 
Paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution 665 of 25 August stated that 
the Council
calls upon those member states co-operating with the government of 
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be 
necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward 
and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their 
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 
provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1991).
Resolution 665 represented the first reference by the Security Council to the 
forces gathering in the Gulf, entrusting the Maritime forces with the task of 
shipping interdiction. Therefore, a role beyond the protection of other Gulf 
states from attacks and the troops’s self-defence was designated for the forces.
34 UN Document A/4390/Add.l, 31 August 1960; Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1972, p. 256.
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By 29 November the functions of forces entered a third phase. Troops 
were authorised to use force to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait if the Iraqis did 
not comply with the Security Council resolutions and pull back before 15 
January 1991.35 During this period the obvious role of the forces was to 
prepare for and participate in war.
The tracing of the role of forces through three main stages illuminates 
the unique nature of the unprecedented military build-up in the Gulf. In the 
Korean crisis of 1950 - 53 the United States, along with South Korea, 
contributed more than ninety percent of the forces deployed to reverse the 
North Korean invasion. In the Korean case the United States forces did not 
face similar problems to justify their presence, for they had moved from the 
beginning of the crisis under the flag of the United Nations with a clear 
enforcement mandate. The United States was free to designate the command 
and to lead the coalition forces to a military action even without serving Kim 
Il-sung with further notice. The Security Council did not issue an ultimatum 
before the outbreak of war as it did in Kuwait.
In the case of Kuwait, despite the unprecedented involvement of the 
Security Council in the crisis, the council did not identify the American-led 
forces as United Nations forces. The situation remained so until the war had 
ended and a cease-fire agreement was signed in February 1991, when the
35 SC resolution 678, 29 November 1990.
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forces were, for the first time, considered as a United Nations peacekeeping 
mission (UNIKOM).
Costs of sanctions and force
The United States sent diplomatic envoys to different parts of the world. These 
envoys were charged with two obvious tasks. First, to demonstrate wide 
support for the establishment of the coalition. Second, to secure adequate 
funds to cover the necessary costs of crisis management There were three 
types of cost arose from the Gulf crisis; these were costs caused by the 
invasion, costs that resulted from the imposition of sanctions, and the basic 
expenses of military deployment and war.
The invasion of Kuwait caused global economic instability. Twenty 
percent of the world’s reserves of oil were at stake in the crisis. This had 
directly affected the world prices of oil as well as the flow of oil supplies in 
different parts of the world. Countries which had economic ties with Iraq and 
Kuwait were clearly expected to suffer financial losses. However, this type of 
global consequence did not constitute a major concern for US campaigns. The 
costs of sanctions and the capability to mitigate their effects were crucial to 
the formation of the coalition. Many states were willing to join the coalition 
but were reluctant to declare this, because they needed assurances that their 
economies would not be hurt and that the alternative resources of financial
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compensation could be secured. American representatives were faced with this 
reality. In almost every country the Secretary of State James Baker had 
visited, a substantial part of discussion was focused on the issue of costs.
The third type of costs, which constituted the major portion and 
remained the centre of US concern, was the expenditure on the deployment of 
forces and eventually on the military action. The costs of the war which 
totalled on the coalition side to about $50 billion represented one of the 
highest costs in history of war.The international efforts to meet the costs of the 
crisis provide convenient grounds for the investigation of roles of the United 
States and the United Nations in the case of Kuwait. A close look at the 
activities of both sides in this respect would help to verify their roles as major 
actors in the crisis.
The role of the United Nations
a) Military costs
If the United Nations mechanism for peace enforcement had been mobilised, 
the authorised principal and subsidiary bodies of the UN could have played a 
substantial role in the management of military costs. According to the 
provisions of Article 47 of the Charter ‘There shall be established a Military
36 James A. Baker, III. With Thomas M. DeFrank, The politics o f  diplomacy, revolution, war 
and peace, 1989-1992, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1995, pp. 289 -  291.
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Staff Committee to advice and assist the Security Council on all questions 
relating to the Security Council’s military requirements...’ These 
‘requirements’ include the financing of military contingents at the disposal of 
the Council. The Committee is well equipped within the context of Chapter 
VII to carry out such movements. It is capable of establishing regional 
subcommittees after consultation with appropriate regional agencies to execute 
its plans. The Committee is also authorised to invite any member of the United 
Nations to be associated with it if that will help the Committee to discharge 
some of its responsibilities effectively. However, because the Military Staff 
Committee had not been utilised during the crisis, this mechanism remained 
dormant and it assumed no role in the issue of military costs. Except for the 
two preambles in resolutions 665 and 678, calling upon member states to 
render assistance and support for the possible undertaking of enforcement 
actions, the Security Council made no efforts to help the military deployment 
in the Gulf. The resolutions of the Security Council did not request the 
Secretary-General to take part in fund raising efforts for military purposes. 
The General Assembly was also paralysed and Article 17 of the Charter was 
not invoked as the entire budgetary system of the United Nations and its 
limited resources remained untouched. It might be worth noting that in a later 
experience in Somalia the Security Council did assign to the Secretary- 
General the task of organising funds. On 3 December 1992 resolution 794
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which authorised the use of all necessary means to secure humanitarian relief 
to Somalia, stated in paragraph 11: ‘Calls on all Member States which are in a 
position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional 
contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and 
requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the 
contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or 
operations concerned;’ It can be argued, accordingly, that Somalia had 
improved on Kuwait with its fund system.
b) The costs o f  Sanctions and the relevance o f  Article 50
The Security Council expressed awareness of the economic hardship facing 
member states as a result of the application of economic sanctions against Iraq 
and the occupied territory of Kuwait. Furthermore, the Council made several 
recommendations to alleviate the effects of the crisis on member states 
pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter. Article 50 stated that: ‘If preventive or 
enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any 
other state, whether a member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself 
confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of 
those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard 
to a solution of those problems.’ Thus, the initiative to mobilise Article 50 did
37 Security Council resolution 669,24 Septemperl990.
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not come from the Security Council. The Secretary-General indicated in his 
report to the Security Council on 6 September 1990, that a number of States 
expressed their intentions to consult with the Council in regard to the 
economic difficulties which resulted from the application of resolution 661. 
The Security Council responded by devoting the full text of resolution 669 to 
help solve this problem. Resolution 669 of 24 September entrusted the 
Committee established under resolution 661 concerning the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance and making 
recommendations to the president of the Security Council for appropriate 
action. The Committee received claims from almost half of the United Nations 
membership. In dealing with these claims the Committee carried out much 
work, but in actual terms it did very little to help member states.
In the Korean crisis there was no reference, in the six Security Council 
resolutions adopted between June 1950 and January 1951, to Article 50 or 
subsequent necessities of providing help to states affected by the crisis. 
However resolution 85 was devoted to the provision of assistance and relief
<JO
supplies to the people of Korea. The Council requested the Secretary- 
General, the Economic and Social Council and other relevant organs to
38 Security Council resolution 85 o f 31 July 1950.
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provide assistance ‘for the relief and support of the civilian population of 
Korea’.39
The role of the United States
a) Campaigns o f  fund raising
In September 1990 President Bush declared that his Treasury Secretary, Mr. 
Brady, would head a Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group. The members 
of the group were said to be: the Group of Seven (G7), the European 
Community (EC), the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), and South Korea.40 
However, this group did not function, and the United States remained the only 
effective actor in fund-raising.
Even before the creation of this body Mr. Brady accompanied James 
Baker in a fund-raising mission which covered nine countries including Arab, 
European, and Asian states. The first stop was Jeddah. The American 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia Mr. Chas Freeman asked James Baker to go easy
over numbers ‘They are strapped for money Don't press for too much right
now.’ Baker disagreed.41 In fact, when Baker and his staff left Washington,
39 However, a sentence at the end of the fourth and last paragraph o f resolution 85 referred to 
the possible use o f relief assistance ‘as appropriate in connection with the responsibilities 
being carried out by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council.’
40 The establishment o f the Co-ordination Group was announced by George Bush during the 
meeting o f International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington in September 
1990. See Daily Telegraph, 1 October 1990.
41 James A. Baker, III. op. cit. note 40, p. 289.
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they had no definite figures. During the twelve hour journey to Jeddah they 
went over estimations made by the Pentagon, Treasury, and State 
Departments. James Baker said: ‘We simply doubled them all on the spot.’42 
King Fahd accepted, without arguing, Baker’s proposal , that Saudi Arabia 
pays $15 billion. A similar amount was secured from Kuwait during the 
meeting between Baker and the Amir in Taif two days later. Almost half of 
Baker’s estimated funds were secured by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 
Americans made the objectives of their fund-raising plan clear and precise. 
They wanted to cover military expenditure and to support front line states, 
namely Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, in order to tighten sanctions against Iraq 
and to hold the coalition together.
The US Administration had therefore acted in parallel to the Committee 
established by the Security Council for this purpose. There was not even close 
co-ordination between the Committee and American campaigns for fund­
raising. There was a lot of controversy concerning calculations of actual costs 
and distribution of collected money. For instance Japan was not able to get 
assurances that its proposed $9 billion would be spent on humanitarian 
projects. Japan wanted to avoid its contribution being used for military 
purposes which might raise internal constitutional problems. Even Britain, the 
US’s closest western ally during the crisis, expressed reservations over the
42 Ibid. pp. 288-289 .
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issue. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer stated on 26 September 1990 
that it was not clear ‘who would give what to whom, when.’43
b) The US and the concept o f  burden sharing
The fund raising tours conducted by James Baker and other American 
campaigners during the Gulf crisis, could be fairly viewed, in an empirical 
sense, as a necessary activity to provide funds for the containment of the 
global effects of the crisis and to meet the costs of hostilities. However, the 
overall picture, comprising states from all over the world either providing 
donations to or receiving compensations from a single managing state, 
collecting and distributing money, was unprecedented in the history of 
contemporary wars. However, this simple observation has far reaching 
implications for theories and concepts of "international leadership" that have 
long retained substance in the field of international relations. For instance, the 
theory of "hegemonic leadership" does not seem to be applicable in the case of 
Kuwait as the stabiliser state, the one who pays the differences from its own 
resources or at least makes the major contribution is missing. Instead, the US
43 Financial Times, 27 September 1990.
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mobilised and managed the funds contributed by other states, however, that 
did not prevent the US from assuming absolute leadership in the Gulf.44
After the Gulf crisis the United States sought burden sharing in 
different areas to cover the costs of its military presence across the world. In 
May 1994, 144 members of the House of Representatives voted for a draft 
asking Europe to pay 75 percent of the costs of maintaining the presence of 
American troops in European countries.45 President Clinton promised that 
America would continue assuming world leadership ‘through multilateral 
means, such as the UN, which spread the costs and express the unified will of 
the international community’46
In the Korean War of 1950, the United States did not conduct similar 
campaigns to spread significantly the burden of costs over other countries. 
One of the reasons for this is that war broke out a few days after the invasion 
of South Korea allowing no time for fund raising plans. It is also worth noting 
that North Korea was not obliged to pay for the damages which resulted from 
its action as Iraq has to under resolution 687.
44 Jarrod Wiener, ‘Leadership, the UN, and the New World Order’ in Dimitris Boumantonis 
and Jarrod Wiener, eds. The United Nations in the New World Order: the world organisation 
at fifty, Macmillan, London, 1995, pp. 41 - 58. Duncan Snidal, ‘The limits o f hegemonic 
stability theory’ International Organistation, vol. 39, no. 4, Autumn 1985; Robert O. 
Keohane, After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1984.
45 ‘House coalition repels efforts to cut military further’ Congressinal Quarterly, 21 May 
1994, pp. 1320-1325.
46 ‘In the name o f the UN, stop it’ The Guardian, 14 June 1993.
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It could be said the successful utilisation of the concept of burden 
sharing is one of the unique features of the Gulf crisis. However, the profound 
results of the United States tours for this purpose give a partial, but significant, 
explanation of the American tendency to act multilaterally during the crisis: it 
wanted to involve as many states as possible, especially the rich ones, so that 
they would contribute to the overall financial and material costs.47
The US dominates the scene Did the Council * remain seized’?
An almost standard phrase with which the Security Council concludes its 
resolutions in dealing with continuing crisis is that the Council will remain 
‘seized of the matter’. It means that the matter will remain in the agendas of 
the Security Council for further considerations and the Council will remain in 
charge to follow the application of the measures it has authorised. In the case 
of Kuwait it is significant to notice that the Council was deliberately absented 
from the scene of the crisis from 29 November 1990 until George Bush 
announced the cease-fire on 27 February 1991. Two important periods 
unfolded, meanwhile. In the first period, between the authorisation of the use 
of force and the outbreak of war, there were rising tensions, polls and public 
opinion divisions, and the last minute attempts to attain peaceful settlement.
47 The concept o f ‘burden sharing’ may find a constitutional support in Article 49 o f Chapter 
VII o f the United Nations Charter which reads: ‘The members o f the United Nations shall join 
in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the SC.’
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This period could broadly be marked with the normative question ‘should the 
coalition go to war with Iraq?’ The second period was the 42 days of war, 
involving the whole range of military strategies, logistic issues, conduct of 
war, and questions of command and control.
The United States presided over the Council during November 1990, 
and before handing the lead of the Council to the Yemeni delegation in 
December 1990, resolution 678 was adopted, authorising the use of all
A a
necessary means to uphold the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Paradoxically, 
the fifth paragraph of resolution 678 reads as follow: ‘Decides to remain 
seized of the matter.’ However, for different reasons the United States on the 
one hand, and the Soviet Union and France on the other, did not want the 
Council to convene to consider issues related to the situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait between 29 November 1990 and 15 January 1991. For the United 
States the most it needed from the Security Council was the authorisation of 
the use of force: it did not express a willingness to mobilise the enforcement 
machinery of the United Nations to implement the provisions of resolution 
678. The United States also did not attempt to utilise the United Nations 
system for pacific settlement of disputes. Paragraph I of Article 36 of the 
Charter reads: ‘The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 [..likely to endanger the maintenance of
48 The Security Council meeting o f 29 November 1990 was headed by James Baker the 
Secretary of State.
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international peace and security] or of a situation of like nature, recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.’ The Soviet Union and 
France, when they voted for resolution 678, had both stipulated that the 
Council should not consider further measures against Iraq until 15 January 
1990. Each of the two states was aiming to mobilise the records of its good 
relations with Iraq in order to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis before the 
elapse of the Council’s dead-line. So, the Soviets and French, like the 
Americans, acted in a bilateral manner during this period, though their 
objectives were not similar.
UN or US action
Peace enforcement and intervention
Investigation of the overall relations between the US and UN in tackling major 
security conflicts may necessitate an assessment of some overlapping aspects 
of ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘military intervention.’ Peace enforcement is the 
term used in the Charter to characterise the concept of collective security: it 
was defined in the first part of this study. The attempt to reach a specific 
definition of the concept of intervention is problematic. As one scholar 
observed, the term intervention is ‘potentially misleading.’49 Definitions of the
49 Herbert K. Tillema, ‘Foreign overt military intervention in the nuclear age’ Journal o f
Peace Research, 1989, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 180.
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term, intervention, range from a restrictive one limiting the concept to direct 
‘military operations conducted upon foreign territory by units of a state’s 
regular military forces.’,50 to a broader definition of ‘any act of interference by 
one state in the affairs of another.’51 Hedley Bull offered a comprehensive 
definition by stating that: ‘It is dictatorial interference or coercive interference, 
by an outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign a 
state, or more broadly of an independent political community.’ However the 
first definition seems more useful within the context of this chapter.
Many have feared the expanding range of interference and the 
hegemonic attitudes of the US, which have risen significantly since 1989.53 
Others recognised the reality that a substantial role for the United States is, in 
most cases, inevitable as perhaps is its supreme leadership in many world 
affairs.54 The rhetoric of some American statesmen has acknowledged the 
importance of their leadership. In January 1991, during the Gulf war, George 
Bush stated that ‘American leadership is essential. Yes, the United States 
bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the
50 Ibid. p. 187.
51 Wolfgang Freidman, ‘Intervention and international law’ in Louis G. M. Jaqquet, ed. 
Intervention in international politics, Netherlands Institute o f International Affairs, Matitnus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, p. 40.
52 Hedley Bull, ‘Introduction’ in Hedley Bull, ed. Intervention in world politics, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 1.
53 Stephen Lewis, interviewed by Wurst, Jim, World Policy Journal, Summer 1991, vol. 8 no. 
3, pp. 539 - 549.
54 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Why international primacy matters’ International Security, vol. 17, 
no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 52 -  67; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Bound to lead: the changing nature o f  
American power, Basic Books, New York, 1990.
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world only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the 
means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble 
the forces of peace.’55 Democrats fought the 1992 elections with different 
slogans in foreign policies, and promised to give more attention to domestic 
affairs.56 John Dumbrell observed that ‘Rather than offering a positive 
alternative vision for American foreign relations, Clinton in 1992 presented 
himself as a candidate concerned pre-eminently with domestic issues.’ 
American electorates had also corroborated this conviction by preferring
f O
Clinton, who had little experience in international affairs, to George Bush, 
one of the most experienced American presidents in foreign affairs who was a 
US representative at the UN, US ambassador to China, director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Reagan’s vice president for eight years.59 
However, during the first term of Clinton presidency the behaviour of the US 
Administration did not seem to be less interventionist.
During the first six post-Cold War years, the United States tended to 
initiate substantial responses to international and internal crisis. With the 
obvious exception of the US intervention in Panama in 1989, which falls
55 George Bush, ‘State o f the Union Address’ Washington Post, 30th January 1991.
56 Tim Hames, ‘Foreign policy’ in Paul S. Hemson and Dilys M. Hill, eds. The Clinton
Presidency, Macmillan Press, London, 1999, p. 126.
57 John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton, Macmillan, London, 1997, p.
178.
58 Tim Hames, op. cit. note 41.
59 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition, American-Soviet Relations and the End o f the
Cold War, The Brooking Institutions, Washington D.C. 1994, p. 376
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beyond the scope of peace enforcement, the multinational US-led, or 
supported, military operations after the Cold War were conducted under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In 1990 - 91 the US led the 
coalition to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. In 1992, George Bush sent over 
30,000 troops to Somalia, in the largest foreign military involvement in a civil 
war since ONUC operation in the Congo in 1960. In 1994, American forces 
intervened in Haiti to restore the authority of the elected president, Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide. At the end of 1996, America sent 40,000 troops to Bosnia 
ending years of reluctance to share a military presence in the Balkans with its 
European Nato partners. In November 1996, it did not take Bill Clinton, the 
re-elected president, long to decide to send American troops to Zaire in a 
humanitarian mission under Canadian command. American forces were the 
first Western contingent to arrive in Kinshasa.
Scholarly analyses drew different conclusions from these cases 
concerning the importance of American leadership and the credibility of UN 
peace enforcement missions. The following discussion will take account of 
these views, exemplified in three groups of scholarly contributions, and 
attempt to draw a general conclusion.
Brian Urquhart expected the style of command to follow the pattern set 
by operation Desert Storm. He observed in 1991 that ‘the Council, in 
responding to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait, had to resort to authorising the
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use of force by a coalition under the leadership of the United States. It seems 
likely that, for the foreseeable future, some such arrangements will be the only 
feasible one in a major military confrontation.’60
Adam Roberts furthered this point by discussing the use of force by or 
on behalf of the UN peacekeeping operations. For Roberts,
[i]n some instances, there can be a strong case for the UN Security 
Council authorising an individual state to take a lead role in a country 
where there is already a UN peacekeeping presence, but it has been ill- 
supported and ineffective. This is roughly what happened over Somalia 
in December 1992 and Rwanda (with the authorisation of the French 
intervention) in June 1994. Such a system of authorisation involves an 
implied reproach to international organisations, yet it may be the only 
way of addressing certain endemic conflicts and failures of 
governments.61
60 Brian, Urquhart, ‘The UN: from peacekeeping to a collective system’ in New dimensions in 
international security, Adelphi Papers no. 265, Part 1, Brassey’s, 1991/92, p. 26.
61 Adam Roberts, ‘The crisis in UN peacekeeping’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Managing global chaos: sources o f  and responses to 
international conflict, United States Institute o f Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 1996, p. 313.
143
Other scholars see no alternative to the use of American power in the face of a 
major crisis. Discussing the role of the United States after the Gulf War Walter 
Slocombe says:
The war highlighted the degree to which the United States has an 
unrivalled capability of world-wide military reach. No country comes 
close to having the combination of forces, bases, technology and lift 
necessary to mobilise an operation on the scale of Operation Desert 
Storm at such a distance and under such difficult conditions. Nor has 
any other nation the potential of the US to organise and co-ordinate an 
international military effort.62
Slocombe argues that ‘On the balance, the Gulf experience seems likely to
fkXreinforce the prospects for an active future American international role’. 
Gareth Evans states that: ‘The position of the United States really is crucial, 
for without the United States there can be no UN role at all in collective 
security.’64
62 Walter B. Slocombe, ‘The role of the United States in international security after the Gulf 
war’ in New dimensions in international security, Adelphi Papers no. 265, Part 1, 1991/92, p. 
46.
63 Ibid.
64 Gareth Evans, 'The New World Order and the United Nations' in Mara R. Bustelo and Philip Alsotn, 
Whose New World Order: What Roles for the United Nations? The Federation Press, Sydney, 1991, p. 10,
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However, views opposing to these arguments were expressed by other 
scholars. Responding to a question as to how the United Nations had reacted 
to the Gulf crisis, Stephen Lewis claimed:
The UN should have insisted that if there was going to be a military 
operation conducted in its name, it would require the use of UN troops 
under a UN flag. Under no circumstances, therefore, should we ever 
permit ourselves again to get into a situation whereby the United 
Nations gives legitimacy to a force that is led by a command structure 
outside the UN and over whose actions the UN has absolutely no 
control whatsoever-as was evident in this war from the beginning to the 
end.65
Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin came up with similar lessons from the 
Gulf experience. They argued that ‘There are alternative procedures that might 
in the future be followed by the Security Council, ones that would offer 
prospects of effective enforcement action without the disadvantages and 
problems associated with according responsibility to individual member 
states.’66 In offering some alternatives, Russett and Sutterlin referred to the
65 Stephen Lewis, interviewed by Jim Wurst, World Policy Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, Summer 1991,
pp. 539 - 549.
66 Bruce Russett, and James S. Sutterlin, ‘The UN in a New World Order’ Foreign Affairs, vol.
70, no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 69-83 .
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Korean crisis of 1950 as the first attempt to apply the enforcement measures of 
the United Nations with a leading role for the United States. They stated that 
‘The problems that arose in the Korean case would conceivably be alleviated 
if the unified commander were required to consult with the Security Council, 
or with some form of military authority appointed by the Council,’
The disapproval of the procedure taken in the Gulf was also echoed in 
the rhetoric of some politicians. Marshal Dimitry Yazov, Soviet Defence 
Minister, said in an article in Pravda, a few weeks after the war, that western 
intervention in the Gulf was simply an attempt to impose a western new world 
order by force: ‘This is objective reality. The events in the Gulf have
/ n
confirmed this convincingly.’ The direct question which arises from such 
situations is whether the action was a UN or US one. Commenting on the 
dominance of the US in Korea 1950 and Kuwait 1991, Russett and Sutterlin 
stated that ‘The major danger is that the entire undertaking will be identified 
with the country or countries actually involved in military action rather than 
with the United Nations.’69
67 Ibid.
68 Yazov, Dimitry, Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1991.
69 Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, op. cit. note 66.
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Conclusion
The UN system of peace enforcement has remained dormant, and from Korea 
1950 to Zaire 1996 the United Nations always delegated the command of its 
forces to member states, with the United States designating the command of 
forces in most cases. To overcome the paradox in UN practice and the obvious 
deviation from UN principles and charter provisions, in future authorised 
peace enforcement actions, the relationships between the authority of the 
Security Council and the power of permanent members needs to be clearly 
defined.
US military and financial support has been considered by the UN 
Secretariat and members of the Security Council as a necessity for the 
undertaking of peace enforcement missions. This assumption stems from the 
importance of showing the credible threat and the ability to use the force 
against an aggressor or war perpetrator, in order to secure compliance with 
Security Council resolutions. For these reasons, UN Secretary-Generals tended 
to rely on the US. A major role for the US in the cases of Korea 1950 and 
Kuwait 1990 was inevitable. However, it is not impossible for the United 
Nations to find adequate military support from other countries to resolve many 
conflicts, and the US leadership is not always necessary. A peace enforcement 
operation in Somalia consisted of national contingents from states other than 
the US, would not have proved less effective than the Task Force.
Part IV
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Chapter 5 
Constitutional problems
The United Nations has been studied both as a political organisation and 
constitutional system. Although there is frequent overlap between the two 
approaches, some of the main examples of the political approach can be found 
in the studies by H. G. Nicholas,1 Sydney Bailey,2 and G. R. Berridge.3 
Constitutional approaches can be found in the writings of Oscar Shachter,4 
Christopher Joyner,5 and Rosalyn Higgins.6 Some scholars, such as Hans 
Morgenthau, combine the two approaches in one context, but maintain a
• • • • • 7distinction between them in the discussion. Morgenthau argued that
In order to understand the constitutional functions and actual operations 
of the United Nations, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between the 
constitutional provisions of the Charter and the manner in which the
1 H. G. N icholas, The United Nations as a P o litica l Institution, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 5th edition 1975.
Sydney D. Bailey, The United Nations, A short P olitica l Guide , Pall M all and 
Praeger, London and N ew  York, 1989.
G. R. Berridge, Return to the UN, Macmillan, London, 1991.
4 Oscar Shachter, International law  in theory and p ra c tice , Martinus N ijhoff 
Publishers, Dordecht, Boston, and London, 1991.
5 Christopher C. Joyner, ed. The United Nations and international law, ASIL and 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
6 Rosalyn H iggins, The D evelopm ent o f  International L aw  through the Political 
Organs o f  the United Nations, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, P olitics Am ong Nations, The Struggle f o r  P ow er and Peace, 
Alfred A. Knopf, N ew  York, 5th edition 1978.
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agencies of the United Nations, under the pressure of unforeseen 
political circumstances, have actually performed their functions under 
the Charter. The government of the United Nations, like the government 
of the United States, can be understood only by confronting the
o
provisions of the constitution with the realities of political practice.
The task of contrasting the practice of the United Nations with the 
constitutional provisions of the Charter is very important in the study of peace 
enforcement in the UN system. Chapter VII of the Charter embodies a 
constitutional and political framework for the handling of one of the most 
important normative questions: should the international community go to war 
against an aggressor? This is the most sensitive aspect of the UN’s role, and as 
such demands the contrast of the political to the constitutional in any analysis. 
As the other parts of the thesis concentrate on the political aspects of peace 
enforcement, this part exclusively discusses the legal problems related to the 
application of Chapter VII of the Charter. It considers four important
Q
Ibid. p. 468. In this sense the study of the United Nations combines elements from 
the two close disciplines of International Law and International Relations. The 
following studies provide better understanding of this relation: G. John Ikenberry, 
‘Constitutional Politics in International Relations’ European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 4, no. 2, June 1998, pp. 147 -  171; International Law as a Language 
for International Relations, Proceedings of the United Nations Congress on Public 
International Law, New York, 12-17 March 1995, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, London, and Boston, 1996; Charlotte Ku and Thomas G. Weiss, Toward 
Understanding Global Governance, The International Law and International 
Relations Toolbox, Acuns, Brown, 1998.
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constitutional issues: the distinction between peace enforcement and actions in 
collective self-defence. The conclusion of agreements between the Security 
Council and member states contributing forces to peace enforcement military 
operations; and the constitutional effect of the absence or abstention of a 
permanent member during the course of voting. A fourth constitutional 
problem, the determination by the Council of the adequacy or inadequacy of 
measures provided for in Article 41 of the Charter, will be originally 
addressed in this part. In considering this problem, the thesis suggests a four- 
points criterion for measuring the adequacy and inadequacy of non-military 
enforcement measures before the Council can decide to take military action 
under Article 42.
1- Collective self-defence and peace enforcement
Peace enforcement, as explained in the first chapter of this study, is a system 
of collective security intended to replace traditional alliances by conferring on 
a central agency, the Security Council, the sole responsibility for the 
undertaking of economic and military measures to enforce the peace. By 
contrast, collective self-defence, as envisaged in Article 51 of the Charter, is 
an exceptional legitimate use of force by a group of states in defence of the 
territorial integrity and political independence of a victim state. Despite the
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clear distinction in theory between these two regimes, their characteristics 
have been confused in practice and thus led to disputes among scholars and 
practitioners. The following analyses take account of these scholarly 
discussions and attempts to evaluate basic constitutional arguments.
Conceptual background
The establishment of the United Nations and the adoption of the Charter 
signified an attempt by the international community to move from a world of 
alliances to a system of collective security. However, this was accompanied by 
a tendency of states to form regional organisations and to create pacts and 
regional arrangements to serve the purpose of defending their territories 
against possible external attacks. The task of blending a rising regionalism 
with a central role for a global organisation was seen as crucial.9
This constitutes the main reason for the adoption of Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. During the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation, at San Francisco, 1945, proposals were drafted to
9 Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated in a speech in March 1943 that ‘One can 
imagine that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, 
and someday all the nations should come into being a Council of Europe and a 
Council of Asia.’ In 1944 Bertram Pickard observed that ‘post-war international 
relations must take into account both regional and universal needs. ... and the 
possibility of combining the two approaches’. These two quotations and lengthy 
discussions on this issue are found in A Symposium of the Institute on World 
Organisation, Regionalism and World Organisation: Post-war aspects of Europe's 
global relationships, American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D. C. 1944, 
pp. 5 - 8, 11 - 26, and 40 - 54.
152
include the right of self-defence in the Charter. The Latin American states 
played a substantial role in the formulation and the adoption of Article 51. 
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, an Inter-American System was developed 
through a series of negotiations and conferences with the intention of 
providing a means for the collective maintenance of peace and security in the 
region. During the decade which preceded the establishment of the United 
Nations, Inter-American states concluded four important agreements: the 
Conventions of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 
the Declaration of Lima, Declaration XV, and the Act of Chapultepec in 
March 1945. The Act of Chapultepec was the most comprehensive of these 
agreements, providing a system of what could be called ‘regional collective 
self-defence’. Josef Kunz, and Goodrich and Hambro argue that Article 51 
was contained in the Charter to ‘harmonise’ the Inter-American System with 
the general global system of the United Nations.10 At San Francisco, Latin 
American Republics were anxious to modify the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to 
include an explicit reference to the right of collective self-defence. Thus, the 
provisions of Article 51 evolved from the works of a committee dealing with 
the question of regional arrangements at San Francisco.11
10 Josef L. Kunz, ‘Editorial Comment’ The American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 41, no. 4, 1947 p. 872; Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hmabro, Charter of the 
United Nations, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1949, p. 297.
11 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisations, San 
Francisco, 1945, UN Information Organisations, New York and London, 1945-46, 
Vol. XI.
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The Dumbarton Oaks proposals did provide for a significant role to be 
undertaken by regional organisations in the maintenance of peace and security. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 52 of Chapter VIII reads: ‘Nothing in the present 
Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations.’ Nonetheless, Article 53 stipulates prior 
authorisation of the Security Council for actions under Chapter VIII, as ‘...no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council’. The restriction 
laid down in Chapter VIII rendered the arrangements for regional action 
unsatisfactory for the Latin American Republics which had endeavoured to 
achieve the adoption of a more ambitious scheme to allow ‘a large measure of 
autonomy to the operation of such regional arrangements.’ Their efforts finally 
culminated in the adoption of Article 51 within the context of Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter.
For the purpose of this study, two observations will be made on the 
review of the conceptual and historical background to Article 51. First, during 
the process of adopting Article 51, emphasis was placed on the notion of 
‘collective self-defence’ rather than ‘individual self-defence’. Second, the
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linkage of the adoption of Article 51 to the emergence of an Inter-American
System is evident. The regional organisations which were formed in the few
years following the establishment of the UN principally organised their entire
existence around Article 51. The North Atlantic Treaty, declared on 4 April
1949, regarded the possible undertaking, by member states, of necessary
action ‘including the use of force’ to defend the North Atlantic area as an
‘exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by
10Article 51* of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the North Atlantic
Treaty incorporated within it a substantial part of the meaning of Article 51 by
declaring that ‘Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures
1 ^necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.’
However, the obvious association of Article 51 with regional 
organisations neither identifies its whole context with the UN scheme for 
dealing with regional arrangements, nor even hampers it from encompassing 
cases of self-defence actions exercised, individually or collectively, by states 
not necessarily members of regional organisations. Juridically, the historical 
background should not dominate the interpretation of Article 51. In other
12 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
13 Ibid.
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words, in practice an individual state or a group of states can claim the right of 
self-defence without necessarily being associated with any regional 
organisation.
Endurance of the right of self-defence
The relevance o f Article 51
The relation between individual or collective self-defence and collective peace 
enforcement is explained in the text of Article 51. In fact, most of the text of 
Article 51 is devoted to explaining the relevance of the right of self-defence to 
the preceding Articles of Chapter VII which provide a system of collective 
peace enforcement. Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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The terms of Article 51 gave rise to mounting debate over their interpretation 
within the context of the Article as to their conformity with relevant Articles 
in other Chapters of the Charter. The issue of an armed attack is a prerequisite 
to the use of force in self-defence. The question of whether states can use 
force in defence of national interests even though no armed attack has taken 
place, or in anticipation of an imminent occurrence of an armed attack, was 
quite central to the scholarly discussions on the issue of the right of self- 
defence. But, as this study is primarily concerned with the Security Council’s 
response to armed attacks which might threaten international peace and 
security, more attention will be given to issues related to the endurance of the 
right of individual and collective self-defence.
Commensurate measures
Before the case of Kuwait, the question of the endurance of the right of self- 
defence while the Security Council is taking measures necessary to deal with a 
certain situation seemed to be hypothetical. An international lawyer, Jean 
Combacau, explained why he tended to avoid discussions on this issue when 
he wrote in 1986 ‘We have not commented on the part of Art. 51, essential as 
it is, which specifies that the individual action of the state may continue (until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
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peace and security) ... This is because the aim was not to study the written 
rules, but to examine U. N. practice, which is more or less non-existent on this 
point.’14
However, this issue appeared to remain central during the Kuwait crisis 
and it has been observed that the Kuwait conflict gave ‘new life to the concept 
of collective self-defence’.15 There were arguments for and against the 
legitimacy of force deployment by states under Article 51 of the Charter while 
the Security Council was taking measures against an aggressor. McCoubrey 
and White argued that ‘Necessary measures within Article 51 must mean those 
which have the ability to perform the objectives of self-defence, namely to 
restore international peace by forcing the aggressor to comply with Article 
2(4) principally by removing it from the victim state and possibly by 
preventing it from further threats or uses of force. The only way of interpreting 
Article 51 without undermining the Charter edifice is to interpret it to mean
14 Jean Combacau, ‘The Exception of Self-defence in UN Practice’ in A. Cassese, ed. 
The Current Legal Regulations of the Use of Force, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordecht, 
Boston, and London, 1986, p. 29. It should be noted that Argentina had argued in 1982 
during the Falklands conflict that the United Kingdom was not permitted to act in self- 
defence after the adoption of resolution 502 by the Security Council under Article 40 
of the Charter. See also, Sir Anthony parsons response to the Argentine claim, 
Security Council meeting 2362, 22 May 1982.
15 Kevin C. Kenny, ‘Self-defense’ in Rudiger Wolfrum, and Christiane Philipp, eds. 
United Nations: Law, Politics and Practice, Vol. 2, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, London, and Boston, 1995, p. 1170.
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that only those measures which can effectively take the place of potential 
actions in self-defence can be said to suspend the right.’16
However, the question which remains whether the right of self- 
defence should cease if the Security Council has taken measures specifically 
in the form of economic sanctions under Article 41. Referring to the Gulf 
crisis, Rein Mullerson observed in 1990 that ‘The Security Council took 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security; it adopted 
trade and financial sanctions against Iraq; and it authorised measures to 
enforce these sanctions. From the moment the Security Council adopted these 
measures and imposed them on Iraq, the inherent right of self-defence was
i 7
replaced by these collective measures.’
In another contribution to the issue, McCoubrey and White asserted 
that ‘If it is concluded that they (economic sanctions) are an effective 
alternative to the use of force, then it could be strongly argued that they could 
replace a state’s right of self-defence. Leaving aside such empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of sanctions, it is pertinent to state that, at the conceptual 
level, it is difficult to see economic coercion, even if authorised by the United 
Nations, as being a replacement for a state’s right of self-defence, ... Whilst it
16 Hillaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, International law and armed conflicts, 
Dartmouth, 1992, p. 102.
17 Rein Mullerson, ‘Self-Defence in the Contemporary World’ in Lori Fisler Damrosch 
and David J. Scheffer, eds. Law and force in the new international order, ASIL and 
Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford, 1991, p. 13.
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is perfectly acceptable to for a state to restrict its response to sanctions, it
seems incongruous to forbid it from using counter-force in self-defence, if the
18imposition of sanctions has been authorised by the Security Council.’ 
Cease-fire and self-defence
Oscar Schachter argued that a call for a cease-fire would necessarily stop the 
right of self-defence. Schachter briefly asserted that ‘A resolution ordering a 
“cease-fire” for all parties would be adequate to preclude the use of force in 
self-defence.’19 This argument is consistent with the literal meaning of such a 
resolution and the Council’s intentions. However, if a state, deemed an 
aggressor by the Security Council, continued its attack against a victim state, 
the Council should follow its call upon parties to cease fire with serious steps 
to protect the victim and to restore international peace. Otherwise, the attacked 
state cannot be asked to stop defending itself simply because the Council has 
called for a cease-fire. However, Schachter’s argument may look more 
reasonable if the Security Council determined that due to the practice of the 
right of self-defence international security was endangered and subsequently 
called for a cease-fire.
18 McCoubrey and White, op. cit. note 16, p. 103.
19 Oscar Schachter, ‘Authorised uses of force by the United Nations and regional 
organisations’ in Damrosch, and Scheffer, op. cit. note 17, p. 79.
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Peace enforcement as burdensome
A practical consequence arises from depriving states of the right of collective 
or individual self-defence because the Security Council has taken measures to 
restore peace. A few days after the invasion of Kuwait, Margaret Thatcher
advised the United States to ‘invoke article 51, begin deploying American
20troops to the Gulf, and launch combat operations as soon as possible.’ James
Baker, then US Secretary of State, said that Thatcher ‘believed that asking the
U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on Iraq, which was happening that
21very day, would preclude our later taking military action under Article 51.’ 
Thatcher’s concerns were shared and addressed from a different angle by an 
American scholar, Richard Gardener, who contended that if the right of self- 
defence was eliminated once the Council started adopting resolutions ‘then the 
United States and other countries would not make use of the Security Council 
again in similar situations ... this would discourage resort to collective 
machinery of the United Nations.’ However, in practical terms, the 
experience of the Gulf crisis affirmed, according to Baker, that ‘the United
20 James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The politics of diplomacy: 
Revolution, war & peace, 1989-92, G. P. Putnams, New York, 1995, p. 278.
21 Ibid. p. 279.
22 Richard N. Gardener, ‘Commentary on the law of self-defense’ in Damrosch, and 
Scheffer, op. cit. note 17, p. 50.
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States had no real choice initially but to try a coalition approach in dealing 
with the crisis.’23
Entitlement to collective self-defence
D. W. Bowett believes that collective self-defence cannot be properly claimed 
unless each of the states which take collective action is a victim of an attack. 
He discussed a simple definition of the right of collective self-defence: ‘If 
state A attacks state B, the latter has a right of self-defence and any other state 
may come to the assistance of state B pursuant to the right of collective self- 
defence.’ Bowett rejected these terms as a definition of Article 51’s 
provisions. In his view, it ‘is palpable nonsense, since it is an open invitation 
to states generally to intervene in any conflict between other states, anywhere 
in the world: it cannot possibly be consistent with a system of collective 
security (which is what the United Nations Charter attempted to establish) and, 
specifically, it is quite contrary to the delegation to the Security Council of 
“primary responsibility”24 for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in Article 24. The above definition would, according to Bowett, bear 
the potential of a global conflict since each party could have some states come
23 James Baker, op. cit. note, p. 279; see also ‘Go-it-alone policy is dangerous in Gulf 
Wall Street Journal, 29 November 1990.
24 Derek W. Bowett, ‘The interrelation of theories of intervention and self-defense’ in 
John N. Moore and Walfgang G. Friedman, eds. Law and civil war in the modem 
world, Baltimore, London, 1974, pp. 46 - 47.
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to its aid, a position similar to the nineteenth-century system of alliance. 
However, in practice, states adopted a definition similar to this, by regarding 
the action of states who come to the defence of a victim state, even if they are 
not direct victims of the aggression, as an action in collective self-defence 
under Article 51. In the case of Vietnam, the ‘Memorandum of the Department 
of State on the legality of the United States participation in the Defence of
25
Viet Nam,’ explained that the US acted in Vietnam pursuant to the right of 
collective self-defence because South Vietnam had the right of self-defence. 
Bowett believes that the Memorandum should have claimed the right of 
collective self-defence on the ground that the attack by North Vietnam upon
97South Vietnam endangered the security of the United States.
However, the International Court of Justice, when it opined on the case 
of Nicaragua, did not proclaim the occurrence of a threat to a third state to 
justify the right of collective self-defence. Instead, the Court stipulated that the
25 Memorandum of the Department of State on the legality of the United States 
participation in the Defence of Viet Nam, prepared by the International legal Adviser 
of the US Department of state, see D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International 
Law, 3rd edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1983, pp. 654 - 655.
26 Michael Akehurst argued that ‘long before North Vietnam started helping the 
insurgents, the USA had been providing the established authorities in South Vietnam 
with money, weapons and military instructors from 1954 onward. (The USA claimed 
that the revolt was organised by North Vietnam from the beginning, but most of the 
evidence suggests that the insurgents received no help from Norh Vietnam during the 
first year or so of the revolt in the late 1950s.) consequently it could be argued that the 
North Vietnams help for the insurgents was justified by the prior American help for 
the established authorities.’ Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International
t V iLaw, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, 4 edition, p. 244.
27 Derek Bowett, op. cit. note 24, p. 46.
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existence of an armed attack and a request of help by the attacked state is
OR •enough to justify collective self-defence. Oscar Shachter sees little practical 
significance in Bowett’s stipulation of a threat to a third state. In his view, ‘it 
is highly unlikely that State A would defend B against an attacker C, unless A 
regarded C’s attack as a threat.’ Shachter believes that ‘When a State comes to 
the aid of another, the legal issue is not whether the assisting State has a right 
of individual defence, but only whether the State receiving aid is a victim of
90external attack and has requested military support from the assisting State.’
Hans Kelsen did not refute the idea of one state or more coming to the 
defence of another UN member state in accordance with Article 51, but he 
believed that such action should not be termed ‘collective self-defence’ 
because the other states are acting in the defence of the attacked state, ‘but not 
in self- defence’. However, the term ‘collective self-defence’ has frequently 
been used to describe a third country action in concert with an attacked state.
Third party states are entitled to the right of collective self-defence, but 
only the attacked state is entitled to claim the occurrence of an armed attack.
281.C.J. Report 3, Nicaragua, 1986, p. 104.
29 The end of the cold war and the subsequent crisis in the Gulf, 1990-91, affected the 
perception of the right of collective self-defence in several ways. Changes in the 
consideration of national interests by each state in the absence of Cold War 
confrontation and interdependency in world economic relations had its impact on the 
relation between the attacked state and those that come to its aid.
Hans Kelsen, Recent Trends in the law of the United Nations, A supplement to The 
law of the United Nations, Stevens and Sons, London, 1951, p. 915; Hans Kelsen, 
‘Collective security and collective self-defence under the Charter of the United 
Nations’ American Journal of International Law, vol. 42, no. 3, 1948, pp. 783 - 796.
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Third party states are not permitted to exercise the right of collective self-
-31
defence according to their own assessment of the situation. The dispute on 
whether third party states should have interests in the area in order to be 
entitled to the right of collective self-defence, is largely diminishing due to the 
growing economic interdependency and the convergence of interests between 
different parts of the world. Even if Bowett’s stipulation is valid, it would not 
be difficult for third party states to justify their action in defence of a victim 
state by claiming that the aggression has affected their interests.
Characterisations of collective self-defence
The characterisation of a military action as collective self-defence has long 
been a source of discrepant opinions among international law scholars and 
practitioners. Collective self-defence could possibly be confused with two 
other kinds of collective military action which are permissible under the 
Charter of the United Nations: action under regional arrangements and 
collective enforcement action authorised by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII. The latter represents the major means of the Charter to combat 
aggression and threats to international peace and security. However, in the few 
incidents where the Charter system for peace enforcement has been invoked, 
an important aspect of this mechanism remained dormant. The non-conclusion
31 See I.C.J. Report 3, Nicaragua, 1986, p. 104.
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of agreements between states contributing military contingents and the 
Security Council,32 and the absence of a role for the Military Staff Committee 
in questions of command made it difficult to try to draw a distinction 
between peace enforcement and collective self-defence. For constitutional 
reasons, Kelsen and Stone considered the United Nations’ action in Korea in 
1950 a collective self-defence action rather than a collective peace 
enforcement action. In the case of Kuwait, the right of collective self-defence 
was recognised by the Security Council a few days after the Iraqi invasion in 
August 1990. Furthermore, in November 1990, the Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, authorised the use of force against Iraqi forces. Oscar Schachter 
argued that the right of collective self-defence, along with the Security 
Council authorisation, continued to provide legal grounds for the use of force 
after November 1990. Shachter contended that ‘the resolution adopted 
authorising “all necessary means” to compel Iraqi withdrawal was consistent 
with collective self-defence, even though no reference was made to Article 
51.’ In his view, ‘it was an authorisation to use force that under the Charter 
was compatible both with collective self-defence under Article 51 and ‘action’ 
under Article 42.’34 A controversial conclusion could be drawn from 
Shachter’s argument, that the right of collective self-defence did not cease
32 Article 43 of the UN Charter.
33 Article 47 of the UN Charter.
34 Oscar Schachter, International law in theory and practice, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordecht, Boston, and London, 1991, p. 403.
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even after the Security Council had taken necessary measures, including the 
authorisation of the use of force to reverse the Iraqi invasion. Schachter 
admitted that the Council has the right to replace collective self-defence by 
enforcement measures, but he saw no evidence that the council intended to do 
so when it adopted resolution 678 in November 1990. Resolution 678 was 
explicitly adopted under Chapter VII but it did not refer to Article 42. 
However, it does not seem quite sensible to regard it merely as an affirmation 
of the earlier recognition by the Council of the right of collective self-
nr
defence. The inherent right of individual or collective self-defence is 
technically part of Chapter VII, but it represents a different authority.
Yet, another prominent scholar, John Murphy, demonstrates that 
‘Resolution 678 refers only to Chapter VII of the Charter and does not
nr
otherwise specify the provisions of the Charter that authorise its issuance.’ 
Murphy states that ‘There have been discussions in various other fora about 
possible Charter bases for this resolution. Articles 42 and 51 have been most
n<n
often suggested as authority for the resolution.’ However, an important 
reservation is that actions under Article 51 do not require the authorisation of 
the Security Council. The authority of the Security Council is needed either to 
carry out an action under regional arrangements under Chapter VIII or for
35 Security Council resolution 661, 6 August 1990.
36 John F. Murphy, ‘Force and arms’ in Christopher Joyner, op. cit. note 5, p. 113.
37 Ibid.
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collective peace enforcement action under Article 42 which seems to be the 
case with regard to resolution 678. Kaikobad argued that, it is not entirely 
helpful to found the legal basis of resolution 678 on Article 51 when it can 
more convincingly be discerned in the scheme set out in Articles 39 to 42. Nor 
would it be correct to deny the status of such measures on the ground that the
- 3 0
Council’s role was marginal.’
It might be helpful, in the process of characterising coercive actions, to 
recall that an action under Article 42 requires that the Council determines a 
breach of peace, threat to peace or act of aggression, as stated in Article 39. 
An action under the right of collective self-defence requires necessity,
<30
proportionality, declaration by the victim state of being a target of an armed 
attack, and a request by the victim state for help.40 An action under Article 51 
does not require a determination that the situation threatens international peace 
and security by the Council.
- ID Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, ‘Self-defence, enforcement action and the Gulf wars, 1980- 
88 and 1990-91’ The British Year Book of International Law, Oxford University Press, 
1992, year 63, p. 363.
39 D. J. Harris, Cases and materials on international law, 3rd. edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1983, p. 656; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, 
International Law and How We Use it, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 228 -  235.
401.C.J. Report 3, Nicaragua, op. cit. note 31.
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Testing the legal parameters
Kuwait and the principle o f immediacy
An attacked state may not immediately act in self-defence, due to an 
incapacity to do so in the face of a massive attack, or pending assistance from 
outside. It may also wish to try other methods of solution by resorting to the 
Security Council or the International Court of Justice or by seeking regional 
arbitration. If such mechanisms do not work, the attacked state may decide to 
use force individually or in concert with other states, claiming the right of self- 
defence. Would a delay of response affect the entitlement of the victim to the 
right of self-defence? American Secretary of State, Daneil Webster, in his 
widely accepted identification of the requirement of action in self-defence, 
proclaimed that self- defence should be confined to situations where ‘the 
necessity of self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation.’41 The phrase ‘no moment for 
deliberation’ assumes that action in self-defence would be immediate. In 
August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and subjugated the whole country 
within hours. Kuwait was unable to mount a significant resistance or act in 
self-defence. It took Kuwait and its allies five months to prepare for a military
41 Included in a letter by Daneil Webster to the British Government on 24 April 1941, 
concerning the Caroline case see D. J. Harris, op. cit. note 39, pp. 655-656. On 29 
December 1837. The British seized the vessel, Caroline, on American shore, fired it 
and sent it over Niagara Falls claiming the right of self-defence. Britain justified its 
action on the bases that Caroline was providing supplies for Canadian rebels.
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response before the outbreak of war in the Gulf in January 1991. The UN 
Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, remarked in early November 1990 that 
Kuwait’s right of self-defence had ceased due to the elapse of a few months 
since Kuwait was invaded.42 The Secretary General’s opinion did not seem to 
contradict the stance of the United States and Britain. The two permanent 
members did claim the right of collective self-defence to justify the early 
presence of the international force in the Gulf, however, the situation changed 
after November 1990 and, eventually, action against Iraq took the form of 
collective enforcement measures authorised by the Security Council.43
In essence, the request for assistance by the victim state and the action 
in collective self-defence, must be reasonably rapid and in response to an 
overwhelming act of aggression.
Bosnia: between embargo and impotency to enforce the peace 
An important question arises from the experience of the 1990s: if the Council 
is acting under Chapter VII and even invoking Article 42 of the Charter and 
deploying forces to the area of conflict, but its actual action in the ground does 
not stop aggression, does the right of the attacked state in self-defence cease?
42 Washington Post, 9 November 1990.
43 An extreme opinion was mentioned by Rostow that the right of individual and 
collective self-defence exists until the Council either has restored peace or voted 
affirmatively to stop the right of self-defence. Eugene V. Rostow, ‘Until what? 
Enforcement action or collective self-defense’ American Journal of International Law, 
July 1991, vol. 85, no. 3, p. 510.
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In the case of Bosnia, the Security Council adopted harsh measures, including 
a comprehensive economic sanctions regime against the Serbs, and an arms 
embargo against the Serbs and the Bosnians. Moreover, the Council adopted 
resolutions authorising the use of force.44 Yet, for more than three years the 
Council was unable to stop aggression and tragic atrocities. For this reason, 
the Bosnians continued to defend themselves against systematic and massive 
armed attacks which left them ‘no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.’ In this case, the right of self-defence endured despite the 
measures taken by the Security Council. However, peace enforcement and 
self-defence had hitherto proved ineffective. Although the Bosnians were 
never denied the right to use force in self-defence, the question is whether it is 
consistent with the principles of the Charter to impose an arms embargo on a 
state entitled to this right.
Kuwait and Bosnia represent two important test cases for the legal parameters 
of the right of self-defence under the Charter. Kuwait is the only instance in 
which the full occupation of a sovereign state was carried out in less than 48 
hours. This situation made impossible an immediate and significant military 
response by the attacked state. Bosnia represents a case where the aggression 
lingered on for years in the absence of decisive action by the international
44 See Security Council resolution 7 7 0 ,1 3  August 1992.
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community, and where the victim retained the right of self-defence but had 
been denied the access to weapons to defend its defence.
2- Agreements under Article 43
The deployment of forces under the authority of the Security Council to 
undertake enforcement measures, in the absence of agreements between the 
Security Council and member states under Article 43, poses an essential 
constitutional problem. The Charter requires the conclusion of special 
agreements between the Council and contributing member states but, in 
practice, all enforcement military operations have been deployed without 
reference to the provisions of Article 43. Attempts to resolve this paradox 
have preoccupied the United Nations from the early days of its creation to the 
recent cases of peace enforcement.45 
Article 43 of the Charter reads:
1- All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make 
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
45 See for example S.C. 1st year Ser. No. 1, pp. 369 -  370; Security Council meeting 
on 16 February 1946; Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A Coate, The
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special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security.
2- Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of 
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and nature of the 
facilities and assistance to be provided.
3- The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible 
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded 
between the Security Council and members or between the Security 
Council and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes.
Scholars have adopted different approaches to the analysis and evaluation of 
the issue of special agreements under Article 43. Hans Kelsen believes that 
enforcement actions remain legitimate even if no agreements have been 
concluded:
It seems that according to the intentions of the framers of the Charter the 
Security Council is authorised to take enforcement action involving the
United Nations and changing world politics, Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford,
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use of armed force only through the armed forces made available to it by 
the special agreements concluded in conformity with Article 43. But the 
wording of Articles 39, 42, 47 and 48 does not exclude the possibility of 
a decision of the Security Council to the effect that members which have 
not concluded a special agreement under Article 43 shall have a definite 
enforcement action, or that members which have concluded special 
agreements shall provide armed forces in excess of those which they 
have placed at the disposal of the Security Council by the members. 
Article 42 refers to “air, sea, or land forces” without providing that these 
forces must be armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council by the Members.46
Kelsen’s approach emphasises the necessity of not precluding states from 
taking enforcement action under Article 42 if special agreements have not 
been concluded between the Council and these member states.47
According to Rosalyn Higgins, it is possible to take enforcement action 
in the absence of the implementation of Article 43, but the Council cannot ask
1994, pp. 32,91 -92.
46 Hans Kelsen, The law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental 
problems, Stevens and Sons, London, 1950, p. 756,
47 At the 476th meeting of the Security Council, Sir Gladwyn Jebb argued that the 
Council measures against Korea could only have been regarded as peace enforcement 
measures in conformity with Article 42 if agreements were concluded between the 
Council and member states under Article 43. Security Council Official Records, 
meeting 476, 5th year, p. 3.
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member states for compulsory participation. Higgins states that ‘This writer 
remains of the view that, while compulsory participation in a United Nations 
enforcement or policing action is not possible in the absence of Article 43, the 
possibility does remain-at the legal level at least-of enforcement action.’ This 
understanding led Higgins to decide that the military action against North 
Korea in 1950 was a peace enforcement action in conformity with the 
provisions of Articles 39 and 42.49
The International Court of Justice, while dealing with the case of 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, responded to a question concerning 
Article 17 of the Charter and the provisions of Article 43 by stating:
1... it cannot be said that the Charter has left the Security Council 
impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agreements under 
Article 43 have not been concluded.50
Mark Weller adopts a different approach, he considers the provisions of 
Article 43 a right and not a requirement. According to Weller, the Security 
Council has the right to initiate the conclusion of agreements with member
4ft Rosalyn Higgins, ‘A General assessment of United Nations peacekeeping’ in A.
Cassese, United Nations peacekeeping: legal essays, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen
aan den Rijn, 1978, pp. 3-4.
49 Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations peacekeeping, Documents and commentary, Vol.
II, Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1970, p. 111.
501.C.J. Report, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962, p.151.
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states, but if the Council is not so willing, the non-conclusion of such 
agreements will not affect its undertaking of enforcement action pursuant to 
Article 42. Weller believed that the provision of Article 43 ‘contains an 
obligation on the part of the members to respond to a call from the Council, 
but no obligation on the part of the Council to make use of the facilities 
offered by its members.’51
A third approach is taken by Oscar Schachter who considers the 
provisions of Article 43 a restraint on the Council’s authority. According to 
this approach, the authority of the Security Council to conclude agreements is 
subject to the constitutional approval of member states.
Consequences of ‘enforcement but not compulsory9
The argument, raised by Kelsen, Higgins, and the ICJ, that a military action 
authorised by the Security Council can still be enforcement despite the 
absence of agreements under Article 43, seems to constitute a prevailing 
notion. Yet, this idea has not been adequately explained in contemporary 
literature. The difficulty of assessing the notion of ‘enforcement but not 
compulsory’, which means an action can be described as enforcement even if 
it lacked the authority of compulsion, arises from the involvement of many
51 Marc Weller, ‘The United Nations and the jus ad bellum’ in Peter Rowe, The Gulf 
war 1990 - 91 in International and English Law, Routledge, London and New York, 
1993, p. 39.
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constitutional problems in the issue. These problems are related to the various 
provisions of Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the Charter52 which 
envisage the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The source of compulsion in the Charter is 
provided in Article 25 which reads: ‘The members of the United Nations agree 
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the present Charter.’ In Article 24 the Charter refers to the primary 
responsibility of the Council in the maintenance of peace and security, and 
member states ‘agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
Council acts on their behalf.’ There is ample discussion on the issue of which 
decisions of the Security Council should be regarded as binding. The most 
restrictive opinion confined the binding power of Article 25 to enforcement 
decisions adopted by the Council under Chapter VII. However, as confusion 
mounts over the obligatory nature of other provisions there is overwhelming 
agreement that enforcement actions are binding.54 The International Court of 
Justice in its advisory opinion on the case of Namibia stated that ‘It also had 
been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter’. The Court took the view
S'? However, with Chapter XII the problem may only exist on theoretical level.
53 N. D. White, The law of international organisations, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester and New York, 1996, pp. 87 - 92.
54 Rudiger Wolfrum and Christiane Philipp, eds. United Nations: Law Policies and 
Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, London and Boston, 1995, Hans 
Kelsen, Recent Trends, op. cit. note 30, pp. 927 -  952, 1150-51.
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that ‘If Article 25 had reference solely to decisions of the Charter, that is to 
say, if it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 25 
would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Article 48 and 49 of the 
Charter.’ However, the Court noted that the determination of whether a 
Council decision is binding requires consideration of the provision of the 
Charter on which the decision is based, the intent of the Council as 
documented by the wording of the decision, and the context in which the 
decision is taken.
The ICJ has provided means for flexible consideration of different 
situations on a case by case basis. This range of flexibility may be interpreted 
as allowing for exceptions to the general rule of regarding enforcement 
measures as binding. Accordingly, in the absence of agreement under Article 
43 enforcement actions may in certain circumstances be considered as 
constituting no authority of compulsion.
Compulsion and the concept of ‘Coalition of Willing9
Legal discussion on whether member states are required to provide military 
force under Article 43 blurred the strategic military exigencies as well as the 
political practicalities of peace enforcement operations. The explanation of 
this argument is twofold. First, the strategic nature of peace enforcement 
military operations does not conform to the assumption that the Security
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Council can compel member states to contribute forces against their will. 
National contingents which participate in the undertaking of an authorised 
coercive action under a unified command, are expected to co-ordinate and 
harmonise their efforts within a workable military plan. Adam Roberts argues 
that ‘military actions require extremely close coordination between 
intelligence-gathering and operations, a smoothly functioning decision-making 
machine and forces with some experience of working together to perform 
dangerous and complex tasks.’55 These strategic military requirements seem to 
be irreconcilable with the literal meaning of Article 43.
Second, the phrase used by some scholars during the Gulf war 
‘Coalition of Willing’ may also be relevant to the present discussion. Although 
the phrase does not represent a perfect means for the carrying out of peace 
enforcement actions, recent practice has shown that enforcement actions are 
usually executed by states which have a reasonable level of understanding, 
capability, and co-operation. The emphasis added by Boutros Ghali: ‘Coalition 
of willing and able’ was also significant.56 States which lack necessary 
capabilities may not be asked to contribute forces.
During the Kuwait crisis, all measures employed by the Security 
Council were considered binding. The provisions of Article 43 were not
55 Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and International Security’ Survival, vol. 35, 
no. 2, Summer, 1993, p. 15.
56 Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN Document S/24111,17 June 1992.
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invoked during the crisis and the Council did not conclude any agreements 
with member states. With the exception of resolution 688 concerning the no-
C Q
fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, there was no dispute over the 
mandatory nature of enforcement measures taken by the Council. On the other 
hand, there was no need to ask ‘unwilling’ states to take part in the military 
operations. For example, there were no prospects in the Security Council or on 
the part of the coalition to ask states, such as China, which opposed the use of 
force, to provide forces or even any kind of material support. Tom Farer 
exemplified this dilemma by asserting that ‘Jordan nominally accepted its 
undoubted obligation to impose economic sanctions against Iraq. Could it also 
have been required to allow use of its air base or space by the coalition forces? 
Neither the language nor history of the Charter appears to offer an 
incontestable answer.’59 However, the language of the Security Council
During the Gulf crisis agreements were concluded between the coalition members, 
however, the Security Council was not a party to these agreements. Tom King 
explained in a statement to the House of Commons that: ‘We agreed certain overall 
objectives between the governments concerned in the Coalition before the campaign 
started. We agreed on the importance, for example, of military objectives; we agreed 
on the need to minimize the risk of civilian casualties on the Iraqi side; we agreed on 
the importance, for example, of avoiding cultural or religious sites; we agreed that, for 
instance, we were not attacking water supplies or sewage installations; we agreed on 
what were military strategic targets and what were specific direct military targets and 
on the targets that we would seek to ensure were avoided.’ Cited in Christopher 
Greenwood, ‘Customary international law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in 
the Gulf conflict’ in Peter Rowe, op. cit. note 51, p. 66.
58 Security Council resolution 688, 5 April 1991.
59 Tom Farer, ‘The future of international law enforcement under Chapter VII: Is there 
room for “new scenarios”?’ in Jost Delbmck, ed. The future of international law 
enforcement: New scenarios - new law? Proceeding of an International Symposium of
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resolutions during the Kuwait crisis was explicit and demonstrative on this 
matter. Both of the Council resolutions, 665 and 678, which authorised the 
implementation of coercive measures, asked ‘Member States cooperating with 
the government of Kuwait’ to impose these measures. Resolution 665 was 
even more specific in adding the phrase ‘which are deploying maritime forces 
to the area.’ Therefore, the word ‘co-operation’ appears to be the operational 
word with respect to the participation of member states in the military action 
against Iraq. Military readiness of national contingents contributed by member 
states was also stipulated to assure the effective implementation of the Council 
resolutions.
Ratification of agreements
The last sentence of Article 43 declares that, agreements between the Security 
Council and member states ‘shall be subject to ratification by the signatory 
states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.’ Schachter 
interpreted this provision as giving member states absolute authority over the 
deployment of their national forces through special agreements with the 
Council. According to Schachter ‘member states cannot be legally bound to
Kiel Institute of International Law, March 25 to 27, 1992, band 115, Duncker and 
Humblot, Berlin, 1993, p. 44.
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provide armed forces unless they have agreed to do so’ and unless such 
agreements were approved by their constitutional processes.60
Schachter’s contention was challenged by Tom Farer, who asserted that
Article 43’s subjection of agreements negotiated between the Council 
and member states to ratification in accordance with national 
constitutional processes certainly need not be construed as an oblique 
way of preserving national discretion. For the requirement of ratification 
may have been intended simply to assure that such agreements were 
embedded in national consciousness and internal law. On this view, a 
state’s obligation was not conditional on ratification; instead ratification 
was an additional obligation.61
The opposing views over Article 43 are largely due to the accommodation of 
various terms within the context of its three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 asks 
member states to make forces ‘available to the Security Council, on its call’. 
However, the sense of urgency expressed in this part of the Article, is 
followed by a procedure that such a responsibility should be discharged ‘in 
accordance with special agreement’. Then, Paragraph 3 starts by asserting that,
60 Oscar Schachter, ‘Authorised uses of force by the United Nations and regional 
organisations’ in Damrosch and Scheffer, op. cit. note 17, pp. 69 and 71.
61 Tom Farer, op. cit. note 59, p. 43.
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‘agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 
Security Council*. However, the same paragraph ends with the controversial 
assertion that agreements are to be ratified in accordance with the contributing 
states’ constitutional processes. At the time of its adoption, the text of Article 
43 attracted controversy and argument between signatory states and, evidently, 
compromise was made at the expense of its clarity and rectitude.
Reflections on possibilities
Throughout scholarly discussions on the Korean crisis, 1950, it has been 
argued that the conflict between the superpowers was the main reason behind 
the failure of the Security Council to implement the agreements mentioned in
£'•y
Article 43. Although the two superpowers came to agree on many mandatory 
resolutions allowing for their adoption by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII in the post Cold War era, the situation remained unchanged and none of 
the provisions of Article 43 were implemented. This fact may suggest that 
disagreement among permanent members was not the only main reason, 
behind the failure to activate the enforcement machinery of the United 
Nations. This argument falls in line with the broad contention that some
fV )  • •See for instance A. Cassese, Violence and law in the modern age, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1986, p. 33.
63 Ibid.
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characteristics of the Cold War period belong to ‘deeper changes in 
international relations. ’64
It remains to be asked what the necessity and significance of discussion 
on a dead letter is to the Charter. The provisions of Article 43 had never been 
implemented in an enforcement operation authorised by the Security Council. 
Schachter observed that ‘It would be excessively optimistic to expect that such 
special agreements could be negotiated in the near future but the hoped-for 
strengthening of collective security through the United Nations may in time 
make it politically feasible to seek such agreements. Perhaps it is not too soon 
to study and reflect on the possibilities.’65 Schachter concluded. During the 
1990s, many proposals were drafted for the creation of a UN standing force. 
At least two permanent members of the Security Council showed interest in 
revitalising the provisions of Article 43. France and Russia, on different 
occasions, expressed their readiness to coordinate their actions pursuant to 
Articles 43 and 47. At the Security Council summit in 1992, President 
Mitterrand offered to provide the UN force with 1000 French troops.66 
President Mitterrand was responding to Boutros Ghali’s proposition to 
establish a UN force, on a permanent basis, under Article 43.67 Mr. Lozinsky,
64 Ian Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation, International Relations in the
Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 172.
65 Oscar Schachter, op. cit. note 60, p. 71.
66 UN Chronicle, June 1992, p. 7.
67 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for peace, United Nations, New York, 1992,
paragraph 51.
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the representative of the Soviet Union at the Security Council during the 
Kuwait crisis, said that his government was ‘prepared to undertake 
consultations immediately in the Security Council’ to verify military options 
in the Gulf.68 However, the opposition of some permanent members to 
coercion made the conclusion of special agreements a difficult task. To 
reactivate the provisions of Article 43 not only requires the non-use of veto, 
but also requires a willingness and agreement among the members of the 
Security Council over the proposed enforcement action.
3- Absence or abstention of a permanent member
Article 27 of the Charter bestowed on the five permanent members of the 
Security Council the power of veto.69 The meaning of the rule veto is that each 
permanent member is capable of blocking the Security Council from acting on 
substantial matters by voting against the draft resolution. There is no dispute 
over the constitutional effect of the use of veto. It renders the resolution under 
consideration invalid.
/ r o E. Lauterpacht and others, The Kuwait Crisis, Basic Documents, Cambridge 
international Documents Series, Vol. 1, Cambridge Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 
1990, pp. 245 -256.
69 The word ‘veto’ is not used by the Charter, but it is frequently used in the literature 
to refer to the negative vote of any permanent member on substantial matters.
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The permanent members of the Security Council, as well as non­
permanent members, have also the right to abstain during the course of voting 
or to absent it-self from the meeting. In certain circumstances the Charter 
oblige member states not to cast either positive or negative vote. This is what 
the Charter has called ‘obligatory abstention’.
Voluntary absence or abstention
In some situations, a permanent member may not agree to a draft resolution or 
some of its terms, or merely wants to show disinterest in the issue, they can 
then choose to abstain during the course of voting. In other situations, a 
permanent member may absent itself from a Security Council meeting while 
the Council is voting on a substantial matter. Possible reasons for this absence 
may include the fact that a representative did not receive instructions from his 
government or that it wanted to object to the work of the organisation on a 
different issue.70 The absence or abstention of a permanent member evokes 
constitutional problems especially in cases of peace enforcement.
70 One example is the absence of the Soviet Union from Security Council meetings in 
1950 in protest at the representation of China in the Council.
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Obligatory abstention
Article 27-(3) states that ‘in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 
3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.’ The Security 
Council’s record is a mixture of situations where members have abided by the 
general rule stated in paragraph 3, and situations where members have ignored 
the rule and participated in the process of voting despite their involvement in
71the disputes. The terms of Article 27-(3) explicitly restrict its effect to 
Council attempts to settle disputes under Chapter VI, and while the Council is 
encouraging a pacific settlement of a dispute through regional arrangements 
pursuant to Article 52-(3). It does not require a member of the Security 
Council who is a party to a certain dispute to abstain during the course of 
voting on enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Constitutional effects of voluntary absence and abstention
In the following analysis the study will take account of two different 
arguments on the constitutionality of Security Council actions when a 
permanent member is absent or abstaining voluntarily. It provides evaluation 
of these two arguments and further suggests a relation between the stipulation
71 For discussion of different eight cases see Sydney Bailey, Voting in the Security 
Council, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1969, pp. 63 - 64.
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of a ‘concurrent vote’ in Article 27 and the status of neutrality in collective 
security.
Sydney Bailey observed that ‘There is some evidence that at the San 
Francisco conference, the Sponsoring Powers took the view that an abstention 
would have the same effect as a negative vote.’
In the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union argued against the 
constitutionality of resolutions 82, 83 and 84, passed in 1950. These 
resolutions authorised the United States to designate the command of forces 
and to use the flag of the United Nations during the military operation against 
North Korea in 1950. At this time, the Soviet Union was deliberately 
absenting itself from the Security Council meetings in protest at the 
representation of China in the Council. The Western response was strongly 
dismissive of the Soviet constitutional claims. The USSR was only able to 
prevent the adoption of further Security Council resolutions on the Korean 
crisis when its delegate returned to the meetings.
Kelsen regarded resolutions 82, 83, and 84 as legally invalid arguing 
that due to the absence of the Soviet Union from the meetings of the Security 
Council the requirement of the concurring votes of the five permanent
72 Ibid. p. 69.
In this respect the Soviet Union vetoed two draft resolutions: draft resolution 
(S/1653) S.C. meeting 496, 6 September 1950 and draft resolution (S/1894) S.C. 
meeting 530, 30 November 1950.
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members was not satisfied.74 However, for Kelsen the use of force against 
North Korea was legal on the basis of Article 51.75 Richard Falk stated that 
‘the Soviet absence from the Security Council during the early stages of the 
Korean War (1950) was not then allowed to prevent ‘decisions’ despite the 
clear language in Article 27(3) that decisions required ‘the concurring votes of
7  f%the permanent members’.
Taking account of the actual record of the Council on the issue of 
abstention, Bailey asserts that ‘ the practice has developed of regarding only 
negative votes as constituting vetoes.’ According to Bailey, this ‘applies also 
to the absence of permanent members.’ As early as August 1947, the President 
of the Security Council (Representative of Syria) issued a statement declaring 
that:
74 Hans Kelsen, Recent Trends, op. cit. note 30, pp. 927 - 952. The Soviet Union was 
of the opinion that two permanent members were absent from the Security Council 
meetings which authorised the military operation against North Korea. On 29 June 
1950 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs cabled the Secretary General in 
connection with the adoption of resolution 83 of 27 June 1950 which recommended 
‘that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of 
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore the international 
peace and security in the area.’ The message explained that this resolution carried no 
legal force as it has been adopted in the absence of the representatives of the Soviet 
Union and China. UN Documents S/1517. For discussions on the representation of 
China in the Security Council see Security Council meeting no. 48, UN Documents. 
S/P.V. 480, Rev. 1, pp. 36 - 40, and 42 -  47; Hans Kelsen, this note, pp. 941 - 944.
75 Hans Kelsen, Recent Trends, op. cit. note 30, pp. 927 -938.
7  f \ Richard Falk, ‘The United Nations, the rule of law and humanitarian intervention’ in 
Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee, eds. Restructuring the world military sector, vol. 1, 
New wars (UNU/WIDER) and Pinter, London and Washington, 1997, p. 112.
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I think it is now jurisprudence in the Security Council-and the 
interpretation accepted for a long time-that an abstention is not 
considered a veto, and the concurrent votes of the permanent members 
mean the votes of the permanent members who participate in the voting.
77Those who abstain intentionally are not considered to have cast a veto.
When the International Court of Justice opined on the matter in 1977 it 
referred to this precedent and similar Security Council presidential rulings as a 
base for its opinion: ‘the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a 
long period supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the position 
taken by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have 
consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by
7 Ra permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions.’ 
The Court did not discuss the legal requirements of the Charter and the 
intentions of its framers, but rather relied on the practice of the Security 
Council. The reference was not to how the provisions of Article 27 could be 
interpreted, but how the Council ‘interpreted the practice’ of its members.
77 S.C.O.R., 2nd year, 173rd meeting, 1 August 1947, p. 1711.
78ICJ, The Namibian Case, 1977, p. 22.
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China and the practice of abstention
During the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, China abstained in the vote on resolution
7 0  _678 which authorised the use of force against Iraq. Though it consistently 
opposed the military measures, China did not claim that its abstention carried 
a constitutional significance. Major-General Du Kuanyi, the head of the 
Delegation of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Military 
Staff Committee, attempted to provide an explanation for China’s abstention. 
General Kuanyi asserted that: ‘I believe you are all aware that China abstained 
in the vote on Resolution 678. The reason for our abstention is that the 
resolution runs counter to China's consistent principled position of settling 
international disputes by peaceful means. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
emphasised that although China did not vote in favour of that resolution as far 
as the Gulf is concerned, China and other members of the international 
community, including the United States, shared a common purpose, that is, to 
bring the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to an early end. It was for this reason that
on
we did not use our right of veto to prevent the adoption of this resolution.’ 
Following the Gulf crisis, China maintained its abstention during the vote on 
resolutions related to the employment of enforcement measures under Chapter
79 Security Council resolution 678, 29 November 1990.
on
An address by General Kuanyi to the seminar of the Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies in Ontario, May 1991. Du Kuanyi, ‘A Chinese view of the role of the United 
Nations in international security’ in Alex Morrison, ed. Peacekeeping, peacemaking or 
war: international security enforcement, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 
Ontario, 1991, p. 73.
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VII.81 It also did so in relation to Libya 1992,82 Rwanda 1993,83 Haiti 1994,84
and Sudan 1996.85 More recently, on 12 November 1997, China voted in
favour of a resolution adopted by the Council under Chapter VII imposing
restrictions on the travel of Iraqi officials. At this meeting the representative
of China stressed that his government opposed the use of force and explained
that China’s ‘affirmative’ vote on this matter did not imply any change in his
£7
government’s position on the question of sanctions.
The absence of concurrence
Sydney Bailey and the president of the Security Council have each rightly 
argued that the practice has developed of considering abstention or absence as
A O
not having the effect of a negative vote. However, the requirement of Article 
27(3) of the ‘affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
Q I In a scholarly interpretation of China’s abstentions Richard Falk contended in 1994 
that ‘In the last few years, China has frequently abstained or even gone along on 
crucial Security Council votes, despite manifesting a degree of opposition to the UN 
approach, possibly because it has been the recipient of diplomatic side-payments (e.g. 
reduced pressures on human rights, preferential trade arrangements) and possibly 
because its economic growth seems tied to positive relations with leading states.’ Falk 
Richard, op. cit. note 75, p.l 17.
82 Security Council resolution 748, 31 March 1992.
83 Security Council resolution 929, 22 June 1994.
84 Security Council resolution 940, 31 July 1994.
85 Security Council resolution 1054, 26 July 1996. China also abstained during the 
course of voting on resolution 688 regarding the humanitarian relief operation in 
Northern and Southern Iraq, on 3 April 1991.
86 Security Council resolution 1137, 12 November 1997.07 Security Council meeting 3831, netsite: http://www.un.org/plwep-cgi/idoc.pl. 17 
November 1997.
88 Sydney Bailey, op. cit. note 71; S.C.O.R. op. cit. note 77.
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of the permanent members’ cannot be satisfied while a permanent member is 
abstaining or absenting itself from a Security Council meeting. In such cases, 
therefore, the vote is neither ‘concurring’ nor ‘affirmative’. However, the 
permanent members seem to have informally agreed that only negative votes 
will carry constitutional effects to hinder the adoption by the Security Council 
of resolutions on substantial matters. As Adam Roberts and Benedict 
Kingsbury observed, much has been achieved in the UN’s history by changes
O Q
in practice rather than Charter amendment. However, it could be noted that 
China, more than any other permanent member, has significantly contributed 
to the establishment of this pattern of practice, by accepting that its repeated 
abstention would not block the Council.
The provisions of the Charter explicitly stipulate that the concurring votes of 
nine of the Security Council member states including the votes of the 
permanent five members are required to adopt a resolution on a substantial 
issue. However, the practice has developed in a different way, considering the 
non-participation or abstention of a permanent member during the course of 
voting as having no constitutional effect. This was largely attributed to 
tendency among member states to limit the scope of the veto and to confine its
O Q Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, United Nations divided world, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 2nd edition, 1993, pp. 48 -  58.
193
effect to the direct negative vote. This part of the thesis suggests that a 
relationship exists between the stipulation of concurrent voting in the Charter 
and the status of neutrality in collective security. The original system of 
collective security, according to Woodrow Wilson, does not allow for 
neutrality, as all states should stand against aggression. To conceive abstention 
as having no constitutional effect is to assume that abstention is a practice of 
neutrality. Although, the scope of Article 27 is not limited to the practice of 
the Security Council in the area of collective security, it seems to draw on one 
of its principles, that no state is allowed to be neutral in the face of aggression. 
However, in practice neither this principle has worked nor has the Security 
Council continued to stipulate concurrence.
4- Adequacy and inadequacy
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may apply 
measures not involving the use of force to secure the compliance of an 
aggressor or a defiant war perpetrator with its resolutions. According to the 
provisions of Article 41, the Council may call upon member states to employ 
total or partial interruption of economic relations with the target, interruption 
of means of communication, and severance of diplomatic relations. The 
underlying premise is that these measures will succeed in bringing about
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compliance. However, this assumption may not be corroborated in practice, 
depending on the particular circumstances of each case, and the aggressor may 
disregard the Security Council resolutions. Because of such defiance and the 
continuing threat to the peace, the Security Council may decide to take further 
action, including the use of force as prescribed by Article 42 while sanctions 
are imposed on the target.
Would be or proved to be inadequate
To shift the agenda from the provisions of Article 41, enforcement measures 
short of the use of force, to coercive measures provided for in Article 42, is by 
no means an easy task. Rather, it has proved to be one of the most difficult 
decisions the Council can take. The only attempt to clarify the issue of when 
the Council should pursue such a move is stated, in imprecise terms, in Article 
42, which allows the Council to consider whether sanctions are adequate or 
inadequate to achieve compliance. The text of Article 42 reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may 
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
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include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of members of the United Nations.
The question of the adequacy or inadequacy of measures provided for in 
Article 41 has rarely been discussed and its entire significance has not yet 
been explored. Brian Urquhart briefly referred to the determination of 
inadequacy describing it as ‘an important condition on the ultimate use of 
force’ under Article 42.90 David Scheffer attempted to apply this provision to 
the adoption of resolution 678 during the Gulf crisis by arguing that ‘The 
Security Council decision reflected a judgement by the governments of some 
of its members - particularly by the Bush administration - both that the 
economic sanctions had proved to be inadequate up to the date of the Council 
action and would be inadequate, at least in the event Iraq continued its policy 
of non-compliance following the deadline of January 15, 1991, established in 
resolution 678.’91
A criterion for assessing the adequacy of measures provided for in 
Article 41 is missing from the Charter system for peace enforcement. Indeed, 
before 1990 the question of ‘adequacy’ was of little concern. Between 1945 
and 1990 mandatory sanctions were authorised by the Security Council only
90 Brian Urquhart, ‘Learning from the Gulf in Mara R. Bustelo and Philip Alston, 
Whose new world order? The Federation Press, Sydney, 1991, p. 14.
91 David J. Scheffer, ‘Commentary on collective security’ in Damrosch and Scheffer, 
eds. op. cit. note 17, p. 104.
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Q 9 Q'Xtwice, against Rhodesia and South Africa, and their range was narrowed in 
the case of South Africa to the level of arms trade only. Prior to the Kuwait 
crisis, 1990-91, the United Nations had never moved from the application of 
sanctions authorised by the Security Council to a course of military action. In 
its early years, the United Nations was confronted with the Korean crisis, 
which seemed at the time to carry the potential of a Third World War. The 
first resolutions to be adopted by the Security Council in relation to the crisis 
instantly authorised the use of force against North Korea.94 The Korean 
conflict represented the only incident during which the Security Council 
employed military measures without prior recourse to mandatory sanctions. 
Such a situation was not foreseen by the Charter. Articles 41 and 42 did not 
emphasise that the Council may determine from the outset, due to the severity 
and seriousness of a certain situation, that sanctions would be ineffective and 
therefore, it should immediately undertake the military measures prescribed in 
Article 42. On the contrary, the Charter adopted an escalating system which 
requires justification for each further step.
0 9 Security Council resolution 232,16 December 1966.
93 Security Council resolution 418, 4 November 1977.
94 Security Council resolution 82, 25 June 1950; S.C. resolution 83, 27 June 1950; S.C. 
resolution 84, 7 July 1950.
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Suggestions of inadequacy and the effect of UN ultimatums
Practice shows that when the Security Council imposes mandatory sanctions, 
member states start, almost immediately, to suggest the inadequacy of 
sanctions, and demand the employment of military measures under Article 42. 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Ivory Coast submitted a draft resolution 
to the Council, a few days after the imposition of sanctions, calling for full 
implementation of military enforcement measures under Articles 42 and 43. It 
was a remarkable gesture that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution 
recommending the use of force against Ian Smith’s white minority government 
even before the imposition of economic sanctions. The comprehensive 
resolution 2022 of the General Assembly called upon the United Kingdom to 
employ all necessary means, including military force. However, despite these 
early recommendations for coercive measures to be employed, the Security 
Council persevered with economic sanctions for some ten years. During these 
years, the Council did not question the adequacy of sanctions against Rhodesia 
and representatives of the UK and US repeatedly vetoed draft resolutions 
which suggested more stringent use of sanctions or the use of force as a means 
to end the minority rule.95 The general assumption was that ‘economic
95 Draft resolution (S/5425/Rev.l) S.C. meeting 1069, 13 September 1963; Draft 
resolution (S/9696/Corr.2) S.C. meeting 1534, 12 March 1970; Draft resolution 
(S/9976) S.C. meeting 1556, 10 November 1970; Draft resolution (S/10489) S.C. 
meeting 1623, 30 December 1971.
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sanctions are always to be preferred to the application of a military strategy 
and, in any case, are always to be exhausted before military action is initiated.’ 
However, as Michael Reisman and Douglas Stevick observed these 
assumptions are not applicable to the majority of unilateral and multilateral 
practice.96
The issuing of an ultimatum, while the Council is imposing sanctions 
on a target clearly determines the remaining period for sanctions before the
07Council can take any military action. Security Council resolution 678 in 
relation to Iraq specified 15 January 1991 as an ultimatum which allowed
QQ
sanctions six weeks more before the commencement of military operations. 
Forming a criterion
The terms of the Charter concerning the adequacy and inadequacy of 
economic and diplomatic measures are ambiguous, they provide no criteria for 
determining the circumstances in which sanctions ‘would be inadequate’. This 
is one of the provisions of the UN mechanism for peace enforcement which 
remained dormant for more than forty years and which needs to be rethought
96 W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, ‘The Application of International 
Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes’ European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 1, 1998, p. 94.
97 Ultimatums define the remaining period for sanctions as well as the time left for 
peaceful initiatives.
8 Security Council resolution 678, 29 November 1991. It could be argued that the five 
month between August 1990 and January 1991 was only the necessary period for the 
US-led coalition to prepare for war.
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after it has been prematurely activated in cases of peace enforcement during 
the 1990s. Such contention stems from the general observation that ‘More 
thought will have to be given to how the Security Council might develop its 
procedures and practices’."
The defining of a criterion for measuring the adequacy and inadequacy 
of sanctions is important for the development of the Council procedure as well 
as for the credibility of the United Nations. It serves the purpose of justifying, 
for public opinion, Council decisions on military action in certain cases 
instead of persevering with sanctions and giving them more time to work. It 
further helps to present to aggressors and war perpetrators the credible threat 
of the use of force if further breaches are committed while the council is 
employing non-military measures. In the following suggestion, the study will 
attempt to outline a four-point criterion derived from subsequent UN 
institutional activities related to the case under consideration and the actual 
developments on the ground.
Further unprovoked attacks
A clear sign that sanctions might not bring about compliance can be detected 
when an aggressor carries out further unprovoked attacks while being 
submitted to mandatory measures under Article 41. Subsequent unlawful
99 Adam Roberts, op. cit. note 55.
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movements, such as forced demographic changes to the territory of the victim 
state, abuse of its natural resources or violation of human rights might also 
raise concerns and cause the Security Council to conclude that sanctions 
‘would be inadequate*.
Breach o f accords
In the case of mandatory sanctions, attempts to resolve the conflict through 
negotiations and good offices might lead parties to the conflict, at some point, 
to sign accords which do not resolve the whole matter but bring about 
agreement on some important issues. The unjustified breach of such accords 
by a signatory party may lead to a questioning of intentions and the Council 
may consider the application of further measures which might involve the use 
of force.
Rejection o f peaceful initiatives
The aggressor may continue to defy the international community and Security 
Council resolutions by refusing reasonable peace deals initiated either by 
neutral mediators acting unilaterally or under the auspices of the Secretary 
General’s good offices. Such circumstances may constitute an ‘inadequate’
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situation as regards the employment of sanctions, and necessitates a move to 
measures under Article 42.
Withdrawal o f consent
In some cases, the Council may impose financial measures or an arms 
embargo on a target while deploying peacekeeping forces to the area. A party 
to the conflict may decide to withdraw its agreement to the presence of UN 
forces in the area. Such a unilateral decision would put the UN mission in 
jeopardy and further, risk a peace process. However, the United Nations may 
decide to continue its military presence on other bases. In this case, the 
peacekeeping mission would be transferred into a peace enforcement one, and 
subsequent economic measures would be followed by the use of force if 
necessary.
Reports o f the Secretary General and UN Commissions 
It is a normal procedure for the Security Council to ask the Secretary General 
to report back on compliance while the Council is in charge of the matter. The 
reports of the Secretary General and his special envoys may suggest that 
further action, involving the use of force, is needed, or urgently needed, to
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rescue a deteriorating situation.100 In the case of Somalia the Secretary General 
recommended to the Security Council ‘The Council would also have to 
determine that non-military measures as referred to in Chapter VII were not 
capable of giving effect to the Council’s decisions.’101 The Council may build 
its action on the Secretary General’s recommendations or on reports submitted
109by UN Commissions.
100 As the former Secretary General Boutros Ghali did with reference to Rwanda and 
Bosnia, however in the latter Ghali was calling for the implementation of the measures 
authorised by the Council.
101 The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, United Nations 
Department of Public Information, New York, 3rd edition 1996, p. 293.
109 Despite the Korean crisis not representing a case of a systematic application of 
Chapter VII, it can be noted that in June 1950 the United Nations Commission on 
Korea reported to the Security Council on the non-compliance of North Korea and 
requested the undertaking of urgent military measures. Paragraph 4 of resolution 83 of 
27 June 1950 noted that ‘...the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that 
the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their 
armed forces to 38 parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore 
international peace and security’
Part V
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Chapter 6
Peace enforcement and international terrorism
During the Cold War the United Nations had never taken measures against 
international terrorism. The Security Council proved to be impotent by 
failing to adopt any resolutions condemning specific terrorist activities. These 
patterns have dramatically changed during the 1990s, and the Security 
Council has actually organised collective responses under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to deal with incidents of international terrorism. The General 
Assembly has also been able to adopt conventions for the prevention and 
elimination of terrorism. The revival of the Security Council, since 1990, has 
enabled its member states to confront the challenges of terrorist activities in 
the world through the mobilisation of the UN system for peace enforcement. 
However, these responses have not been without difficulties and controversy 
over their justification and the Cold War confrontation over the meaning of 
international terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist attack did not 
disappear.
This chapter is concerned with collective responses to international 
terrorism in the form of peace enforcement actions. It examines the Security 
Council’s innovative practice in this area and the challenge of imposing peace
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enforcement measures in situations of international terrorism. It does not 
intend to explore the issue of terrorism and its wider implications, however 
some of its aspects are briefly explained where necessary.
The employment of diplomatic sanctions against Sudan will be 
discussed in length for three reasons. First, it is the first incident of 
mandatory diplomatic sanctions adopted as an exclusive regime of sanctions. 
The Council did not implement other kind of sanctions against Sudan. 
Second, the issue of diplomatic sanctions was rarely discussed in the 
literature on mandatory sanctions.1 Third, the case of Sudan has not been 
studied before, a fact necessitates the explanation of regional and 
international factors for a coherent understanding of the case.
Terrorist acts are usually conceived of as involving the threat or use of 
force. When a state initiates or supports a terrorist attack against another state 
it breaches, to a certain degree, the principle of non-use of force among states 
provided for in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. This formulation 
provides the basis for states’ obligations to refrain from the use of terror in 
their interstate relations.
1 A study carried out by a group designated by the Royal Institute for International Affairs 
(RIIA) in 1938 to study the issue of sanctions and the role o f the League o f Nations, 
remained one o f the rare contributions to discussions on the issue o f diplomatic sanctions, 
International Sanctions, A Report by a Group of Members o f the Royal Institute of 
International affairs, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1938, pp. 15-23.
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If an armed attack occurs against a state through the mobilisation of 
terrorist activities by another state, the attacked state might consider the 
undertaking of unilateral or multilateral counter-measures. However, the 
question arises about the appropriate and permissible response to such acts? 
Yuri Kolosov proposes that in the face of international terrorism ‘[t]he 
international community has two choices: either to recognise the right of self- 
defence against states which support terrorism or drug trafficking; or to 
recognise the competence of the Security Council to undertake collective 
sanctions against such states.’ The first option, responding in self-defence, 
dominated the practice of states during the Cold War era. The cases of 
Entebbe 1976, Iran 1980, and Libya 1986 are some examples of this practice. 
Oscar Schachter notes that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 
the case of Nicaragua and the report of the International Law Commission on 
state responsibility do not support the use of force in self-defence on the basis 
of combating or responding to terrorist activities. However, because of 
disagreement among the big powers on the issue of international terrorism, 
collective action through the Security Council against terrorism was almost 
impossible during the Cold War.
2 Yuri M. Kolosov, ‘Limiting the use of force: Self defence, terrorism and drug trafficking’ 
In Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, Law and force in the new international 
order, Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford, 1991, p. 236.
3 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordercht, Boston, London, 1991, pp. 164 - 165.
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Terrorist acts may include attacks against the territories, properties, 
civilians or armed forces of another state. Such acts may amount to the 
category of international wrong doings that necessitate and justify the 
employment of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. However, this fact 
does not preclude the international community from considering other 
methods of settlement. Like other interstate low intensity conflicts, terrorist 
attacks may also be dealt with through recommendations pursuant to the 
obligations of pacific settlement, judicial rulings, or other peaceful means. 
Yet, many terrorist acts may provoke unilateral or multilateral coercive 
responses.
There have been no international regulations specifically set out for the 
collective management of situations which involve international terrorism. No 
agreement has been reached on the requirements of enforcement action to 
combat terrorist activities. However, two important requirements could be 
derived from the relevant rulings of the ICJ and the provisions of the Charter. 
First, the ‘scale and effect’ of the action should amount to the level of an 
armed attack.4 Second, the Security Council should determine that such an act 
has threatened the peace, breached the peace, or constituted an act of 
aggression.5 When the Council make such a determination, it may apply
4 ICJ Report, Nicaragua case, 1986, p. 103.
5 Article 39 o f the UN Charter.
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measures against the terrorist aggressor under Article 40, 41, or 42. However, 
in actual terms the Council has rarely been able to mobilise some of these 
provisions in the face of international terrorism.
The Record of the United Nations
The UN has a very limited record in dealing with the issue of international 
terrorism. The United Nations Charter neither mentions the word terrorism 
nor contains any explicit reference to it. The General Assembly has only been 
successful in issuing general condemnations of international terrorism. The 
Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism established by the General 
Assembly in 1972 submitted a report to the Assembly in 1979 without 
reaching an agreed definition of terrorism.6 While the 1954 Draft Code on the 
Peace and Security of Mankind included the term ‘terrorist acts’ in its 
definition of aggression, the work of the International Law Commission on 
this draft was not completed until 1990. Hedley Bull described the 
atmosphere of disagreement over this issue by stating that:
6 GAOR 34th session, supplement No. 37 (A/34/37) 1979.
7 UN Documents, A/CN.4/430,1990; In his address to the International Law Commission at 
its fiftieth anniversary on 7 July 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commended the work 
of the Commission by stating that ‘We are living through a remarkable period in the 
advancement o f international law. Great strides have made in refining its writ, expanding its 
reach and enforcing its mandate. The challenges o f the future, in areas such as narcotics, 
disease, crime and international terrorism, are increasingly recognised as transnational 
challenges. ... For the past 50 years, the International Law Commission has been in the
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Attempts to curb the hijacking of aircraft and the kidnapping of 
diplomats by international action have foundered on this lack of 
solidarity. In 1972 the United Nations General Assembly was not able 
to endorse a U.S.-sponsored conventions against ‘international 
terrorism’. Most Socialist and Third World states, so far from seeking to 
condemn resort to international violence by non-state groups, have 
sought to extend to them the protection of the laws of war, at all events 
in cases where these groups are engaged in armed struggle for self- 
determination, against colonial rule, alien occupation or ‘racist’ 
governments.8
Differences between the Third World and the West over the definition of 
terrorism represented a fundamental reason behind the controversy over the 
issue.9 Many Third World countries wanted the struggle of national liberation
forefront o f meeting those challenges.’ Press Release SG/SM/6279 L/2834, Netsite: 
file :///H/6279,htm.
8 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study o f Order in World Politics, Macmillan Press, 
London, 2ndedition 1995, p. 259.
9 For attempts to establish a definition o f international terrorism see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
‘An International Control Scheme for the prosecution o f International Terrorism’ in Alona E. 
Evans and John F. Murphy, eds. Legal Aspects o f  International Terrorism, D. C. Heath, 
Massachusetts and Toronto, 1978, p. 485; Adrian Guelke, The Age o f  Terrorism and 
International Political System, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, New York, 1995, pp. 18 -  34. 
Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode o f Conflict, Crescent Publications, Los 
Angeles, 1975; Martin Slann and Bernard Schechterman, eds. Multidimensional Terrorism, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1987; General Assembly, ‘Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism’ in United Nations Publications, International Instruments 
o f  United Nations, edited by Irving Samoff, United Nations, New York, 1997, pp. 74 -  75.
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movements to be exempted, while Western countries withheld their support 
for a definition that included state terrorism. The term ‘state terrorism’ was 
invoked by Third World countries against practices of governments in 
colonised and occupied territories, and apartheid policies of white minority 
governments. In an incident chronicled by John Vincent,10 cited by 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse,11 the Tunisian representative to the United 
Nations called for international intervention in South Africa to protect human 
rights. The South African representative disagreed and argued that it was 
contrary to Article 2(7) of the Charter. These discrepancies and the conflict of 
interests among big powers during the cold war era, contributed to the state of 
inaction within the United Nations.
Inconsistency in the use of the term 'terrorism*
There is inconsistency in the use of the term terrorism. While the term was
mobilised in some situations, it has been omitted in many texts which deal
with incidents of terrorist attacks. Some scholars favour the use of other terms
• 12as they could, in certain incidents, fairly substitute for the term terrorism.
10 John Vincent, Non-intervention and international order, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1974, pp. 261 - 277.
11 Oliver Rabsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian intervention in contemporary 
conflict, a reconceptualisation, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 52 -53 .
12 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The general international law of terrorism’ in Rosalyn Higgins, and 
Maurice Flory, eds. Terrorism and international law, Routledge and LSE, London and New 
York, 1997, pp. 19 - 20.
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Judge Higgins indicated how the term was omitted in one important case. 
Higgins observed that ‘[t]he judgement of the International Court in the case 
of Nicaragua v United States is a striking example of how relevant subject- 
matter can be dealt with without invocation of ‘terrorism’. In that case many 
of the claims advanced by Nicaragua against the United States were of a 
category frequently included in the concept of ‘terrorism’.’ Higgins noticed 
that ‘[f]rom beginning to end of this long case (over 550 pages) there is no 
use made of the concept of State terrorism.’13
For the purposes of this study and so as to elaborate on Higgins’ 
observation reference could also be made to the hostages issue between the 
United States and Iran in 1979-80. On 13 January 1980, the United States 
submitted a draft resolution that called for the immediate release of the US 
diplomats who were being held hostage in Teheran, and asked all member 
states to apply comprehensive financial penalties against Iran.14 The lengthy 
text of the draft resolution, which contains more than twenty paragraphs and 
preambles and is fully devoted to the issue of the hostages made no mention 
of the word terrorism, despite the 1979 Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages considers ‘all acts of taking of hostages as manifestations of 
international terrorism’. Furthermore, when the question was referred to the
13 Ibid.
14 Draft resolution (S/13735) Security Council meeting 2191,13 January 1980.
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International Court of Justice, the order of the World Court of 15 December 
1979 regarding the hostage crisis also made no reference to international 
terrorism.15
In these cases and in many other different situations the use of terror by 
states has been dealt with as acts violating the international norms of human 
rights or breaching the laws of war in cases involving terrorism generated by 
armed conflicts.16
1- The Security Council and terrorism
The permanent members of the Security Council have repeatedly used the 
veto to block the adoption of resolutions which refer to international 
terrorism. In 1972 a draft resolution on the situation in the Middle East stated 
that the Security Council, ‘Deplore [s] deeply all acts of terrorism and 
violence and all breaches of the cease-fire in the Middle East’. China and the 
Soviet Union vetoed amendments to the draft and the United States vetoed the
1 Hfinal draft as a whole. In 1986, the Security Council voted on a draft 
resolution which related to the situation in the Mediterranean and that referred
15 ICJ Report, Order o f  International Court o f  Justice, 15 December 1979; It should be noted 
that the ICJ order was issued two days before the adoption by the General Assembly o f the 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.
16 See comments by, John F. Murphy on ‘The United Nations and international terrorism’ in 
Henry Hyunwook Han, Terrorism, political violence and world order, University Press of 
America, Lanham, New York, and London, p. 603.
17 Draft resolution (S/10784) and amended draft resolution (S/10786), Security Council 
meeting 1662, 10 September 1972.
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to terrorist attacks. Paragraph 3 of the submitted draft reads: ‘Condemns all 
terrorist activities, whether perpetrated by individuals, groups or states’.
1 fiFrance, Britain, and the United States vetoed the draft. Between 1945 and 
1990, the Security Council did not adopt any resolution which condemned 
terrorism and no measures were employed by the Council against a terrorist 
aggressor.
The case of Kuwait, however, represented a significant move from the 
pattern of practice within the Security Council in dealing with this sensitive 
issue. For the first time in the history of the UN, the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted in April 1991 a resolution 
explicitly referring to international terrorism and subsequently applying 
enforcement measures on Iraq.19 Two preambles of resolution 687 referred to 
the international obligation of refraining from terrorist acts and deplored the 
threat of the use of terrorism in retaliation for the imposition of the measures 
authorised by the Council. Furthermore, resolution 687 made the cease-fire 
contingent, among other conditions, upon the official notification by Iraq to 
the Secretary-General and the Security Council of its acceptance not to 
‘commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any 
organisation directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its
18 Draft resolution (S/18016/Rev. 1), Security Council meeting 2682, 21 April 1986.
19 Security Council resolution 679, 3 April 1991.
214
territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods, and 
practices of terrorism.’ Iraq notified the Council that it intended to comply 
with the provisions of resolution 687 including the above demands. The call 
for Iraq, not only to stop committing or supporting terrorism, but also to 
condemn unequivocally ‘all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism’ is a 
reflection of the comprehensive nature of resolution 687 which has been 
dubbed ‘the mother of all resolutions’.
Consideration of the issue of international terrorism was not a 
predominant character of the Gulf crisis. Instead, discussions on breaches of 
internationally agreed principles and norms prevailed. None of the twelve 
resolutions adopted by the Council before 15 January 1991 with relation to 
the Gulf crisis included a provision which explicitly condemned Iraq for 
committing terrorist acts.
The case of Kuwait, in this respect, provided a pattern for the future. In 
1992, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, decided in resolution 
748 ‘that the Libyan government must commit itself definitively to cease all 
forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups and that it must
90promptly, by concrete action, demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism’. 
Eight months later, the Council determined in resolution 883 that the Libyan
20 Security Council resolution 748, 31 March 1992.
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government failed ‘to demonstrate by concrete action its renunciation of 
terrorism’ and, therefore, the situation constituted a threat to international 
peace and security.21
In a more recent experience, the Council adopted three resolutions 
under Chapter VII in relation to the case of Sudan. The texts of these 
resolutions were solely pertinent to an issue of international terrorism. 
Resolution 1054, in one of its preambles, stated that ‘Reaffirming that the 
suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States 
are involved is essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’. The Council expressed its determination to eliminate international 
terrorism and its fifteen members expressed their unanimous support for the 
involvement of the Council in issues of international terrorism.
2- Embargo against Libya
Libya was an obvious target for sanctions. Uniquely, the Lockerbie incident
directly involved the three Western permanent members of the Security
22Council. Indeed, the American airplane, which crashed over Scotland in 
December 1988 killing 270 people, was carrying French, British and
21 Security Council resolution 883,
22 For analysis o f confrontation between Libya and Western states over terrorist allegations 
before Lockerbie, see Lawrence Freedman, Christopher Hill, Adam Roberts, R.J. Vincent, 
Paul Wilkinson, and Philip Windsor, Terrorism and international order, The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, New York, and Henley, 1986.
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American citizens.23 The victims of the crash included all 259 passengers and crew, 
as well as 11 people on the ground. The Security Council asked Libya to 
extradite two suspects for their alleged involvement in the crash, and 
subsequently imposed mandatory air and arms embargo.24
Sanctions against Libya are three-pronged. First, the Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII, asked all countries, whether members of the United 
Nations or not, to prohibit any aircraft from taking off, landing in, or flying- 
over their territory if it was going to or coming from Libya, unless a particular 
flight had been approved for significant humanitarian reasons. Ancillary- 
measures were also adopted to ban the supply of any aircraft or aircraft 
components to Libya, and to ban the provision of engineering and 
maintenance servicing, the certification of airworthiness and the provision of 
new direct insurance for Libyan aircraft. Second, all states were asked to 
prohibit the provision to Libya of arms and related materials of all types. 
Military relations with Libya, from the supply of equipment to technical 
advice and maintenance of army machinery, are also prohibited. Third, 
countries were asked to reduce significantly the number and level of staff at
See also C. Greenwood International law and the United States air operation against Libya, 
West Virginia Law Review, No. 89, 1986-87, p. 911.
23 The victims o f the crash included all 259 passengers and crew, as well as 11 people on the 
ground.
24 Op. cit. notes 20 and 21.
217
Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and to restrict or control the 
movement within their territory of all such staff who remain.
More restraints designed to extend and tighten sanctions against Libya 
were included in the preambles. States hosting international organisations 
were asked to consult with them on the actions required for implementing the 
diplomatic measures. All states were to prevent the operation of all Libyan 
Arab Airlines offices. Libyan nationals who have previously been denied 
entry to or expelled from any country for involvement in terrorist activity 
were to be denied entry to all states or even expelled from their territory.
So far, sanctions against Libya have involved three measures: an air 
embargo, an arms embargo, and diplomatic sanctions. A ban on petroleum 
exports is not included. In the first years most countries have tended to be 
strict in imposing sanctions against Libya.
Developments of 1998
During 1998, many states and organisations challenged the validity of the 
measures arrayed against Libya. On 27 February 1998 the ICJ declared that it 
had the jurisdiction to deal with the dispute between Libya and the United
25 Security Council resolution 748, 31 March 1992.
26 A detailed discussion about the legality o f sanctions against Libya is found in, among 
other studies, Turkkaya Ataov, The Lockerbie case, sanctions against Libya & Legality, 
Ankara, 1992; Mark Weller, ‘The Lockerbie Case: Premature End to the “New World 
Order’” , African Journal o f International and Comparative Law, 1992, vol. 4 no. 2. p. 321.
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Kingdom.27 A similar judgement was issued by the ICJ concerning the 
situation between Libya and the United States.28 The Court based its ruling on 
the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation. The Court explicitly referred to article 14(1) concerning the 
settlement of disputes on the interpretation or application of the provisions of 
the Convention. The United Kingdom and the United States argued that the
90Security Council resolutions had rendered the Libyan claims without object. 
However, the Court found it inappropriate, at this stage, to decide on the 
arguments raised by the UK and US. The two countries, the Respondents, 
were allowed until 30 December to file the Counter-Memorials, before the
91Court could start to consider its judgement on the merits.
Despite the preliminary nature of the ICJ rulings in this respect, many 
member states considered them to signal a significant development with 
relation to the issuing of sanctions.32 On 20 March 1998, in an open session,33
27 ICJ Press Release, 552, 27 March 1998.
28 Ibid.
29 ICJ Report, 1 August 1995.
30 ICJ op. cit. note 27; Ibid.
31 ICJ Press Release, 555,2 April 1998.
32 For useful discussions on the relation between the Security Council and the International 
Court o f Justice see Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The procedure o f  the UN Security 
Council, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd edition, 1998, pp. 307 - 320. Baily and Daws 
included in the 3rd edition o f the book discussions on the relation between the SC and the 
ICJ over the case o f Lockerbie until 1996 on pages 318 and 319. See also Gowlland-Debbas 
Vera ‘The relationship between the International Court o f Justice and the Security Council in 
the light o f Lockerbie case’ The American Journal o f  International Law, 1994, vol. 88, no. 4, 
pp. 643 - 677.
33 According to Article 31 o f the UN Charter the Council may allow a state which is not a 
member o f the Council to participate in discussions on a specific dispute. In recent years the 
Security Council expressed its willingness to increase recourse to open meetings. In 1994 a
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the majority of the Security Council members and other speakers who were 
not members of the Council, called for sanctions against Libya to be lifted or 
suspended pending a final decision by the Court.34 The United States did not 
agree. It asserted that the Court rulings did not question the legality of the 
Security Council actions and, in its opinion, that Libya must continue to 
comply with its obligations pursuant to the Security Council decisions.
The Security Council discussed an Arab League proposal, which 
provided three options for the trial of two Libyan suspects. According to 
these options, the suspects could either be tried: a) in a neutral country to be 
determined by the Security Council, b) at the World Court in The Hague by 
Scottish Judges, or c) in a special tribunal to be created at The Hague. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference also approved the proposal. The text of the proposal clearly 
intended to alter one of the provisions of resolution 883 of 1993, which asks
Security Council Presidential Statement asserted that there was widespread support among 
member states for greater recourse to open meetings o f the Council and a clear will on the 
part o f members o f the Council to respond to this. It is therefore the intention of the Council, 
as part of its efforts to improve the flow of information and the exchange o f ideas between 
members o f the Council and other United Nations Member States, that there should be an 
increased recourse to open meetings, particularly at an early stage in its consideration of a 
subject. The Council will decide on a case-by-case basis when to schedule public meetings 
of this sort. Security Council meeting 3483, 16 December 1994. In this case Libya called for 
a Security Council open session to discuss the matter. The OAU supported the Libyan 
request in a letter dated 5 March 1998 by the Chairman o f the OAU committee on Lockerbie 
issue, Zimbabwean foreign minister, to the Security Council. See Panafrican News Agency,
26 March 1998.
34 Security Council meeting 3864, 20 March 1998.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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for the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 
for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States courts. 
Responding to the above proposal, the United Kingdom expressed hopes that 
the Arab League and the OAU would not be used to undermine the Council’s 
resolutions.37
The OAU, however, took a practical step towards lifting sanctions 
against Libya. In June 1998, the OAU Summit in Burkina Faso, decided that 
all African states would cease implementing sanctions against Libya if they 
were not formally lifted by the Security Council before the end of 1998.
However, in August 1998, the United States and Britain offered a plan 
for the trial of the two suspects in The Hague by Scottish judges, a suggestion 
which matches one of the options proposed by the Arab League in March 
1998. The plan also offered Libya the immediate suspension of economic 
sanctions by the Security Council.
3- Diplomatic Sanctions against Sudan 
Introduction
Husni Mubarak, President of Egypt and former President of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), was on his way to the 1995 OAU summit in Addis
37 Ibid.
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Ababa when a serious attempt was made on his life. A group of around nine 
Egyptian Islamic militants carrying machine guns, attacked President 
Mubarak’s car a few miles from the airport of Addis Ababa. President 
Mubarak was not hurt, one of his private guards was killed, and some of the 
attackers were shot dead by Ethiopian security forces. Mubarak returned to 
the airport and took his airplane back to Cairo the same day.
As the competent regional organisation, the OAU immediately started 
to investigate the attempted assassination, which was unanimously 
condemned by other African leaders. Seven months after the incident, the 
Security Council discussed the issue and adopted mandatory measures under 
Chapter VII of the Charter against Sudan.
Diplomatic sanctions
Security Council resolution 1054 of 26 April 1996 affirmed the determination 
of existence of a threat to international peace and security. Acting under 
Chapter VII, the Council decided that ‘the non compliance by the 
Government of Sudan with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1044 (1996) constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’ 
Furthermore, the Council expressed its determination to ‘eliminate
38 Independent, 27 June 1995; Africa Overview, Websit http://www.acsp.uic.edu/patter/Ethiopia. 
htm.
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international terrorism and to ensure effective implementation of resolution 
1044(1996).*
Under Security Council resolution 1054 which imposed diplomatic 
sanctions on Sudan, all member states which maintained diplomatic 
representation in Khartoum were compelled to reduce the numbers of 
Sudanese diplomatic personnel in their counteries and restrict the travel of 
Sudanese officials to their territories. The resolution decided that ‘all states 
shall: (a) Significantly reduce the number and level of the staff at Sudanese 
diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement 
within their territory of all such staff who remain; (b) Take steps to restrict the 
entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of 
Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed 
forces’. Moreover, paragraph 4 of the resolution called ‘upon all international 
and regional organisations not to convene any conference in Sudan’. The 
resolution was adopted under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, ‘enforcement measures short of the use of force’.39 Thirteen
39 Abram Chayes, and Antonia Chayes, discuss the frequent mobilisation o f Chapter VII in 
the 1990s. They contrast this tendency with the original intentions o f UN framers: ‘The UN 
framers and their immediate successors held a common-speech conception of a threat to 
international peace and security as a situation in which significant interstate hostilities are in 
train or at least imminent. By mid-1993, the words had become little more than a necessary 
incantation to transmute a Security Council resolution into a formally binding obligation. 
Where in 1945, action under Chapter VII was regarded as the Jovian thunderbolt o f the 
international system, fifty years later it seemed to be only one among many instruments at 
the disposal o f the Security Council. It was simply a specialised tool, to be called on when 
agreement could not be negotiated ... ’ Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler, The
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members of the Security Council voted for resolution 1054. Two permanent 
members, Russia and China, abstained. No member voted against.40
Recourse to Chapter VII in the case of Sudan was unique in several 
ways. It was the first time that an attempted assassination of a political leader 
had triggered the imposition of UN mandatory sanctions.41 The provisions of 
Chapter VII were explicitly invoked to satisfy a broad interpretation of the 
principle of non-use of force against the independence and territorial integrity 
of states, provided for in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 
Although, the Charter does not make an explicit reference to international 
terrorism, it is widely accepted that such activities may create aggressive 
actions within the context of the ‘Definition of Aggression’ adopted by the 
General Assembly on 14 December 1974.
new sovereignty, compliance with international regulatory agreements, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 50.
40 Security Council meeting No. 3660, 26 April 1996. The ten non-permanent members of 
the Security Council during the adoption of resolution 1054 were Botswana, Chile, Egypt, 
Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Republic o f Korea, and Poland. Other 
three countries, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda were invited to attend the meeting.
41 On 24 June 1960, President Romulo Betancourt o f Venezuela was injured in an 
assassination attempt. The Organisation o f American States (OAS) accused the President o f  
the Dominican Republic Rafeal Trujillo o f fomenting the attempt and adopted diplomatic 
sanctions against the Dominican Republic. However, Trujillo himself was assassinated and 
the OAS voted to lift diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic. In 
another case the OAS ordered member states to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba 
because an arms cache o f Cuban origin was found in Venezuela in 1964, which the OAS 
regarded as posing a threat to international peace. In July 1975 the OAS sanctions against 
Cuba were lifted, though the United States maintained the embargo on a unilateral bases.
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Enabling of resolution 1054
During discussions on the draft of resolution 1054 the two abstaining 
permanent members made similar statements on three points. They approved 
the involvement of the Security Council in issues of international terrorism, 
regarded the evidence provided against the Sudan as insufficient, and 
generally opposed the use of sanctions to resolve such situations. Mr. Sergey 
Lavrov, the Russian representative, stated that
The current draft resolution seemed intended, not to locate the suspects, 
but to isolate the Sudan internationally. Really convincing evidence of 
Khartoum’s involvement in the assassination attempt had not been 
provided to the United Nations. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution 
had been forced to acknowledge that fact. There was also information 
that one of the suspects was not even in the Sudan. If that turned out to 
be true, other practical steps would need to be taken.42
Mr. Lavrov added that his government ‘opposed the use of sanctions to 
punish certain regimes or attain the political goals of one or more member 
states.’43 Russia maintained its opposition to the employment by the Council
42 Security Council meeting no. 3660, 26 April 1996.
43 Ibid.
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of sanctions against Sudan and it abstained during the voting on resolution 
1070 raising similar arguments.
The United States and the United Kingdom were confident that the 
government of Sudan was involved, at the least harbouring, and therefore, 
knowing the location of the suspects. The United States expressed 
reservations contrary to those of Russia, it stated that the measures imposed 
against Sudan were not commensurate with the situation and called for even 
tougher sanctions against Khartoum.44 Mr. Edward Gnehm, representative of 
the US at the Council meeting, said that his government ‘supported the 
resolution, with reservations. It did not believe the sanctions outlined in the 
resolution were sufficient to convince the government of the Sudan to cease 
its sponsorship of international terrorism and return to the fold of responsible, 
law abiding nations.’45 Mr. Gnehm warned the Council on persevering with 
such a mild response. He stated that ‘in failing to impose more meaningful 
sanctions against the Sudan, it (the council) risked further insecurity and 
instability for the people of Eastern Africa, the Middle East and the Sudan.’46 
Sir John Weston, representative of the United Kingdom, dismissed the notion 
of conspiracy which was explicitly claimed by the representatives of the 
Sudan and Russia. He explained that the measures ‘had nothing to do with the
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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orientation of the current government in the Sudan.’ He further stated that 
‘[i]t was purely and simply a necessary response to Sudan’s failure to respond 
adequately to the demands of the Council and the OAU.’47
France supported the adoption of the resolution in a restrictive manner. 
The French representative described the demands of resolution 1054 as 
follows: ‘It required the Sudan to try to extradite the suspects if they were in 
its territory. To ask more than that would not be appropriate.’ Both France 
and Germany welcomed the imposition of sanctions as far as they had no 
economic impact on the population of the Sudan.
Application of sanctions
The United States was the first to act, but it only ordered one of the Sudanese 
diplomats in Washington to leave.49 The US did not seem to favour 
diplomatic sanctions against Sudan. Perhaps that is the reason for its limited 
application of the diplomatic measures contained in resolution 1054. Russia 
and China, who abstained during the course of voting on resolution 1054, did 
not take any action under the provisions of the resolution.50 Austria 
considered that the provisions of the resolution contradicted its constitution.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/532) 2 July 1996.
50 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/515) 28 June 1996 and (S/1996/530) 2 July 
1996.
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However, it asked Sudan not to replace one of its mission staff in Vienna who 
returned to Khartoum at the end of his term, and maintained that it had 
thereby implemented the resolution.51 Most of the states, which took 
diplomatic measures against Sudan, asked Khartoum to remove one diplomat 
from its mission. Only the United Kingdom, and then Egypt, required three 
Sudanese diplomats to return to Khartoum. The UK warned Sudan against 
taking any retaliatory decisions by reducing the size of the British mission in 
Khartoum. Prior to that diplomatic relations between the two countries had 
suffered a serious blow in 1993 when Sudan expelled the British Ambassador 
in Khartoum and the UK retaliated in kind, but diplomatic representation 
between the two countries returned to normal soon after with the exchange 
ambassadors in 1994.53
Some other countries made varying responses. Kuwait, for instance, 
notified the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, that it would 
apply the measures concerning the restrictions on visas for Sudanese officials, 
but it regretted that it had no resident Sudanese diplomats to expel, having 
severed diplomatic relations with Sudan at the time of the Gulf war.54 South
51 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/455) 20 June 1996.
52 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/387) 22 May 1996 and (S/1996/534) 3 July 
1996.
53 Another setback to the relations between the two countries was marked by the Sudanese 
government’s decision on 24 August 1998 to reduce the level o f its diplomatic representation 
in Britain by withdrawing its ambassador and the second in command from the Sudanese 
embassy in London, and asked Britain to take a similar step.
54 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/398) 28 May 1996.
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Korea, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, explained that the 
Sudanese mission in Seoul was very small and it would be unrealistic to 
reduce the number further.55 In summary, by July 1996 about 40 countries 
had responded to resolution 1054.
55 UN Security Council Documents (S/1996/428) 7 June 1996.
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Table shows the dates and document numbers of 40 replies of member states.
Country Date of reply Document no.
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland
22 May 1996 (S/1996/387)
Spain 22 May 1996 (S/1996/388)
Kuwait 28 May 1996 (S/1996/398)
Ecuador 31 May 1996 (S/1996/415)
Israel 3 June 1996 (S/1996/406)
Hungary 6 June 1996 (S/1996/419)
Republic of Korea 7 June 1996 (S/1996/428)
Ethiopia 12 June 1996 (S/1996/440)
Brazil 12 June 1996 (S/1996/441)
Norway 14 June 1996 (S/1996/450)
Czech Republic 17 June 1996 (S/1996/437)
India 17 June 1996 (S/1996/451)
Monaco 17 June 1996 (S/1996/480)
Belarus 17 June 1996 (S/1996/519)
Japan 18 June 1996 (S/1996/482)
Finland 18 June 1996 (S/1996/483)
Turkey 19 June 1996 (S/1996/452)
Austria 20 June 1996 (S/1996/455)
Chile 20 June 1996 (S/1996/484)
Slovakia 21 June 1996 (S/1996/461)
Burkina Faso 21 June 1996 (S/1996/481)
Bulgaria 21 June 1996 (S/1996/485)
Sweden 21 June 1996 (S/1996/486)
Liechtenstein 21 June 1996 (S/1996/487)
Germany 21 June 1996 (S/1996/489)
Slovenia 24 June 1996 (S/1996/488)
Netherlands 24 June 1996 (S/1996/490)
France 24 June 1996 (S/1996/491)
Italy 24 June 1996 (S/1996/516)
Argentina 25 June 1996 (S/1996/492)
Greece 25 June 1996 (S/1996493)
Ukraine 25 June 1996 (S/1996/504)
Denmark 25 June 1996 (S/1996/512)
Belgium 27 June 1996 (S/1996/518)
Russian Federation 28 June 1996 (S/1996/515)
Malta 28 June 1996 (S/1996/517)
Luxembourg 2 July 1996 (S/1996/524)
China 2 July 1996 (S/1996/530)
United States of 
America
2 July 1996 (S/1996/531)
Egypt 3 July 1996 (S/1996/534)
Source: Abstracted from reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.
230
Suspended air measures
Since the Security Council’s actions dealing with the attempted assassination 
of Husni Mubarak, Sudan was facing the threat of further measures if it did 
not comply with the Council’s demands. Some of the Council’s member 
states preferred what they called a ‘gradual approach in the light of the efforts 
of the government of Sudan’.56 The build-up of pressures on the government 
of Sudan through the Security Council culminated in the adoption of 
resolution 1070 on 16 August 1996, which imposes air-craft sanctions on 
Sudan.57 The resolution bans all international flights of Sudan Airways or of 
any other Sudanese public airlines company. Operationally, the resolution has 
set a precedent. While paragraph 3 of resolution 1070 clearly states the 
limited measures to be implemented against Sudan, paragraph 4 asserts that
the Security Council further decides that it shall, 90 days after the date 
of adoption of this resolution, determine the date of entry into force of 
the provisions set out in paragraph 3 above and all aspects of the 
modalities of its implementation, unless the Council decides before 
then, on the basis of a report presented by the Secretary-General, on the 
compliance of Sudan with the demand in paragraph 1 above.
56 op. cit. note 42.
57 All Security Council resolutions in the case o f Sudan (1996), including resolution 1070, 
were adopted under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter.
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The resolution does not specify when the measures stated in paragraph 3 
should come into effect. The 90-day period declared in paragraph 4 was not 
an ultimatum after which sanctions would automatically be implemented. 
Rather, if the Secretary-General’s report did not indicate that Sudan had 
complied with the Council’s demands then the Council was expected to meet 
after this period to specify when sanctions should come into effect. This was 
the first time that the Security Council adopted mandatory sanctions under 
Chapter VII in such imprecise terms, concerning their application. No official 
decision was made by the Council to determine whether to implement the 
ban, suspend it, or to negate the course of action altogether. Many members 
of the Security Council feared the humanitarian effect of the ban, and asked 
for the provision of detailed reports on possible effects. When the Secretary- 
General reported to the Security Council on 15 November 1996 pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of resolution 1070 he referred to the humanitarian and economic 
aspects in one paragraph which asserts
During my Special Envoy’s mission, the Sudanese government, trade
union, non-governmental organisations and private air transport
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companies all spoke of likely negative humanitarian effects of the 
possible ban envisaged in resolution 1070(1996) and gave my envoy 
memoranda and petitions thereon. His attention was also drawn to the 
potential negative impact on the health situation. My Special envoy’s 
interlocutors also underlined the likely economic consequences of a 
possible ban.58
The Secretary-General report did not encourage the application of the 
measures provided for in resolution 1070. The report stressed the possible 
humanitarian effects of sanctions and featured a detailed description of steps 
undertaken by the government of the Sudan pursuant to resolution 1070.
Generally, the issue of the humanitarian effects of sanctions has 
always led to real concerns among member states, but, before the case of 
Sudan, it did not lead to indefinite suspension of mandatory measures after 
their formal adoption by the Security Council. In previous cases, the Security 
Council has raised the issue of sanctions’ effects after their application, in an 
attempt to alleviate the consequent suffering of the people in the target state 
as well as the economic effects on other countries.59 In the case of Sudan, 
however, throughout the consideration of the issue of sanctions, the
58 Security Council Documents (S/1996/940) 14 November 1996.
59 In accordance with Article 50 o f the UN Charter and reports submitted by special 
committees usually established by the Security Council to observe the application of 
sanctions and their economic effects.
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humanitarian aspect played a crucial role in restraining the capacity of the 
Security Council to apply stringent measures. Many members of the Council, 
who voted for the above resolutions, including Egypt, France, and Germany, 
stipulated that sanctions against Sudan should not entail measures that would 
have negative economic effects on the people of Sudan.
International and regional factors
Two factors played a significant role in the process of imposing sanctions on 
the Sudan. The first factor was the relation between the United States and 
Sudan, and the contentious dispute over the issue of terrorism at the bilateral 
level. The United States withdrew its diplomats from Khartoum in 1996, 
employed financial sanctions against Sudan in 1997, and, in 1998, made 
recourse to the unilateral use of force against Sudan. The US measures 
paralleled the UN mandatory sanctions against Sudan, and claimed Sudan’s 
alleged relationship with terrorism as justification.
The second factor is the regional context of Sudan’s relationship with 
four of its neighbouring countries. Each of these countries has its own 
interests and political agendas in the region, which, to a certain extent, 
dominated their responses to the issue of sanctions against Sudan. The
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analysis of the two factors will highlight the role of some of the forces, 
regional and international, which shaped the development of the case of 
Sudan.
US unilateral sanctions
The United States was a major actor in the Security Council during 
consideration of the issuing of sanctions against Sudan. Careful monitoring of 
the discussions in the Council during the adoption of resolutions 1044, 1054, 
and 1070 of 1996 would suggest, inter alia, that the United States was the 
most ardent supporter of the application of sanctions against Sudan. A better 
understanding of the case of Sudan requires an explanation of the United 
States’ behaviour in this context. This can be achieved by studying the role of 
the United States in the Security Council, as well as its subsequent unilateral 
attempts to deploy sanctions against Sudan.
Sudan is the most recent addition to America’s list of states which, it 
claims, support international terrorism. Before 1993 Sudan was not on the list. 
In 1989, a report of the US Department of State, ‘Patterns of Global 
Terrorism’, asserted that ‘the United States has maintained its formal 
designation of six countries as state supporters of terrorism - Cuba, Iran,
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Libya, North Korea, South Yemen, and Syria’.60 Only Libya out of the six 
states was subjected to UN mandatory sanctions, which came into effect in 
1992. In 1993, the United States formally added Sudan to the list.
Withdrawal o f US diplomats
On 31 January 1996, the same day resolution 1044 was adopted by the 
Security Council calling on Sudan to hand over the suspects, the US 
Administration ordered its diplomatic staff to leave Khartoum and to pursue 
their mission from Nairobi.61 A statement issued by the State Department 
declared that
The United States has decided to suspend its diplomatic presence in 
Sudan, due to continuing concern for the safety of American officials in 
Sudan. While we are aware of the government of Sudan’s assurances 
regarding security, there are abiding concerns about movements and 
activities of terrorist groups in Sudan. In our discussions with the 
Sudanese government we have urged them to take adequate measures to
60 Patterns o f Global Terrorism, 1989, United States Department o f State, Washington DC, 
1990, p. 43.
61 It may be recalled that twelve o f the staff o f the United States Embassy in Nairobi were 
killed in a terrorist attack which also resulted in the destruction o f the building and the 
killing o f more than 200 Kenyan citizens in August 1998.
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curb the activities of terrorists groups and to guarantee the safety of 
Americans.62
However, the suspension of official American presence represents ‘neither a 
break in diplomatic relations with the government of Sudan nor a change in 
US policy toward Sudan.’ Furthermore, the declaration announced the 
establishment of an office in the region for the purpose of maintaining a 
dialogue with Sudan.
Neither the language of the decision, nor the actual measures it 
employed, has matched the rhetoric of American officials in calling for 
tougher sanctions against Sudan. As the State Department declared in a later 
statement, the US embassy in Khartoum remained open and ‘Ambassador 
Carney and his staff have made regular trips to Sudan to conduct political, 
consular and administrative business.’
One of the United States’ possible aims in making such a decision was 
to advance political pressure on the government of Sudan. However, reports 
about the existence of non-Sudanese militant groups in the country might 
have caused worries to the United States. Washington probably feared a 
repetition of past incidents. In March 1973, members of a Palestinian faction,
62 Netsite file///H//doc.us.htm, US Department of State, 2 February 1996.
63 US Department of State, Fact Sheet: Restaffing o f US embassy in Khartoum, 24 September 1997.
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Aylool El-Aswad (Black September) stormed the Saudi Arabian Embassy in 
Khartoum and took the American ambassador and charge d’affaires, the 
Belgian charge d’affaires, the Saudi Arabian ambassador, the Jordanian 
charge d’affaires and the Japanese charge d’affaires as hostages. The group 
announced their demands to the US, Jordan, West Germany, and Israel. On 
the second day the three Western diplomats, including the American 
ambassador, were killed, and on the fourth day the group released the 
remaining hostages and surrendered to the Sudanese authorities.
The legacy of such an incident, the degree of security measures that 
local authorities afford to provided for the safety of foreign diplomats, and 
the unfriendly stance of the Sudanese government all contributed to the 
concerns of the United States. However, the government of Sudan has 
repeatedly made assurances that the country is safe and diplomats and 
nationals of other Western countries, as well as representatives of 
international organisations, enjoy a satisfactory level of security in Sudan.
In September 1997, the State Department decided to restaff the 
American embassy in Khartoum. The text of the decision explained that ‘[w]e 
have determined that the security situation permits American diplomatic staff 
to be reassigned to Khartoum.’64 The diplomatic presence in Khartoum,
64 Ibid.
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according to the State Department fact sheet, would allow the United States, 
inter alia, to ‘monitor and gauge Sudanese government compliance with UN 
Security Council resolutions which demand that the Sudanese government 
end its support and sanctuary to terrorists’ and to ‘conduct an intensive 
dialogue with Sudanese government officials to induce change in Khartoum.’ 
Yet, the fact sheet ended by stating that ‘We seek, among other things, 
stronger sanctions against Sudan and an increase in non-lethal military 
assistance to the front line states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda to contain 
Sudanese-sponsored insurgencies.’ Within 48 hours, the United States had 
changed its decision to restaff its embassy in Khartoum. No official statement 
was issued to explain why the Administration had reversed its decision.
Until November 1997, the United States showed ambivalence towards 
the imposition of stringent sanctions against Sudan. Differences between the 
Administration and the Congress contributed to uncertainty in the American 
policy towards Sudan for many Congressmen wanted tougher sanctions to be 
imposed on Khartoum.
US financial sanctions
On 4 November 1997, the President of the United States declared the
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imposition of economic sanctions against Sudan. Exercising his statutory 
authority, President Clinton issued unilateral sanctions pursuant to section 
204 (b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1703(b) which entails a declaration of national emergency to deal with 
an external threat. President Clinton reported to Congress he had decided to 
impose comprehensive sanctions on Sudan ‘in response to (among other 
things) the Sudanese government’s continued provision of sanctuary and 
support for terrorist groups (and) its support of regional insurgencies that 
threaten neighbouring governments friendly to the United States.’ The 
package of trade and financial sanctions included blocking Sudanese 
government assets in the United States. It also prohibited certain financial 
transactions, banned imports of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, and 
outlawed the exportation to Sudan of any non-exempt goods or technology. 
President Clinton explained that humanitarian, diplomatic, and journalistic 
activities between the two countries would continue. The presidential order 
exempted the importation from Sudan of certain products unavailable from 
other sources, such as gum arabic. As it deems necessary, certain financial 
transactions and trade activities will be permitted in accordance with the 
executive order and the licensing system.65
65 The presidential order made other exemptions such as: transactions necessary to conduct 
the official business o f the United States and the United Nations, regulated transfers o f fees 
and stipends from the government o f Sudan to Sudanese students in the United States. It also 
considered licensing activities, which allow American citizens residents in Sudan to make
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The American economic measures were not imposed in response to a 
specific or direct provocative incident. However, there were repeated calls 
from Congress, urging the White House to take measures against Sudan. In 
her remarks on economic sanctions against Sudan, the Secretary of State, 
Madeline Albright, explained that the Administration ‘appreciate(s) and 
share(s) the concern that many members of Congress have expressed 
regarding this issue* and promised to maintain close co-operation with 
Congress in the future.66
Furthermore, there was the possibility of Congress issuing sanctions 
against Sudan in the form of legislation. This action could have undermined 
the administration’s absolute monopoly of the application of measures and 
hindered chances of manoeuvring over the subsequent possibilities of 
relaxing or lifting the sanctions. In a paper presented to the Council on 
Foreign Affairs, Gary Mufbauer and Maurice Greenberg argued that
the president must have unfettered freedom to lift sanctions step by 
step, when he obtains appropriate co-operation from the target 
country. Sanctions legislation enacted by Congress, states, or
payments for their routine living expenses, including taxes and utilities, and ‘products to 
ensure civilian aircraft safety’.
66 Press Release, US Department o f State, 4 November 1997.
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municipalities should be vetoed, or challenged in court when it does
f i lnot contain a national interests waiver exercisable by the president.
With regard to Sudan, the President might have acted in anticipation of an 
imminent move by the Congress in this direction. Congress has long pressed 
for the employment of sanctions against countries like Syria and Sudan. Both 
countries were considered by the United States to threaten the security of 
neighbouring states which America considered strategic allies in two 
sensitive areas. Members of Congress who welcomed the President’s decision 
to employ sanctions against Khartoum might have seen it as an overdue step 
to punish Sudan. According to this explanation the President acted in attempt 
to avoid being superseded by the Congress.
Another possible interpretation for the course of US sanctions against 
Sudan could be the unwillingness of Security Council members to adopt 
further measures or even to implement the authorised measures against 
Sudan. The adoption of mandatory diplomatic sanctions in April 1996 was 
considered by the United States as unsatisfactory and even in that case, UN 
member states showed little enthusiasm for implementing the measures.
67 Gary C. Hafbauer and Maurice R. Greenberg, Economic Sanctions: America's Polly, 
Website, The Council on Foreign Relations, Home page, 1997, p. 3.
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US missile strikes
On 20 August 1998, the United States launched a missile attack against 
Sudan. The US unmanned cruise missiles targeted Elshifa Pharmaceutical 
Factory in Bahri, one of the three main towns which form the capital, 
Khartoum. The factory was suspected, by the United States, of having the 
capacity for chemical weapons production. The five missiles, which landed 
on the Sudanese factory, represented one of four simultaneous American 
strikes. The other three were aimed at what American officials claimed were 
terrorists camps in Khowst and Jalalabad in Afghanistan near Pakistan’s 
North-West Frontiers Province. The missiles were launched from seven ships 
in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.
The United States justified its attack as a response to the bombing of 
its embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. In a letter to the Security 
Council, the United States argued that it was acting in self-defence and in 
conformity with the United Nations Charter. The British Prime Minister and 
the French President, as well as the German Chancellor, immediately declared 
their support for the United States. Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, 
criticised the American action.
The US missile strike against Sudan and the Western support for that
243
action, has remarkably moved the issue of Sudan from a phase of political 
pressure and mild sanctions, to military coercion and the actual use of force. 
It represented the first incident of Western military force used against Sudan 
since the Kitchiner conquest of Omdurman in 1898 and Mussolini’s attempt 
to annex eastern Sudan during World War II.
The American action also demonstrated two important factors. First, it 
was the first time since the end of the Could War, with the exception of 
controversial military strikes against Iraq, that the United States had taken a 
unilateral military action without seeking prior authorisation from the 
Security Council. Once again the United States, in a pre Gulf war manner, 
invoked the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter to justify the 
military attack against Sudan. Michael Howard classified the US attack 
against Sudan among ‘wars of honour’ which have been motivated by ‘the 
desire to restore the prestige and dignity’ of a certain country. He stated that 
‘[i]t was certainly a sense of offended “honour”, and probably a desire for 
vengeance as well, that led the US to retaliate so precipitately against 
Afghanistan and Sudan when their embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam 
were bombed in August 1998, we would be unwise to assume that “honour” 
is any less significant in causing and prolonging conflict today than it was in
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the days of Thucydides’68
It might be asked whether the United States will be required in this 
case to disclose the results of its intelligence investigations and to impart 
details of its military assault to the Security Council. The strikes also 
demonstrated that the United Nations should establish rapid reaction teams of 
experts to investigate such situations and report back to the Security Council.
Second, the international response to the US air strikes marked a 
significant shift in the perception of the unilateral use of force in such cases, 
at least at the level of the United Nations and Western governments. The 
situation could be contrasted with the response to the American air strike 
against Libya in 1986. At that time, the Security Council voted on a draft 
resolution which condemned the attack and explicitly called it a terrorist 
action by the United States.69 Perez de Cuellar, then Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, strongly condemned the military strike against Libya. 
However, when the strike against Sudan was made, the United Nations did 
not condemn the attack. Secretary-General, Koki Annan, explained that the 
United States informed him a few minutes after the strikes. Annan issued a 
brief and general condemnation of terrorism pending further information on
68 Michael Howard, ‘When Are Wars Decisive?’ Survival, Spring 1999, vol. 41, no. 1, p. 
128.
69 Draft resolution (S/10784) op. cit. note 11.
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7ft •the issue. The Security Council did not consider the strike as an urgent issue
71and its discussion was delayed many times.
These changes are definitely related to the end of the Cold War and 
practice of world peace and security since then. The emerging notion of 
justifiable foreign intervention, especially among Western policymakers and 
academics, and the condemnation of international terrorism at the level of 
international norms, provides a conceptual thesis that explains such changes 
and their scope.
Regional diplomacy
At the level of non-state actors, the OAU made some efforts to settle the 
question of extradition between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Salim Salim, the 
OAU Secretary-General, held talks in the capitals of the three countries but 
no agreement was concluded before the Security Council imposed sanctions 
against Sudan in April 1996. The two statements of the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution on 11 September and 14 
December 1995, considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as
77aimed at Africa as a whole. Despite the fact that the OAU efforts did not 
make significant assertion or any real progress, the Security Council
70 Press Release, SG/SM/6675.
71 In cases during the 1980s the General Assembly condemned the United States for an aggression 
in Grenada by 109 votes of UN member states and by 75 votes o f an act o f aggression in Panama.
72 Security Council Documents (S/1996/10, annexes I and II).
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frequently referred to them in resolution 1054. The rhetoric of all sides 
seemed to indicate a greater involvement for the OAU in the conflict than 
actually occurred. In reality, the role of the OAU was strictly limited.
The role of the OAU cannot be viewed out of the context of its 
functioning and capabilities. Some experts believe that the OAU was formed, 
and historically functioned, as a promoter of independence and in cases where 
a challenge was posed from outside the region. In the view of those experts, 
the OAU is not capable of playing a significant role in issues of regional 
security. Edmond Keller argued that ‘The Organisation has aspirations of 
becoming the focus of a large regional order, but the reality of the situation is 
that the process has moved much faster and further at the sub-regional 
level.’ The inherited limitations, which for decades crippled the 
Organisation and its ability to function properly in the resolution of regional 
conflicts, proved to render its mediation in the case of Sudan unsuccessful.
At the level of neighbouring states the situation was described by the 
Secretary-General as ‘difficult’, one that needed co-operative efforts.74 On the 
one hand, all the neighbours of Sudan who were visited by the Secretary- 
General’s Special Envoy, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda,
73 Edmond J. Keller, ‘Rethinking African Regional Security’ in David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan, Regional Orders, Building Security in a New World, The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997, p. 298.
74 Security Council Press Release (SC/6214) p. 3.
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nc
‘accused Sudan of supporting terrorist activities within their territories’. On 
the other hand, Sudan submitted complaints to the Security Council accusing
7the four neighbouring countries of military assaults on its borders.
Sudan was accused of harbouring three suspects wanted by Ethiopia 
for their involvement in the Mubarak assassination attempt. Thus, Egypt, 
Sudan, and Ethiopia, the three countries which form the valley of the Blue 
Nile and have vital common interests, were all involved. These factors all 
added to the already complex and unique situation in the Horn of Africa and 
further exacerbated the deteriorating relations between Sudan and its two 
neighbours.
Egypt, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, first called 
for the imposition of sanctions against Sudan. The Egyptian rhetoric was full 
of bitterness and relations between the two countries suffered a further 
deterioration as a result. Assaults on the Sudanese diplomatic mission in
77Cairo and Egyptian diplomatic representatives in Khartoum were reported.
The following scenario was put forward by the Aspen conference a 
few weeks after the assassination attempt.
75 The Secretary-General report to the Security Council on 11 March 96 (S/1996/179).
76 Ibid.
77 Attacks on diplomats and other internationally protected persons were regarded by the 
1979 Convention as terrorist acts.
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In the wake of the June 1995 assassination attempt on President 
Mubarak of Egypt, the Egyptian government has increased security 
measures against Islamist elements. Fighting breaks out between Egypt 
and Sudan over the border question. Internal opposition to Egyptian 
government mounts, possibly with external support from Sudan and 
Iran. Attacks of foreigners and on leading Egyptian public figures 
mount. Egypt’s friends fear that it might become another Algeria or 
even Iran. Several army units refuse to assist internal security in putting 
down rebellion in rural areas. One can hear open calls for the 
establishment of an Islamic Republic of Egypt. President Mubarak is 
getting conflicting advice: carry out a domestic crackdown, take action 
against Sudan, negotiate with opposition groups. Your government has 
a call to Mubarak arranged in an hour. What should your government 
recommend? If Mubarak asks for a show of external military support,
78what should your government reply?
Although the scenario addresses problems beyond the scope of this chapter, 
the question of how Egypt should behave towards Sudan was central to the 
above text as it remained an important factor in Western strategic thinking
78 Report o f the Aspen Institute Conference 2-6 August 1995, Managing conflict in the post­
cold war world: the role o f intervention, The Aspen Institute, 1996, p. 25.
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about the region.
Yet, Egypt obstructed the adoption by the Security Council of more 
stringent measures against Sudan. Egyptian officials have repeatedly asserted 
that Cairo will not propose or support any sanctions that might hurt the 
Sudanese people. Husni Mubarak was trying to draw a line between the 
government in Khartoum and the Sudanese people. A partial explanation for 
Mubarak’s stance can be found in Francis Deng’s observation that ‘Arousing 
nationalist sentiment against Egypt is likely to rally support for the
70government (of Sudan)’.
Attempts to apply certain measures of a strategic nature against Sudan 
were abandoned by Egypt. President Mubarak stated publicly, in an interview
O A
with CNN, that he would not agree to an arms embargo against Sudan. In 
his view, such a move would cause an imbalance of power in the region 
whereby the south would be well armed while the north would be denied 
access to weapons. In fact, Mubarak has mixed feelings about the issue of 
sanctions against Sudan. He would like to see an early end to the Islamic 
regime in Khartoum which is approaching its second decade in power, but at
79 Francis M. Deng, ‘Egypt’s dilemmas on the Sudan’ Middle East Policy, vol. IV, no. 1&2, 
September 1995, p. 53. For background and further analysis o f the special nature o f the 
relationship between Sudan and Egypt see, for example Peter Woodward, Sudan 1898-1989, 
The Unstable State, Lynne Rienner Publishers and Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 
Boulder and London, 1990, pp. 13 -  62, 160, 168-9; Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959; Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, The 
Dynamics o f  Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985, Macmillan, London, 1987, pp. 121, 129, 235.
80 CNN Interview with President Husni Mubarak, 10 April 1996.
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the same time a prolonged period of weak Sudanese government without an 
adequate force to defend its territory might pose a threat to Egyptian interests 
there.
Nabil El-Arabi, the Egyptian representative in the Security Council,
gave further explanation for Egypt's consideration of the case of Sudan. He
stated during the adoption of resolution 1054 that ‘Every Egyptian felt and
appreciated the special nature of the historical relations which bound the
peoples of the Nile Valley and the Sudan. Anything that harmed the people of
the Sudan harmed the people of Egypt, and vice versa. The relations between
their countries should return to normal, so the people of the Sudan might
81 •enjoy good relations with all its neighbours.’ Egyptian leaders see great 
strategic importance of Sudan; it is the source of necessary reserves of water 
and other natural resources for their over-populated country.
The Ethiopian stance was different. Ethiopia wanted an arms embargo 
against Sudan in order to weaken the Khartoum regime’s ability to threaten its 
security. Its representative in the Security Council expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the diplomatic measures by stating that ‘we feel justified 
to be disappointed when our call for justice is given short shrift and when we 
see principles being sacrificed on the altar of expediency and political
81 Security Council meeting 3660, op. cit. note 42.
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calculations.’ He added that ‘An arms embargo would have been one of the 
most appropriate steps that the Council should have taken to secure Sudan’s 
compliance with its demands.’
The Ethiopian government feared that Khartoum might attempt to 
exploit the traditional rivalry between the two powerful groups, the Amhara 
and the Tigray. Sudan played a significant role in the armed overthrow of the 
Mengistu regime. Ethiopians know that Khartoum keeps close ties with many 
Ethiopian political leaders who grew up in Sudan and organised opposition 
movements from Sudanese territory. However, in terms of logistics, the 
regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea equally benefit from their previous 
experience.83
The assassination attempt proved to be a turning point in Ethiopian- 
Sudanese relations. The two countries maintained good relations until three 
months after the attempt, when the Ethiopian government issued a statement 
explicitly accusing Sudan of providing support and shelter for the Egyptian 
suspects.84
82 Ibid.
83 The Washington Post reported on 10 November 1996 that the US Administration was 
ready to provide military aid to Sudan’s neighbouring countries to help overthrow the 
Khartoum regime. The report added: ‘Nearly $20 million in surplus US military equipment 
will be sent to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda ... the three countries support Sudanese 
opposition groups preparing a joint offensive to topple the Khartoum government.’
84 Independent, 2 September 1995.
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Extradition of Suspects
The question of extradition was central in the two cases of Sudan and Libya 
which the Security Council considered as threatening international peace and 
security. Extradition, defined in simple terms by Alun Jones, ‘is an act of 
government, normally in fulfilment of formal, reciprocal arrangements 
between states, by returning a person suspected or convicted of crime to the
o r
country which wishes to try or punish him for that crime’. Extradition is a 
delicate issue that sometimes triggers discontent in interstate relations. 
Historically, most extradition treaties excluded political offenders, following 
the lead of a Franco-Belgium extradition agreement signed in 1834. Twenty 
years later, this treaty was amended to include political offenders when a
or
failed attempt to assassinate Napoleon III took place in 1855. A relationship 
could be traced between the tendency to exclude political offenders from the 
application of extradition rules and the lack of will to characterise activities of 
liberation movements as terrorist acts.
Although extradition is normally conceived of as involving two states, 
the requesting state and the asylum state, in many cases, a third or fourth state 
is also involved. Geoff Gilbert gives an interesting hypothetical example:
85 Alun Jones, Jones on Extradition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1995, p. v.
86 Adrian Guelke, The Age o f Terrorism and International Political System, I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, London and New York, 1995, p. 163.
253
Sven is a Swedish national. In Dublin, in the Republic of Ireland, he is 
alleged to have used explosives to rob a bank. With the funds raised 
from the robbery, he fled to New York, U.S.A., where he committed 
financial crimes having cross-frontier aspects, which seriously 
damaged the economic interests of France. To avoid arrest, he hijacked 
a plane and flew to Toronto, Canada. Shooting several guards and 
Turkish tourists at the airport, he boarded a plane bound for London. 
At Heathrow Airport he was arrested.87
Gilbert’s example illustrates how terrorist attacks can provoke claims of 
extradition by several countries. It also explains the nature of terrorist 
activities and their inclination to transnational proliferation. In reality, many 
governments around the world demand the hand-over of criminals or political 
dissidents who have taken shelter in other countries, to be tried or even - if 
they have already been convicted of serious crimes - executed. Almost all 
cases involve sensitive political calculations and in some cases fugitives have 
been used by host states as a bargaining counter in their political relations 
with other countries. But in most cases, requests by states for the return of 
suspects tend to remain unsatisfied.88 Controversy often arises from the
87 Geoff Gilbert, Aspects o f extradition Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordecht, Boston, 
and London, 1991, p. 5.
88 See John F. Murphy, Punishing International Terrorism, The Legal Framework fo r  policy 
initiatives, Rowman and Allanheld, 1985, pp. 107 -  122.
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elastic nature of multilateral treaties on extradition. Like other branches of 
international law, international criminal law and extradition law lack adequate
QA
enforcement of their rules.
In the cases of Libya and Sudan, the demands of the requesting states were 
supported by Security Council mandatory measures. The Council asked 
Sudan to take ‘immediate action to ensure extradition to Ethiopia for 
prosecution of the three suspects sheltered in Sudan and wanted in connection 
with the assassination attempt’ on the life of President Husni Mubarak.90
This demand touches on complicated and delicate issues, one of them 
constitutional. Ostensibly, sanctions in such cases are implemented on the 
preliminary assumptions that: (a) the suspects are likely to have been 
involved in the terrorist action; (b) the suspects are definitely resident within 
the territory of the target state, whether they are its nationals or not; (c) the 
government of the target state has refused to hand over the suspects.
Political problems also arise in the hand-over of suspects in cases of 
alleged terrorism, since the political regime in the target state may itself be 
involved in the terrorist plot. If so, it might fear that the hand-over of suspects 
could worsen its situation, provoking more trouble and tougher sanctions. If 
the regime is in fact not part of the plot and the suspects are not in its
89 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The general international law o f terrorism’ in Rosalyn Higgins and 
Maurice Flory, Terrorism in international law, LSE / Routledge, London and New York, 
1997, pp. 13-30.
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territory, or at least it does not know that they are, the mistrust which usually 
surrounds such cases may prevent any understanding being reached, and the 
situation may long remain unresolved.91
4- Effects of mandatory sanctions against Libya and Sudan 
Impact of sanctions on Libya
The mandatory closure of Libyan air space is unprecedented in the African 
continent. Similar to the situation in Iraq, the air blockade has significantly 
increased the international isolation of Libya. The air embargo has proved to 
be a demonstrably damaging measure. It causes conspicuous interruption to 
trade and communications especially when adopted on a mandatory basis, 
with a total ban on flights. Two elements contribute to the enforceability and 
efficacy of an air embargo. First, the nature of an air embargo may not allow 
for easy evasion or undetected flights. Second, the increasing dependency on 
air navigation for different trade activities made it an essential economic tool.
90 It could be noted that in August 1994 Sudan extradited to France Carlos for his alleged 
killing o f two French officers in 1975.
91 Perhaps it is significant to note that the first extradition treaty in history was concluded 
between Raineses II o f Egypt and the Hittite Prince Hattushilish III. The treaty explicitly 
referred to surrender o f political offenders (great men) and not common criminals. However, 
most contemporary extradition treaties strictly exclude political offenders from surrender.
92 In September 1990 the Security Council imposed the most comprehensive air embargo 
regime against Iraq, Security Council resolution 670,25 September 1990.
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For these reasons an air blockade may have multiple consequences on the 
economy of the targeted state, as proved to be the case in Libya.
Apart from Iraq, Libya represents the longest term of mandatory 
sanctions imposed on a target in the post-Cold War era. More than six years 
after the air and arms embargo against Libya came into effect in 1992, and 
despite effective implementation of measures and their impact on the people 
of Libya, sanctions have failed to bring about the settlement of the conflict 
over the aerial incident at Lockerbie. The Secretary-General expressed, what 
could be called ‘Good Offices fatigue’, and so indicated his special envoy’s 
reports.94 However, there is some hope that the plan of the United States and 
the United Kingdom, which coincided with the proposal of the Arab League 
and the OAU, could finally bring justice to all parties to the conflict.
Incoherence of mandatory sanctions against Sudan
Non-comprehensive application of mandatory measures under Chapter VII by 
UN member states is by no means unique to the case of Sudan. From 
Rhodesia (1966) to Zaire (1996), some countries always evade mandatory 
sanctions, undermining the measures adopted by the Security Council. Even
93 During the 1990s, the Security Council applied mandatory sanctions in various forms, 
including trade and financial sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, arms embargo, oil embargo, air 
embargo, and no-fly zones.
94 Boutros Boutros Ghali described his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem as 
unsuccessful. For a brief account o f Ghali’s effort and the report o f his special envoy to 
Libya Vladimir Petrovsky, see UN Chronicle, September 1992, pp. 2 2 - 2 3 .
257
in serious cases like Iraq, despite sanctions being tightened and maritime 
forces policing the blockade, oil tankers continued to travel between Iraq and 
Jordan after August 1990. On 19 August 1990, American warships fired two 
shots across the bow of two Iraqi oil tankers.95 In Rhodesia, states violated 
mandatory sanctions more than 350 times, and over 45 violations were 
committed by the United States.96
However, the application of diplomatic measures against Sudan may 
be seen as mild and selective. The majority of UN member states disregarded 
the resolution, and, apart from Egypt, hardly any of the Arab countries which 
maintain diplomatic relations with Sudan implemented the measures 
prescribed by the Security Council. However, diplomatic sanctions were not 
adopted before in such an exclusive form. In other cases, they were always 
used to back up the application of economic sanctions.
The first attempt to issue diplomatic sanctions through the Security 
Council was made against Spain in response to a complaint by Poland. The 
attempt was made a few months after the creation of the United Nations, the 
Polish claimed that Franco’s policies endangered international peace and 
security and proposed a draft resolution under Articles 39 and 41. The draft 
resolution called upon ‘all member states of the United Nations who maintain
95 Independent, 20 August 1990.
96 See J. Pokalas, ‘Economic sanctions: an effective alternative to military coercion?’ 
Brooklyn Journal o f  International Law, vol. 6, 1980, p. 312; Nigel White, ‘Collective
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diplomatic relations with the Franco Government to sever such relations 
immediately’. A Sub-Committee, which was appointed by the Security 
Council, concluded by stating that
although the activities of the Franco regime do not constitute an 
existing threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the 
Charter and therefore the Security Council has no jurisdiction to 
direct or authorise enforcement measures under Article 40 or 42, 
nevertheless such activities do constitute a situation “likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” 
Within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter ... the Security 
Council is therefore empowered by paragraph 1 of Article 36 to 
recommend procedures or methods of adjustment in order to improve 
the situation mentioned.97
However, when the amended draft resolution was put to the vote, although 
ten out of the eleven members of the Council voted in favour, it was atrophied 
by a negative vote from the USSR.
sanctions: an alternative to military coercion?’ International Relations, vol. XII, no. 3, 
December 1994, p. 83.
97 Report o f  the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question, S.C.O.R., First Year, First Series, 
Sp. Supp., p. 5.
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Even if they are to be effectively implemented, diplomatic sanctions 
alone can only have mild effects on the target. A group designated by the 
Royal Institute for International Affairs in 1938 to study the issue of 
sanctions, concluded that diplomatic sanctions do not amount to more than 
conveying a message of disagreement.98 The case of Sudan corroborates the 
conviction of the Group of the Royal Institute. As it included one of the rare 
analyses of the issue of diplomatic sanctions, the report still retains significant 
relevance to today’s inter-state practice. During 1998-99, the United States 
and Britain expressed willingness to restore diplomatic relations with Sudan 
as Khartoum reduced the level of its diplomatic representation with the two 
countries after the US missile attack against Khartoum in August 1998.
Sudan represents a case where Chapter VII was invoked to impose 
mild measures and rhetoric overwhelmed the actual application of mandatory 
sanctions. It further constitutes what Lawrence Freedman calls an attempt ‘to 
obtain concessions through a threat-based bargaining process.’99
Conclusion
The end of the Cold War allowed the United Nations to develop and approve 
methods for the management of incidents of international terrorism. The
98 International Sanctions, op. cit. note 1, pp. 15-23.
99 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Introduction’ in Lawrence Freedman, ed. Strategic Coercion, Concepts 
and Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998, p. 3.
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agreement and co-operation among members of the Security Council 
permitted the undertaking of enforcement measures under Chapter VII to 
address situations which involve allegations of international terrorism and 
subsequent non-compliance with Security Council resolutions.
Peace enforcement is not an alternative for peaceful measures to settle 
disputes over incidents of international terrorism, but in cases of non- 
compliance and defiance peace enforcement measures will be the appropriate 
course of action to deal with the situation. However, since the Security 
Council is functioning and capable of taking measures commensurate with the 
situation, unilateral actions are restricted according to the provisions of 
Article 51.
The progress attained by the United Nations in the area of international 
terrorism does not mean that the international community has established an 
agreed formula or achieved coherence in the interpretation of the 
phenomenon. The adoption of conventions and declarations by the General 
Assembly which include useful guidelines represent a step forward, but 
member states are still far from agreeing on a specific definition or 
establishing a framework for the prevention and elimination of international 
terrorism.
Part VI
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Review of peace enforcement
The purpose of this part is to review cases of peace enforcement during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It examines the political aspects and the 
constitutional basis of military enforcement actions and the regimes of 
mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council during these periods.
Part one of this thesis highlighted how the frequent involvement of the 
Security Council in situations of civil war by adopting enforcement measures 
has transformed the concept of peace enforcement. This part demonstrates, 
through empirical analyses, how this transformation has affected the 
consideration of the nature of the UN actions in earlier cases such as Korea 
1950 and Congo 1960. The argument that the Security Council is not permitted 
to take enforcement measures with relation to civil wars is no longer the 
convention.
Two controversial cases are studied to verify whether they represent 
peace enforcement cases or not: the Congo crisis during the Cold War and the 
intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan in the post-Cold War period. In Congo, the 
dispute was about whether the mandate and function of ONUC constituted a 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. In the case of Kurds the 
enforcement nature of Operation Provide Hope was admitted, but the confusion 
was about the authorisation, justification, and the extent of time. Despite the
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controversy over their mandate, the cases of Congo and the Kurds influenced 
the study and practice of the UN peace enforcement operations.
The impact of the enforcement measures on the outcome of each conflict 
will be evaluated with the aim of drawing some conclusions for the future of 
UN practice in the area of peace enforcement.
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Chapter 7 
The Cold War Period
The Use o f  Force by the United Nations 
1- Korea
The involvement of the United Nations in Korea predated the outbreak of war 
in 1950 and came at a time of turmoil and instability that marked the most 
sensitive transitional period in the Korean peninsula. Korea, which remained a 
dependency of China for centuries and had been formally subjugated by Japan 
in 1910, was declared a free state at the Yalta conference in February 1945. 
However, a transitional period was agreed upon during which the United States
i L  # 1
would operate south the 38 parallel and the Soviet Union North of it. When 
the US-Soviet Commission disagreed on the issue of democratic elections in 
Korea the United States unilaterally decided to refer the matter to the United 
Nations. On 14 November 1947 the General Assembly formed a UN 
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe elections in both 
parts of the country. As disagreement continued between the superpowers and 
the relations between South Korea and North Korea became bitter, UNTCOK
1 See I. Stone, The Hidden History o f the Korean War, Monthly Review Press, New York, 2nd 
ed. 1969; D. Rees, Korea, The Limited War, Macmillan, London, 1964; Guy Wint, What 
happened in Korea, a study o f collective security, The Batchworth Press, London, 1954;
2 General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 18.
3 General Assembly resolution 112(11), 14 November 1947. Yugoslavia pointed out that it 
would be a dangerous precedent to involve the United Nations in elections, and described the 
Korean election as an internal issue to be undertaken by the people o f Korea alone.
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was only able to observe the election in South Korea in May 1948. On 20 July 
1948 Dr Syngman Rhee became the first President of the Republic of Korea 
and the General Assembly recognised his Government’s authority and control 
over the part of Korea which was accessible to the Commission.4
North Korea established its own authority through the adoption of a new 
constitution and the election of Kim Il-sung on 10 September 1948 as Prime 
Minister of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
The United States and the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of their 
forces the following year.
Growing enmity between the two authorities and repeated border 
skirmishes culminated in the invasion of South Korea by forces from North 
Korea on 25 June 1950. As it did with Kuwait in 1990, the United States was 
the first to bring the North Korean invasion to the attention of the Security 
Council shortly after the attack.5 The Council convened on the same day and 
passed a resolution which deemed the armed attack a breach of the peace, and 
called upon North Korea to withdraw its forces to the 38th parallel.6 With the 
Soviet Union absenting itself from the Security Council meetings between
4 General Assembly resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948; 48 member states voted for the 
resolution 6 against and one abstaining; the resolution had also called for the withdrawal o f  
the occupying forces.
5 See L. Goodrich, Korea, A Study o f  United States Policy in the United Nations, Council on 
Foreign Relations, New York, 1956.
6 Security Council resolution 82,25 June 1950; 9 members voted for the resolution, 1 member 
abstained (Yugoslavia), and the USSR absent; non-permanent members o f the Security 
Council during this period were Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Norway, and Yugoslavia.
266
January and July 1950,7 and the seat of China in the Council occupied by the 
Nationalists, the mobilisation of the veto was almost impossible. Two days 
later the Council adopted another resolution recommending the provision of 
necessary assistance by member states to the Republic of Korea to repel the
Q
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. For 
these purposes the resolution of 7 July stated that the Security Council 
requested
4. ... the United States to designate the commander of such forces; 5. 
Authorise[d] the unified command at its discretion to use the United 
Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces 
concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.9
President Harry Truman announced the sending of ground forces to Korea and 
the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the United 
Nations force. For the United States, the Korean case represented the most 
convenient form of command and control of force it has ever been able to 
secure from the Council. In 1992, the United States sought a Security Council 
resolution to designate to it command of UN forces in Somalia, but Russia and 
China, haunted by the Korean experience, were obviously not prepared to allow
7 When the Soviet Union returned to the Council in August 1950, the Council was presided by 
its representative Jacop Malik.
8 Security Council resolution 83, 27 June 1950; 7 members voted for the resolution, 1 against 
(Yugoslavia), two members (Egypt and India) did not participate and the USSR absent.
9 Security Council resolution 84, 7 July 1950.
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such an authorisation. The only incident similar to Korea took place in 1994 
with relation to the crisis in Haiti. However, it was made possible in Haiti 
because three permanent members were simultaneously seeking to be 
authorised by the Council to establish the command of UN forces in three 
different situations. Consequently, France was authorised to lead the 
international forces in Rwanda, Russia was allowed to command a 
peacekeeping force in Georgia and the United States led the international force 
in Haiti.
Fifteen countries sent military contingents to fight against North Korea 
under the Unified Command and the flag of the United Nations. On 15 
September General MacArthur launched a full-scale offensive against North 
Korean forces. Before the end of September, MacArthur retook Seoul and on 1
t l i
October ordered his forces across the 38 parallel. On 27 October allies’ forces 
reached the Yalu River on the Korean border with China. This action provoked 
an immediate Chinese response. On 26 November China formally entered the 
war, and before the end of December 1950, Chinese forces pushed the Unified 
Command beyond the 38th parallel and recaptured Seoul.10
On 11 April 1951 Truman relieved MacArthur, as they disagreed on the 
scope of the military operation and their views appeared to represent the two 
different schools of limited and total war. General MacArthur wanted to
10 See A. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, Macmillan, New York, 1960.
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capture North Korea and to expand the war into China’s mainland; Truman 
disagreed, he sought to avoid a total war with China and the Soviet Union.11
There was also confusion within the United Nations on the objectives of 
the unified command and the mandate and function of the operation. Although 
the Security Council resolutions defined the mandate of the forces as the 
repulsion of the North Korean aggression, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution on 7 October 1950 recommending that the Unified Command should
12
undertake all appropriate steps to reunify the country under one government.
By mid 1951, General Mathew Ridgway, the new American commander 
of the UN forces, had retaken Seoul again. On the initiative of the Soviet 
Union, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and a two years negotiation 
process started on 10 July 1951 with many interruptions and disagreements. 
Finally a cease-fire agreement was reached in May 1952 and a two and a half 
mile demilitarised zone was demarcated along the border between the two 
Koreas.
Western and Eastern authorities expressed opposing views on many vital 
points including the nature of the conflict in Korea - was it civil war or 
international conflict - the effect of the absence of the Soviet Union, and the
11 For deep analysis o f the American and Chinese strategies to end the war, see Rosemary 
Foot, The Wrong War, American Policy and the Dimensions o f  the Korean Conflict, 1950- 
1953, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1985, pp. 204 -  223.
12 A wider discussion on the history o f UN roles in Korean reunification is found in Tae Hwan 
Kwak, ‘The United Nations and Reunification’ in Young Whan Kihl, ed. Korea and the 
World Politics Beyond the Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford,
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representation of China in the Security Council.13 The latter issue was even a 
source of disagreement between the United States and the UN Secretary- 
General, Trygve Lie, who supported Peking’s claim to the seat of China in the 
Council.14 Animosity between the two camps reached its zenith. The Soviet 
Union had repeatedly accused Western countries of monopolising the United 
Nations to serve their own interests. In the Western opinion, it was customary 
‘to view the attitudes and actions of the USSR in the United Nations - as 
elsewhere -  as dictated only by malice and evil.’15 Statesmen and scholars on 
both sides arrayed a series of well-established and opposing arguments 
regarding the situation in Korea.
The constitutional effect of the Soviet absence was discussed in Part II 
of the thesis. However, this chapter will further the discussion by exploring the
1994, pp. 302-4; L. Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f  Korea 
1947-50, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959.
13 The stance o f the Communist block towards the Security Council resolutions and the 
Secretary-General was exemplified in the message cabled by Chou En-lai o f China to the 
Secretary-General in July 1950: ‘The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 27 June 
(S/1511) under the instigation and manipulation o f the United States Government calling 
upon the members o f the United Nations to assist the South Korean authorities, is in support 
of United States armed aggression and constitutes an intervention in the internal affairs o f  
Korea and a violation o f world peace. This resolution, being adopted moreover in the absence 
of China and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, is obviously illegal. The United Nations 
Charter stipulates that the United Nations shall not be authorised to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the internal jurisdiction o f any state, while the resolution o f the Security 
Council o f 27 June exactly violates this important principle o f the United Nations Charter. 
Therefore the resolution of the Security Council with regard to the Korean question is not 
only destitute o f any legal validity, but greatly damages the United Nations Charter. The 
action taken by Mr Trygve Lie, Secretary-General o f the United Nations, on the Korean 
question serves exactly to aggravate this damage.’ UN Documents S/1583, 6 July 1950.
14 Robert G. Wesson, ‘The United Nations in the World Outlook o f the Soviet Union and of 
the United States’ in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs, eds. Soviet and American 
Policies in the United Nations: A Twenty-Five-Year Perspective, New York University Press, 
New York, 1971, p. 10.
15 Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, JR. ‘The Soviet Union and the United Nations, An 
Essay in interpretation’, International Organisation, vol. VI, no. 1, February 1952, p. 1.
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political philosophy behind the constitutionality of the absence of a permanent 
member. The Charter implicitly assumed that peace enforcement could not be 
effected against the will of a permanent member. The power of veto was 
envisaged in the system to assure the permanent members that no such an 
action could be pursued. Technically, the USSR did not use the veto in the 
Korean situation, but it vigorously opposed the action undertaken by the 
unified command which had been directed against its will. Furthermore, 
Western powers led the General Assembly to assume peace enforcement 
responsibilities under the Uniting for Peace resolution of 3 November 1950,16 
and subsequently paralysed the Security Council. Inis Claude argued that the 
adoption of this plan soon proved futile, and
members of the United Nations have returned to the original conception 
that collective security is inapplicable to crises involving great powers. 
Korea was an aberration. The Uniting for Peace plan represented a 
fleeting urge to normalise the abnormality of the Korean experience, but 
second thoughts turned the minds of statesmen back to the view that the 
Organisation should not challenge a recalcitrant great power.17
16 52 member states voted for the Uniting for peace resolution, 5 members against and 2 
abstaining.
17 Inis L. Claude, JR., ‘The United Nations and the Use o f Force’ International Conciliation, 
March 1961, p. 364.
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Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye reiterated this conviction in 1990, by stating 
that the Uniting for Peace was a failure and no action should be attempted 
against a great power.18
Still, this assertion does not represent a conventional view. The inability 
of the United Nations to act against a great power, when this power engages in 
an act of aggression, was cited by many critics as one of the deficiencies of the 
UN peace enforcement system. Ronald Steel argued that
The virtue of collective security for powerful states is that it is extremely 
difficult to invoke against them. The major ones have vetoes in the 
Security Council. Yet it is against such states that collective action is 
most needed. It is hardly necessary to summon the might of all the 
world’s industrial powers to punish countries like Somalia and Serbia.19
Attempts to reform the veto regime and discussions on the issue of
onmembership have subsequently sought to deal with this kind of impotency in 
the system of the Security Council. However, in practical terms, Claude’s 
assertion represents a widely embraced argument. Alan James stated coherently
18 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2nd edition 1989, p. 280.
19 Ronald Steel, Temptations o f  A Superpower, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and 
London, 1995, p. 94.
20 See for example Barry O’Neill, ‘Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security 
Council’ Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, vol. 40, no. 2, June 1996, pp. 224, 235-36.
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[t]hus the Soviet Union was not in a position to cast a veto-which it
assuredly would have done had it been present. Furthermore, there were
many who saw what happened in Korea as a case of the organisation
being, as it were, captured by the United States and its allies and used as
a front for U.S. anticommunist foreign policy. Partly for this reason the
steam soon went out of the idea that, on further occasions when the
Security Council was blocked by a veto, the General Assembly might
make the kind of recommendation that the Council had made in June
011950. The United States also lost its initial enthusiasm for this scheme.
The Soviet Union’s rejection of the Uniting for Peace plan was consistent with
its opposition to the idea of a larger role for the General Assembly, especially
00 _in issues of security. The United States abandoned the Uniting for Peace 
strategy because the General Assembly was dominated, a few years after the 
Korean war, by the Third World countries. William O’Brien observed that ‘It is 
not inconceivable that a contemporary Uniting for Peace Resolution might 
brand Israel or South Africa as an aggressor ... the United States ... would no
21 Alan M. James, ‘Unit Veto Dominance in United Nations Peace-Keeping’ in Lawrence S. 
Finkelstein, ed. Politics in the United Nations System, Duke University Press, Durham and 
London, 1988, p. 78.
22 John Holmes observed that ‘The USSR deserves credit for opposing full powers to the 
General Assembly.’ John W. Holmes, ‘A Non-American Perspective’ in David A. Kay, ed. 
The Changing United Nations, Options fo r  the United States, Praeger Publishers, New York 
and London, 1977, p. 31.
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23longer accept the majority votes of the assembly as right and/or binding’. 
Although, the application of the Uniting for Peace scheme had practically 
succeeded in reversing the North Korean invasion, it did not result in creating a 
universal collective security system as initially intended by the majority of 
member states.
However, a more fundamental question was raised about the nature of 
the Korean war and whether the Security Council was empowered to intervene 
in such crisis. Western allies considered the North Korean invasion as an 
external attack against a sovereign state, while the Soviet Union and China 
regarded the situation as an internal civil war. B. K. Gills argued that
the Korean war (1950-53) is a classic example of Clausewitz’s famous 
dictum on the relation of war to politics. The initial issue in which the 
war was fought was national reunification, but this implied a struggle to 
determine the form of government and social system. This aspect was 
essentially civil war. As the war expanded, however, it came to embody 
an issue of global importance. It became the focal point of conflict 
between ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’ and stood at the centre of the 
US policy in Asia and around the world. In this respect it was essentially 
an international war among great powers.24
23 William O’Brien, The Conduct o f  Just and Limited War, Praeger Publishers, New York, 
1981, p. 249.
24 B. K. Gills, Korea versus Korea, A case o f contesting legitimacy, Routledge, London and 
New York, 1996, p. 45.
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A literal understanding of Gills’ analysis could lead to the conclusion that the 
Korean conflict was initially a civil war fought on internal issues before the 
arrival of the foreign forces under the Unified Command in the peninsula. In 
line with this, it is possible to argue that the Korean conflict was 
internationalised by the United Nations. However, a plausible reservation on 
this contention is that the conflicting interests of the two superpowers in the 
area were evident before the outbreak of war. Soviet and American forces were 
formally present in Korea until 1949, dividing the country into two separate 
parts. After the elections of 1948 two different regimes were installed in North 
and South Korea. However, the fact that the General Assembly did not 
recognise the existence of two Koreas supports the argument that war was not 
between two internationally recognised countries.
Martin Wight, accepted the assertion that the Korean War illustrated a 
kind of collective security, but in military terms he defined the Korean war as a 
balance of power paradigm, ‘a struggle between the two great coalitions into 
which international society was divided’. In his view ‘the attempt by one half 
of partitioned Korea to unify the country turned into a Sino-American War.’
Attempts made during the Cold War to refute the argument that the 
Korean conflict was an internal affair did not contest the principle of non­
intervention in domestic jurisdiction or purport to justify the UN intervention in
25 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Leicester University Press and the RIIA, Leicester, 2nd 
edition 1995, 2nd print 1997, p. 227.
26 Ibid.
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civil wars. At that time the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference 
in domestic jurisdictions of other countries retained universal approval, as the 
world was becoming more amenable to the process of de-colonisation and the 
principle of self-determination. Instead, these attempts endeavoured to prove 
the international character of the conflict. For Higgins, Kelsen, and other 
Western scholars if Korea was to be identified with the internal civil strife then 
the US led military response would have lacked the legal justification.
Korea is a significant episode for today’s discussion on intervention and
onUN enforcement action in civil wars. Attempts to assess the outcome of the 
UN involvement in Korea face the challenge of the continuing existence of two 
irreconcilable evaluations. However, international norms regarding collective 
actions in civil wars as well as in interstate conflicts have been significantly 
transformed since the Korean crisis. In many situations during the 1990s, 
measures undertaken by the Security Council to deal with civil wars were 
labelled as peace enforcement actions. By analogy, the argument that the 
military measures taken against North Korea represent a UN peace 
enforcement operation under Article 42 of the Charter or an action in collective 
self-defence pursuant to Article 51 could hardly be challenged in the light of
27 It is worth noting that now, almost half a century since the outbreak o f war in Korea, the 
Pentagon ‘still considers a Korean war scenario to be the primary near-term military concern 
of the United States. The Pentagon also appears to think that North Korea just might achieve 
an initial breakthrough, perhaps taking nearby Seoul and even much o f the rest o f the 
peninsula . . . ’ Michael O’ Hanlon attempted to answer the question: ‘Could another massive 
North Korean attack on South Korea intended to quickly reunify the peninsula under 
Pyongyang’s rule really succeed?’ Michael O’ Hanlon, ‘Stopping a North Korea Invasion, 
Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks’ International Security, 
Spring 1998, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 135 -  170.
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UN practice in the post-Cold War era. The right of sovereignty is no longer 
absolute and civil wars in many parts of the world have become a major 
concern for the international community. The United Nations has intervened 
militarily in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda without being blamed for breaching 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. On the contrary, the UN 
was accused in the three incidents of not doing enough to save civilian lives.
Korea 1950-53 and Kuwait 1990-91 have been considered the closest two cases 
to the spirit and letter of Chapter VII. Most of the studies which attempt to 
compare Korea with Kuwait intend to investigate how much each situation was 
in conformity with the UN peace enforcement regime. This chapter intends to 
compare the significance the Korean case had for the four decades, following 
the war, with the patterns provided by the case of Kuwait for the 1990s.
D. W. Bowett argued in 1964 that the UN action in Korea was highly 
unusual and that it was unlikely to give a pattern for the future. This claim 
proved to be very accurate. For forty years no similar action with such a clear 
mandate was enacted. The Uniting for Peace resolution remained dormant, as 
no permanent member of the SC was interested in its revival. The attempt made 
by member states in 1960 to refer the issue of the conflict in Congo to the 
General Assembly proved unsuccessful and the matter was soon returned to the 
Security Council.
28 D. W. Bowett, United Nations Force, A Legal Study o f  United Nations Practice, Stevens 
and Sons, London, 1964.
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In forming one of its main hypotheses with regard to the case of Kuwait, 
this study has reformulated Bowett’s assertion in the following context: the UN 
operation in Kuwait was highly unusual but it is likely to give a pattern for the 
future. The characteristics of succeeding episodes would not be identical to 
those of the Gulf crisis and might not necessarily affirm a transformation 
towards a perfect collective security system, but they do represent a replication 
of some of the major sanctioning policies imposed by the Security Council 
against Iraq. The measures adopted by the Council with relation to the crises in 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda were clear examples of this replication.
The broad explanation of this difference is due to the effect of the Cold 
War on the competence of the Security Council; it rendered it virtually inactive. 
Even when a breakthrough was made in 1950, member states were not able to 
sustain it or agree on the legitimacy of the military action. The Gulf crisis 
emerged in a different political context. The world did not fear a confrontation 
between the superpowers as a result of a military action against Iraq. Unlike 
Desert Storm in 1991, the Korean war had directly involved the two 
superpowers opposing each other, risking the outbreak of a total war between 
the Western and Eastern blocs. The Korean war had, therefore, substituted for a 
third world war. It ended with no conclusive victory and provided no pattern 
for the future of UN practice in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
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Inis Claude described the allies’ victory in Korea as follows: ‘They 
finally emerged from the venture with a sense of relief, not a sense of triumph. 
They felt fortunate to be able to muddle out of a messy and potentially 
disastrous situation, not heroic at having performed admirably in a noble cause. 
When the Korean war was over, the general reaction was more “... never 
again” than “Now let’s arrange things so that we can repeat this whenever 
necessary.”29
In the Gulf war, the allies attained a relatively decisive victory and when
the war ended member states did start to arrange for further possible preventive
and peace enforcement actions. On 31 January 1992 the Security Council
summit, meeting for the first time in its history at the level of heads of states,
instructed the Secretary-General to prepare his analysis and recommendations
on the role of the UN in identifying potential crisis and areas of instability and
to make recommendations on ways of strengthening the UN capacity for
maintaining international peace and security. In June 1992 Boutros Ghali,
presented his famous report, An Agenda for Peace, which included the most
ambitious project for the enforcement of peace and security in international
1 1
conflicts as well as in civil wars.
Korea remained an isolated experience for forty years, but it might have 
deterred potential aggressive actions from taking place during that period. It is
29 Inis Claude, op. cit. Note 17, p. 362.
30 UN Document S/23500, 31 January 1992.
31 Report o f the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN Document S/24111,17 June 1992.
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significant that even in the case of Kuwait, the Security Council resolutions and 
decisions, for reasons explained in part II of this thesis, did not refer to Korea, 
despite the fact that it represented the only previous UN experience in taking 
collective action to combat aggression. Despite the agreement between member 
states on the adoption of mandatory and coercive measures under Chapter VII 
in many situations since August 1990, disagreement over the Korean war still 
exists among the concerned members. Co-operation among member states of 
the Security Council during the first ten post-Cold War years did not remove 
these differences and each permanent member continued to hold the same 
opinions almost half a century after the breakout of war in Korea.
2- Congo 1960-63
In June 1960 Belgium ended its occupation of the Congo allowing for the 
declaration of independence and the formation of a national government. The 
new Congolese parliament elected Joseph Kasavubu the leader of the Abako 
political movement as President of Congo and Patrice Lumumba the leader of 
the Mouvement Nationale Congolaise as Prime Minister. Belgium continued to 
maintain two military bases at Kamina and Kiton and the Congo army (Force 
Publique) remained under the leadership of Belgian officers.
General Janssens, the Belgian Commander, rejected a petition submitted 
by Congolese soldiers calling for better conditions. Five days after the
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announcement of independence mutiny spread in the armed forces and security 
in the country started to deteriorate. Prime Minister Lumumba responded by 
dismissing General Janssens and appointing two Congolese, Victor Lundula as 
Commander of the Army and Joseph Mobutu as Chief of Staff. A few days 
later, as the situation continued to deteriorate, Belgium intervened by sending 
forces to Katanga and was soon involved in fighting the Congolese army, 
Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC).
Following the Belgium intervention Moise Tshombe declared on 11 July 
1960 the secession of Katanga from the Republic of Congo. On 12 July 
Kasavubu and Lumumba asked the United Nations Secretary-General to 
furnish the government of the Congo with military assistance against the 
‘external aggression which is a threat to international peace and security.’
The text of this telegram, which invoked the meaning of Article 39 of 
the Charter, and the subsequent response made by the United Nations, 
represented the first signs of disagreement over the purposes and mandate of 
the UN mission in the Congo. This contention had gradually developed 
between the Secretary-General and the Congolese Government and led to 
major disputes between member states during the consideration of the issue in 
the General Assembly and the Security Council. It also proved to be a 
controversial issue in the subsequent scholarly discussions and literature.
32 Telegram dated 12 July 1960, UN Document S/4382, 1960. The next day Kasavubu and 
Lumumba stressed in a message to the Secretary-General explaining that they were asking 
for military assistance not for the maintenance o f the internal order, but to enable the
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The aim of the following analysis is to establish whether resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council with relation to the crisis in the Congo had 
authorised the employment of enforcement measures. It attempts to verify the 
controversy over the mandate of Operation des Nations Unies-Congo (ONUC) 
and explain how the discussion on this issue has been influenced by two 
significant elements pertinent to the internal nature of the conflict as a civil 
war, and the effect of the foreign military intervention by Belgian forces.
In July 1960 the Secretary-General deployed ONUC, as authorised by 
the Security Council, to provide military and technical assistance for the 
Congolese Government ‘until the national security forces may be able to meet 
fully their tasks.’ The Secretary-General had carefully emphasised the 
impartial nature of the UN force which, under no circumstances, would become 
a party to the internal conflict or treat a party to the conflict as an aggressor.34 
Security Council resolution 146 affirmed this meaning by stating that ‘the 
United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party or in any way intervene 
in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or 
otherwise.’ At the same time all the Security Council resolutions on the 
Congo crisis called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the 
Congolese territories. Although the Security Council treated the existence of
Congolese to counter the Belgian aggression, see telegram dated 13 July 1960, UN Document 
S /4382,1960.
33 Security Council resolution 143,14 July 1960.
34 Secretary-General report to the Security Council on the implementation o f resolution 143, 
UN Document S/4389, 18 July 1960.
35 Security Council resolution 146,17 September 1960.
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Belgian forces in the Congo as an intervention by a foreign power, it never 
called Belgium an aggressor.
In September 1960, the Security Council admitted that the lack of 
unanimity among the five permanent members had prevented it from assuming 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.36 Therefore, the Council decided to call an emergency session of the 
General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution, which had been 
adopted during the Korean crisis in 1950. For six months, between September 
1960 and February 1991, the Security Council did not adopt any resolutions 
regarding the situation in Congo. However, when the killing of Patrice 
Lumumba was announced the Council immediately convened, regretted the 
killing and its grave repercussions, and adopted resolution 161 authorising the 
use of force as a last resort to stop the civil war. The explicit authorisation of 
the use of force in this resolution was different form the right of UN troops to
36 Security Council resolution 157,17 September 1960.
37 General Assembly resolution 377 A (V), 3 November 1950.
38 Brian Urquhart mentions four versions o f Lumumba’s death: ‘(1) the fabrication of  
Lumumba’s escape and capture put out by Munongo in February 1961, (2) the story that 
Munongo and /or the Katangese authorities executed the prisoners, (3) Tshombe’s story that 
the prisoners were already dying when they reached Elisabethville, and, (4) the allegations of 
Nkrumah and other African sources that Europeans were the executioners.’ see Brian 
Urquhart, Hammarskjold, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1972, p. 505; Report o f  Commission 
o f  Investigation on the deaths o f  Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, Yearbook o f the United 
Nations, Special Edition, UN Fiftieth Anniversary 1945-1995, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
The Hague, Boston, and London, 1995, pp. 39 and 40.
39 Security Council resolution 161 (A), 21 February 1991. Two observations could be made in 
this respect. First, in paragraph 1 o f this resolution the Council called upon ‘the United 
Nations to take all ‘appropriate measures’ including the use o f force. In all other cases of 
authorised use o f force the Council called upon member of states or a specific group o f states 
to carry out the mission. Second, the same paragraph indicated that the mission o f the UN  
forces was to prevent the occurrence o f the civil war though it would be more accurate to 
describes its mission as prevention of the spread o f civil war which already erupted in the 
Congo.
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use force in self-defence, implied in the mandate of any peacekeeping 
operation. Writing in 1995, Anthony Parsons described resolution 161 as 
follows ‘This resolution had no parallel in the UN history.’ He noticed that the 
UN peacekeeping force was authorised by the Council ‘to adopt an 
enforcement role without’ formally invoking Chapter VII of the Charter or 
being empowered to face the deteriorating situation.40
The impact of this resolution on ONUC was profound, in that it 
provoked military attacks by all factions against UN forces present in the 
country. One of the United Nations official publications described the 
consequences of resolution 161 as follows: ‘The period immediately following 
the adoption of the Security Council’s resolution of 21 February 1961 was a 
critical one for the United Nations Operation in the Congo.’41 The authorities in 
both Leopoldville and Elisabethville interpreted the Council resolution as a 
declaration of war against them and started to prepare for fighting against the 
United Nations forces. On 4 March 1961 the ANC troops attacked ONUC 
forces in Matadi and forced a Sudanese garrison out the Atlantic port city. This 
incident was followed by a series of military assaults against ONUC.42 In 
another situation the UN forces took the initiative to put down an imminent 
attack by Toshombe’s forces against the people of Kabalo in Katanga. In
40 Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace, UN interventions 1947-1994, Michael 
Joseph, London, 1995, p. 87.
41 The Blue Helmets, A Review o f United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd edition, The United 
Nations Department o f Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 184.
42 In April 1996, 44 ONUC personnel were massacred by ANC troops in Port-Francqui; 
another 13 ONUC aircrew members were killed in November 1996.
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response to these developments the Security Council took a further step by 
authorising the Secretary-General under resolution 169
to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measures of 
force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, and detention 
pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and 
paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United 
Nations Command, and mercenaries, as laid down in paragraph 2 of 
Security Council resolution 161 A (1961); Further requests the 
Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or 
return of such elements under whatever guise,.. .43
The provisions of resolution 169 stressed the foreign element in the conflict 
and authorised the use of force, if necessary, to secure the deportation of 
foreign forces.44 Britain and France declined to support a UN action against 
Belgian troops and, for this reason, abstained during the course of voting on 
this resolution. However, the adoption of resolution 169 marked the beginning 
of a new phase of ONUC’s roles in the Congo.
This chapter will now analyse both the arms embargo and the use of 
force authorised by the Security Council resolutions to test the validity of the
43 Security Council resolution 169,24 November 1961.
44 It is significant that resolution 169 ordered the deportation o f  political advisers from the 
Congo by the use o f the requisite measures o f force.
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general argument that no enforcement measures were taken in the Congo 
conflict.
Arms embargo
Almost no prominent studies have discussed the arms embargo imposed on 
Congo by resolution 169 and its relevance to the dispute on the nature and 
mandate of ONUC. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this resolution stated that the 
Security Council
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary 
measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever 
guise, and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such 
activities;
6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment 
or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take 
the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, 
and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies 
across their territories, except in accordance with the decision, policies 
and purposes of the United Nations;45
45 Security Council resolution 169,24 November 1961.
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These provisions were not referred to as mandatory measures within the 
meaning of Article 41, as no such measures were applied against North Korea 
in 1950, Rhodesia and South Africa remained the only two experiences of 
United Nations mandatory sanctions during the Cold War. However, when the 
text of paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 169 is compared with the provisions of 
Security Council resolutions which imposed mandatory arms embargoes 
against South Africa,46 Somalia,47 UNITA (Angola),48 or Haiti,49 it is difficult 
to draw clear distinctions between them as two different regimes of arms 
embargo.
When the Council was first engaged in the conflict in July 1960 it had 
no intention to impose an arms embargo against the Congolese Central 
Government as its initial aim was to provide military and technical assistance 
for that Government. There was also no attempt to employ a partial arms 
embargo either against Belgian forces or Katangese secessionists as it did three 
decades later with UNITA in Angola.50 However, by the time the Council had 
adopted resolution 169 in November 1991 the situation had changed 
remarkably. The ANC forces of the Central Government, the Katangese forces, 
and the Belgian forces were all active parties to the civil war and initiating or 
supporting aggressive military attacks against ONUC. Furthermore, after 
February 1991, the United Nations proposed that the ANC forces should be
46 Security Council resolution 418,4  November 1977.
47 Security Council resolution 733,23 January 1992.
48 Security Council resolution 864,15 September 1993.
49 Security Council resolution 841,16 June 1993.
50 Security Council resolution 864,15 September 1993.
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dissolved, restructured, and kept away from politically motivated disputes. 
There was no reason why at least the nine members of the Council who voted 
in favour of resolution 169 should, not aim at a general and mandatory arms 
embargo in the Congo as a means of preventing the flow of arms to the 
country.
Hammarskjold, the majority of the ICJ jurists, and other scholars stated 
that the UN measures in the Congo, though not authorised under Article 41 or 
42, were binding on all member states. This would logically lead to the 
assumption that the arms embargo against the Congo was a binding measure 
which should have been implemented by all member states.
ONUC’s uncertain mandate
The question of whether ONUC was a peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
operation raised practical and constitutional differences on various levels. First, 
the question was a source of deep disagreement between Hammarskjold and the 
central Government of Congo. On the one hand, there is evidence that Prime 
Minister Lumumba regarded ONUC as a peace enforcement operation. This 
evidence could be drawn from the chronicle of Michael Donelan and M. 
Grieve: ‘Lumumba wanted the UN force to be used to end Katanga’s
secession.’51 During his life-time Lumumba’s demand remained unsatisfied, 
but it was ultimately accomplished by ONUC after the adoption of resolution
51 M. D. Donelan and M. J. Grieve, International Disputes, Case Histories 1945-1970, Europa 
Publications, London, 1973, p. 205.
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169. On the other hand Dag Hammarskjold held the opinion that ONUC was 
not a peace enforcement operation. He stated that
it is significant that the Council did not invoke Articles 41 and 42 of 
Chapter VII, which provide for enforcement measures and which would 
override the domestic jurisdiction limitation of Article 2(7). I mention 
this as one of the reasons why some far-reaching interpretations of the 
mandate of the Force, to which we have listened here, are, quite frankly, 
difficult to understand. Those interpretations would require at least that 
the Security Council had clearly taken enforcement measures under 
Article 41 and 42.52
As Linda Miller observed, ‘[f]or Hammarskjold, the legal basis of ONUC’s 
mandate remained unchanged by the Council’s February resolution.’ 
Hammarskjold continued to embrace this opinion until his death on 18 
September 1961, when his plane crashed near the airport of Ndola in Zambia.54 
It could not be determined whether, if Hammarskjold was alive in November 
1961, he would have admitted a shift in ONUC mandate after the adoption of 
resolution 169 and the undertaking of a coercive action against defiant forces. 
However, members of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General’s close
52 Security Council Official Records, 15th year, 920th meeting, paragraph 73.
53 Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, The United Nations and Internal 
Conflicts, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967, p. 94.
54 For further statement by Hammarskjold in support o f this opinion see UN Documents 
S/P.V. 887th meeting, 20 July 1960, p. 17.
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advisers adhered to Hammarskjold’s opinion and continued to regard his belief 
that ONUC and the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) were laying the groundwork 
for UN peacekeeping operations. A partial explanation of Hammarskjold’s 
stance could be found in Brian Urquhart’s observation that ‘Hammarskjold was 
increasingly convinced that in the political field the UN should concentrate on 
preventive action rather than corrective action.’55 Another reason was 
Hammarskjold’s determination to avoid loosing necessary Western support in 
his quest to find a resolution for the Congo crisis.
Second, on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council, 
the Congo case aroused Cold War tensions with claims of hypocrisy and a 
general distrust. This was further aggravated by a series of allegations 
concerning the killings, secessionist activities, and the conflict of foreign 
interests in the region. Discussions in the Security Council during that period 
represented a clear manifestation of this Cold War tension. The Council was 
crippled by East-West divisions and only after shocking incidents of murder, 
atrocities, and attacks on UN personnel, was the Council able to adopt effective 
measures. However, even when effective actions were taken there was no 
agreement among the permanent members on the function and constitutional 
bases of these actions. The Soviet Union interpreted the authorisation of the use 
of force as falling within the enforcement measures of Chapter VII. For 
different reasons, France adopted the same interpretation to argue that it was 
not obliged to pay for the expenses of ONUC. The Soviet Union wanted the
55 Brian Urquhart, Hammarslgold, op. cit. Note 38, p. 256.
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Security Council to impose economic sanctions against Belgium, to expel its 
forces from the Congo, to call Tshombe forces terrorist bandits, and to 
authorise the arrest of Mobutu and Tshombe. Western countries opposed such 
proposals and adopted a restricted interpretation of the measures authorised by 
the Council.56
When the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their contributions for 
ONUC, on the grounds that ONUC was a peace enforcement operation, the 
Security Council referred the matter to the International Court of Justice. In its 
subsequent advisory opinion of July 1962 ‘the case of Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations’ the Court stated that
UNEF and ONUC were not enforcement actions within the compass of 
Chapter VII of the Charter and ... therefore Article 43 could not have
c n
any applicability to the cases with which the Court is here concerned.
Most scholars shared the opinion expressed by Hammarskjold and supported 
by the International Court of Justice that ONUC was not a peace enforcement 
operation. Judge Higgins observed that ‘By the end of 1960 the question was 
being raised within the UN and without: did the actions of ONUC constitute 
enforcement measures?’ Higgins viewed the situation, until February 1961, as
56 For comprehensive account o f the Soviet Union and the Congo crisis see Alexander Dallin, 
The Soviet Union at the United Nations, an Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1962, pp. 135 -  148.
57 Certain Expenses o f  the United Nations, Yearbook of the International Court o f Justice, 
1961-62, pp. 7 8 -8 4 .
291
follows: ‘while in resolution S/4741 the Council now spoke of a “threat to 
international peace and security” [employing the language of Chapter VII]
58there is still no evidence that ONUC had embarked upon enforcement action.’ 
Even after the ONUC mandate was enlarged by resolution 169 of November 
1961, for Higgins the action was still not enforcement.59
Writing in October 1961, R. Y. Jennings discussed the provisions of 
resolution 161 asserting that ‘[t]hey were now authorising military action 
should it prove necessary in the last resort in order to prevent civil war. In so 
doing they were, I would have thought, authorising ‘enforcement’ measures 
with the clear implication that there was a threat to peace in the sense of 
Chapter VII of the Charter.’60 Many scholars did not go as far as Jennings did,
58 Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 -  1967, Documents and 
Commentary, HI Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, Toronto, and 
Melbourne, 1980, p. 57.
59 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development o f International Law through the Political Organs o f  
the United Nations, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 236; In the same study 
Higgins asserted that
‘The important point as to whether the United Nations action in the Congo-or any part 
thereof-has fallen under Article 42 rather than under Article 40 has been the object of 
surprisingly little discussion. The question has only been occasionally raised in the United 
States, and in the United Kingdom there has been a general tendency to assume that, in recent 
months at least, the United Nations action fell under Article 42. The distinction is a vital one, 
both for legal and political reasons. ... The political consequences o f the United Nations role 
in the Congo being interpreted as one o f ‘enforcement’ are too apparent to need further 
elaboration here. This writer believes that there is every reason for considering the United 
Nations operation as one o f interim measures under Article 40.’ Ibid. p. 235. D. W. Bowett 
argued that ONUC was not an enforcement action under Article 42 o f the Charter, see D. W. 
Bowett, op. cit. note 28, p. 180.
60 R. Y. Jennings, ‘The United Nations, Force, and the Congo’ The Listener, vol. LXVI. no. 
1699, 19 October 1961, p. 591. Few recent studies adopted similar views, for instance Brady, 
Daws and Arnold-Foster stated that ‘However, as the crisis developed, SCRs 161 and 169 
became far more permissive and were clearly enforcement resolutions.’ Christopher Brady, 
Sam Daws and Josh Arnold-Foster, UN Operations: The Political-Military Relationship, 
DHIA and UNA-UK, London, no date, p. 11; Winrich Kuhne observed that ONUC ‘mandate 
had to be extended to allow for limited enforcement action’ Winrich Kuhne, ‘Fragmenting 
States and the Need for Enlarged Peacekeeping’ in Paul Taylor, Sam Daws, and UTE
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but they admitted that ONUC was an obvious exception to UN traditional 
peacekeeping.61
  / \0  •  •  •The paradox is overwhelming. According to the UN official opinion
which had been endorsed by the ICJ Advisory Opinion and embraced by the
majority of scholars, the UN action in the Congo was a provisional measure
under Article 40 of the Charter. Article 40 reads
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council 
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the 
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to 
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable.
Could the provisions of this Article be stretched to cover the areas of UN action 
and the scope of its military engagement in the crisis? This chapter will attempt 
to show why it was not possible for UN officials and many Western statesmen 
and scholars to argue otherwise.
Adamczick-Gerteis, Documents on reform o f the United Nations, Dartmouth, Aldershot and 
Brookfield, 1997, p 43.
61 To mention some o f these views, Nigel White asserted that ‘It is very difficult to see ONUC 
as a true peacekeeping operation ... On the other hand, ONUC was not clearly an 
enforcement action as undertaken by the UN forces in Korea . . . ’ Nigel White, ‘UN 
Peacekeeping -  Development or Destruction?’ International Relations, vol. XII, no. 1, April 
1994, p. 150; Geoffrey Stem described ONUC as controversial ‘some times firing without 
being fired on.’ Geoffrey Stem, The Structure o f  International Society - An Introduction to the 
Study o f  International Relations, Pinter, London and New York, 1995, p. 208.
62 Evan Luard argued in 1989: ‘The Congo operation was immeasurably the largest, most 
complex and most controversial the United Nations has ever undertaken.’ Evan Luard, A
293
Viewing the Congo crisis of 1960-64 at the end of the century against 
the background of UN engagement in conflict resolution during 45 years of 
Cold War and 10 years of post-Cold War experiences is likely to prove a 
challenging task.63 The perception of UN policies in civil wars has significantly 
changed since the Congo crisis, especially in the post-Cold War years. In 1996 
it was much easier for the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII to stop the civil war in Zaire, despite the absence of hostile 
foreign involvement, signified by the presence of Belgium forces in 1950. The 
main reason behind the Council’s inability to adopt enforcement measures 
during the Cold War era, as mentioned by many scholars, was the confrontation 
between the great powers.
However, the element of colonialism had a far-reaching impact on the 
case of Congo. This study contends that the understanding of the colonial 
context in which ONUC was mandated is crucial to the discussion of the 
functional and organisational aspects of the UN action in the Congo.
By the time the Security Council started to consider the crisis in the 
Congo, European forces were still present in many parts of the African 
continent. The dispute between France and Tunisia, which coincided with the 
conflict in the Congo, was one example of the effects of colonial interests in
History o f  the United Nations, Volume 2: The Age o f  Decolonisation, 1955-1965, Macmillan, 
London, 1989, p. 264.
63 Thomas Frank discussed the situation in Congo under the heading: ‘Hard Cases’, while 
classified Korea and Kuwait as ‘Easy Cases’. In his opinion the latter did not pose challenges 
to the legitimacy of UN collective action, as did the Congo case. Thomas M. Frank, Fairness
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Africa. In 1960 France was facing mounting pressures from the United Nations 
to withdraw its troops from Tunisia. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, 
was adamant, he wanted to keep his forces in Bizerte and thus diplomatic 
relations broke off between the two countries. The Security Council considered 
three draft resolutions presented before it in July 1960, calling for the 
withdrawal of the French troops, but the United States and Britain, with France 
absenting itself from the meetings, blocked the adoption of any of the these 
resolutions.64
Hammarskjold supported the Tunisian claim and asked the United States 
to try to persuade France to withdraw its forces from Bizerte. During July and 
August 1960 the situation was tense in the United Nations and the relation 
between Hammarskjold and de Gaulle reached a breaking point.65 De Gaulle, 
ten years later stated in his biography: ‘Hammarskjold who was already in 
disagreement with us at the time because he was interfering directly in the 
affairs of the Congo, sided personally with Bourguiba.’66 The Tunisian 
question was then moved to the General Assembly which passed a resolution 
supporting the Tunisian request for the evacuation of French troops that were
in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford and New York, 1997, pp. 222- 
242.
64 UN Documents S/4903, S/4904, S/4905,28 July 1960.
65 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, op. cit. note 38, pp. 537-8.
66 Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs o f  Hope-Renewal 1958-62, Endeavour 1962-, (translated by 
Terence Kilmartin) Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1971, p. 118.
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present on its territories without its consent and contrary to sovereign rights of
7independent states.
Consequently, the Security Council was not able to condemn the 
presence of colonial forces in African states or to call any colonial power an
/ 'n
aggressor. The study argues, in this respect, that peace enforcement was never 
a plausible option against colonialism. This general contention was specifically 
applicable to the Congo. Anthony Parsons mentioned one vital element of this 
colonial dominance stressing the effect of European financial interests in Africa 
on the work of the Security Council and how this element restrained its ability 
to adopt enforcement measures against Belgium. He asserted that ‘Britain and 
France, sympathetic to Belgium and with important financial interests with 
breakaway Katanga which was also developing close relations with the 
(British) Central African Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, 
would have vetoed any enforcement action directed specifically against 
Belgium.’69 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan admitted the political and 
financial influence in support of Katangese secessionist. He stated that ‘there 
was strong pressure in Britain, partly from business interests and partly from 
the right wing of conservative party, to support Toshombe.’70
67 General Assembly resolution 1622 (S-III), 25 August 1961. Thirty states abstained 
including the United States and Britain.
68 For discussion on the United Nations and colonial wars in relevant cases, Indonesia, 
Algeria, and Angola see L. B. Miller, note 53, pp. 36 -  60; for a brief discussion on the role o f  
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in enabling the process o f decolonisation see A. J. R. 
Groom, ‘The Question o f Peace and Security’ in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom eds. 
International Institutions at Work, Pinter Publishers, London, 1988, p. 80.
69 Anthony Parsons, Note 14.
70 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, Harper and Row, New York, 1972, p. 263.
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For these considerations it was not possible to invoke explicitly the UN 
Charter mechanism for peace enforcement in the Congo, but provisions for the 
Council resolutions and the practice of the UN forces on the ground indicate 
some obvious peace enforcement characteristics of the UN action in the Congo.
Mandatory sanctions
Mandatory sanctions had only been imposed twice before the 1990s. In both 
cases sanctions imposed against the rule of white minority governments and 
their racial and apartheid policies, which lingered on into the post-colonial era 
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and remained intact even during the 
first years of the post-Cold War period in the case of South Africa. In fact, 
these were the only two cases of UN mandatory sanctions applied anywhere in 
the world before August 1990. Therefore, they represent the only opportunity 
for the study of the UN practice in the area of sanctions during 45 years. They 
also demonstrated the limitations of the Cold War period on the sanctioning 
policies of the UN.
3- Rhodesia: Economic sanctions
In Rhodesia, sanctions were invoked in response to the white minority’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain on 11 November 1964. 
Mandatory economic sanctions came into effect in 1966. Resolution 232 which 
designated one of the most comprehensive sanctions regime, was adopted by
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the Security Council in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of Chapter VII. 
Member states were explicitly reminded that ‘refusal by any of them to
• V Iimplement the resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25’.
Rhodesia represented a case where, for more than a decade, sanctions 
failed to bring about compliance, as the white minority government of Ian 
Smith remained defiant throughout that period. However, after this period 
Smith’s government showed readiness to comply with the Security Council 
resolutions and to accept a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Therefore, in 
December 1979 the Council expressed its satisfaction with the outcome of the 
conference held at Lancaster House in London, and asked member states ‘to
79terminate the measures taken against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII’.
4- South Africa: Arms embargo
The Security Council started to consider the case of South Africa after the 
March 1960 Sharpeville massacre, which resulted in the killing of 69 people 
during a protest march, but mandatory measures against the white government
71 See Pokalas, J. ‘Economic sanctions: an effective alternative to military coercion?’ 
Brooklyn Journal o f International Law, vol. 6, 1980, p. 312; Nigel White, ‘Collective 
sanctions: an alternative to military coercion?’ International Relations, vol. XII, no. 3, 
December 1994, p. 83.
72 Security Council resolution 460, 21 December 1979. Of course, much has been written 
about the Rhodesian case. Useful studies include: Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions 
in Contemporary Perspective, Macmillan, London, 1987; Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations
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of South Africa were not adopted until 17 years later. Meanwhile, in 1963, two 
resolutions - 181 and 182 - were adopted recommending a voluntary arms 
embargo against South Africa. Black African states struggled to make the 
embargo mandatory. Their efforts finally culminated in the adoption by the 
Security Council of resolution 418 on 4 November 1977, imposing a 
mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. Furthermore, in 1985 resolution 569 
suspended all sports and cultural links and banned computer exports to South 
Africa. In September 1992 the UN established an observer mission 
(UNOMSA) which represented the first deployment of force in South Africa.
In 1993 President De Klerk called for free elections to be held in April 
1994. However, the embargo remained in place until a new government was 
formed by Nelson Mandela, ending the longest ever case of mandatory 
sanctions, as well as decades of apartheid.
The case of South Africa was not replicated. The adoption and 
implementation of mandatory arms embargo to combat apartheid remained 
peculiar to South Africa. However, some scholars consider it as the earliest 
precedent of UN intervention to protect human rights, and called for the UN 
experience in South Africa to be generalised.74
and Rhodesia: a study in international Law, Praeger, New York, 1974; See discussion on 
Rhodesia in Part II o f the thesis under: the impact o f sanctions.
73 For further details see Daoudi, M. S. and Dajani M. S. Economic Sanctions: Ideal and 
Experience, Rouledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1983.
74 Stanley Hoffmann, observed that ‘It is high time that the principle the UN has applied only 
to South Africa be generalised: No state should be able to claim that the way it treats its 
citizens is sovereign right if  this treatment is likely to create international tensions’ Stanley 
Hoffmann, ‘Avoiding New World Disorder’ The New York Times, 25 February 1991.
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Rhodesia, South Africa, and other cases of long-term sanctions show that even 
if sanctions were not strictly implemented, target states cannot afford to live 
with international sanctions, mandated by the UN, for unlimited time. In this 
sense sanctions serve as a means of political pressure and isolation, to induce 
target regimes to abandon unacceptable policies. However, by imposing such 
long term sanctioning policy, compliance would be attained at a high cost of 
civilian suffering and devastation. In fact, the population would continue to 
suffer from both, the internal repressive policies of the regime, while the 
regime might intend to manipulate sanctions to strengthen its internal position, 
and the effect of the economic blockade imposed by other countries.
Chapter 8 
The post-Cold War period
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1- The Kurds
The Kurdish community forms one of the largest ethnic groups in the Middle 
East. Their population totals 26 million, with over 13 million in Turkey, 6 
million in Iran, 4 million in Iraq, 1 million in Syria, 500,000 in the former 
Soviet Union, and 700,000 in different parts of the world.1 However, Iraq has 
the highest percentage of population, 23%, of their presence in states. Despite 
their large population, Kurds lack a state of their own, and they have been 
denied any genuine political autonomy by the regimes of these countries. This 
peculiar situation caused the Kurdish population cycles of atrocities and 
displacement.4
The international community has done little to find permanent 
solutions for the Kurdish problem. Until 1991, the Security Council of the 
United Nations did not adopt any resolution concerning the Kurds’ problem.
1 David McDowall, The Kurds, MRG, London, 1996, p. 7.
2 For history o f Kurds in Iraq see ‘Ismet Sheriff Vanly, ‘Kurdistan in Iraq’, in Gerard 
Chaliand, People Without A Country, The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Press, London, 1980, 
pp. 1 5 3 -2 1 0 .
3 For discussions in the League o f Nations on the future o f Kurdistan during the 1920s see F. 
S. Northedge, The League o f  Nations, its life and times 1920 - 1946, Leicester University 
Press, Leicester, 1986, pp. 105 -  107.
4 For accounts o f atrocities against Kurds see Middle East Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The 
Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, New York and London, 1993; Medico International and 
Kurdish Human Rights Project, The Destruction o f villages in South-East Turkey, London, 
June 1996; David McDowall, A Modem History o f the Kurds, Tauris, London, 1996. For 
claims o f genocide committed against Kurds see Lori Fisler Damrosch, ‘Genocide and 
Ethnic Conflict’, in David Wippman, ed. International Law and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell 
University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 256-79.
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The first clear involvement of the Council in the Kurdish problem came in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War in April 1991 in response to Iraqi suppression of the 
Kurdish uprising in northern and north-eastern Iraq. The Kurds attempted to 
take advantage of the situation caused by the war to advance their political 
agenda and to attain the political autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan. The deteriorating 
economic situation as a result of the sanctions and blockade since August 19905 
and the effects of the destruction of essential infrastructure in the country 
caused by the war6 also contributed to the Kurdish revolt.
Kurdish guerrilla forces stepped-up their military activities and took 
control of the main cities of Arbil, Suleimaniya, and the oil city of Kirkuk. 
Kurds had never before gained control of Kirkuk ‘even at the height of Mulla
oMustafa’s Kurdish wars in the 1960s and 1970s’. Fighting in Sulaymanyia 
resulted in the killing of over 900 pro-Govemment officials including the 
governor of the town, and the arrest of thousands of Iraqi forces by Kurdish 
insurgents. They also captured heavy Iraqi weapons including tanks, armoured 
cars, and several air-fighters.9 Masud Barzani cited the historic triumph of 
Kurds by stating that ‘the result of seventy years of Kurdish struggle is at hand
5 David Keen, The Kurds o f  Iraq: How Safe is Their Haven Now, Save the Children, 
London, 1993, p. 4.
6 Chris Dammers, ‘Post-War Iraq and the Politics o f Humanitarianism’, in Herbert H. 
Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds. The Persian Gulf War, Views from the Social 
and Behavioural Sciences, University Press o f America, Lanham, New York, and London, 
1994, pp. 399 -  411. Dammers provides a useful summary and analysis o f reports on the 
humanitarian effects o f war prepared in 1991 by special agencies and groups including 
Harvard Study Team in Iraq, on health issues, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
and UNICEF along his own observations.
7 The Kurdish control over Kirkuk lasted for only 11 days, before Iraqi forces retook the 
town.
8 Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91, The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 
and Its Implications, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1997, pp. 202-3.
9 For more details see ibid. p. 203.
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now’.10 However, it was only a matter of days before the insurgents’ victory 
turned into a most grievous situation.
The Iraqi counteroffensive and the subsequent killings and destruction 
of areas populated by Kurds resulted in the tragic humanitarian crisis of 1991 in 
Northern Iraq. Panic and fear among Kurdish civilians was aroused by news of 
massacres at Sulaymanyia and Qara Hanjir, and the possible use of weapons of 
mass destruction by Iraqi forces against their villages. As a result, by early 
April 1991 more than a million Kurds were moving in freezing weather towards 
Iranian and Turkish borders. It was estimated that 1000 people, most of them 
children and aged men and women, died every day.
Turkey and Iran claimed that the situation had posed a threat to 
regional peace and security and urged the Security Council to take effective 
measures to stop the flood of refugees into their territories.11 Turkey cited the 
need to cope with about 500,000 having fled to areas on its border with Iraq.
19Iran cited the almost 1 million people seeking shelter in the country.
Meeting on 4 April 1991, the Security Council passed resolution 688, 
which determined that, the ‘massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers ... threatened international peace and security’. 
According to this resolution, the Council
10 The Washington Post, 27 March 1991.
11 UN Document S/22435 (1991), letter from Turkey to the Secretary-General on 2 April 
1991; UN Document S/22447 (1991), letter from Iran to the Secretary-General on 4 April 
1991.
12 The United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait 
Conflict 1990-1996, Report by Sadruddin Aga Khan to the Secretary-General, 15 May 1991, 
Ducument 51, The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 246.
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2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international 
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses 
the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure 
that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisation to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make 
available all necessary facilities for their operations.
Three days after the adoption of resolution 688, Britain proposed the
establishment of an ‘enclave’ in Northern Iraq to protect and assist Iraqi
refugees. The plan was endorsed by the Luxembourg summit of the European
Community (EC) on 8 April 1991. However, the original conception of an
11  .‘enclave’ was changed by the EC members to a ‘safe haven’ for Kurds. The 
United States promised to consider the plan and eventually accepted, with 
reluctance, to lead the humanitarian efforts and the enforcement of the protected 
area.
The Council intervention was meant to provide shelter and relief 
supplies for Iraqi refugees.14 Resolution 688 asked Iraq to end immediately the 
repression of its people and hoped that human and political rights would be 
respected through sustainable dialogue. Although the resolution contained a
13 Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 3, Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and 
their Aftermath, Marc Weller, ed. Cambridge Grotius Publication, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 
714-5.
14 It should be noted that over twenty million Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, and Syria were 
not meant to be affected by this resolution.
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sense of urgency in dealing with the crisis, it did not mandate the coalition to 
use force to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Instead, Iraq was asked to allow 
immediate access for the delivery of relief supplies. Furthermore, the resolution 
affirmed in its preamble the commitment of all member states ‘to the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq’. However, 
the ‘humanitarian need’ compelled many observers to seek justification beyond 
the authority of Chapter VII.15
15 Three contributions by British scholars, Edward Mortimer, Lawrence Freedman and 
David Boren, and James Mayall, provided justifications beyond the framework o f Chapter 
VII; Edward Mortimer argued that Operation Provide Comfort
would find its strongest legal support in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment o f the Crime of Genocide. ... A prima facie case could be made against 
Iraq under several o f ... [its] headings. However, none o f the powers involved in 
Operation Provide Comfort invoked the convention.
Edward Mortimer, ‘Under What Circumstances should the UN Intervene Militarily in a 
“Domestic” Crisis?’ in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, eds. Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping fo r  the New Century, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, New York, 
and Oxford, 1998, p. 131.
Lawrence Freedman and David Boren asserted that
The ‘safe havens’ were organised with full awareness o f the fact that this constituted 
an ‘interference in internal affairs’ o f Iraq, but were justified by the failure o f Iraq to 
conduct its internal affairs in an acceptable manner.
They further observed
Its logic was to establish Western military authority over a substantial area o f Iraq.
Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, ‘Save Havens for Kurds’ in Nigel S. Rodley, ed. To 
Loose the Bands o f Wickedness, International Intervention in Defence o f  Human Rights, 
Brassey’s, UK, 1992, pp. 43 and 57.
James Mayall argued that
The Iraqi safe havens were justified because, having encouraged the Iraqi people to 
depose Saddam Hussein, Western leaders could not escape responsibility for the fate 
of the Kurds when predictably he suppressed their rebellion.
James Mayall, ‘Intervention in International Society: Theory and Practice in Contemporary 
Perspective’, in B. A. Roberson ed. International Society and the Development o f  
International Relations, Pinter, London and Washington, 1998, p. 177.
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Britain, France, and the United States hinted that the no-fly zone was mandated 
under resolution 688. Francois Mitterrand stated after the adoption of the 
resolution that ‘for the first time, non-interference has stopped at the point 
where it was becoming a failure to assist a people in danger.’ France was quite 
enthusiastic about the establishment of the no-fly zone and even called, in the 
wake of the adoption of resolution 688, for the principle of non-intervention to 
be reconsidered in favour of human rights protection.16 President Mitterrand 
had sent 1000 French troops to join the 5000 American and 2000 British forces 
in imposing the safe areas in Northern Iraq.
Allied forces established two military bases in Turkey, in Diyarbakir 
and Silopi. They were instructed to make occasional patrols of the area to the
t T »south as far as Almousel, 100 Kilometres inside Iraq. The 36 parallel, north of 
Baghdad, was designated to serve as the demarcation line for the no-fly zone. 
This logistical task was accomplished by the Pentagon. Colin Powell stated that
with me in Washington and Jack in Belgium, (Jack Galvin the American 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR) each with a map in 
front of us, we sketched out a “security zone”, a sector around Kurdish 
cities in Iraq that Saddam’s troops would not be allowed to enter. I felt 
like one of those British diplomats in the 1920s carving out nations like 
Jordan and Iraq on a tablecloth at a gentleman’s club. I called Galvin, in
16 H. Fontanaud, ‘France Says World Must Re-examine “Non-interference” Code’, Reuters,
4 April 1991.
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his Trans-European role. “Charlemagne,” and I told him that now he was 
truly a kingdom maker. After lining out the security zone, we ordered the
17Iraqi military to get out.’
A no-fly zone is defined in military terms as ‘a de facto aerial occupation of
18sovereign airspace in which only aircraft of enforcement forces may fly’. 
However, in Kurdistan only Iraqi fixed or rotary-wing aircraft were required not 
fly north of the 36th parallel.19 In fact, the prohibition against the Iraqi fixed- 
wing planes was concluded between Schwarzkopf and Iraqi generals on 3 
March within the cease-fire agreement. Iraqis asked for their helicopters to be 
exempted. General Ahmed, the leader of Iraqi negotiating team in Safwan, 
appealed at the end of discussion ‘We have one point, you know the situation of 
our roads and bridges and communications. We would like to fly helicopters to 
carry officials of our government in areas where roads and bridges are out.’20 
Schwarzkopf agreed to exempt Iraqi helicopters from the ban. James Baker
17 Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, A Soldier’s Way, An Autobiography, Hutchinson, 
London, p. 531.
18 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-fly zone Rules o f  
Engagement’ in Michael N. Schmitt, ed. The Law o f Military Operations, (International Law 
Studies, vol. 72), Naval War College Press, 1998, p. 240.
19 Lawrence Freedman and David Boren observed that ‘Choosing the 36th parallel, north o f  
the oil town o f Kirkuk claimed by Kurdish separatists, reduced the likelihood that this policy 
would encourage Kurdish separatism.’ Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, op. cite, note 
15, p. 53. A similar observation was made by Sean Murphy, that the term ‘safe havens’ was 
‘designed to avoid subsequent claims o f statehood by the Kurds’, see Sean D. Murphy, 
Humanitarian Intervention, The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, University o f  
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996, p. 173.
20 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography, It D oesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam 
Press, London and New York, 1992, pp. 488-89.
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01later criticised Schwarzkopf for making this commitment. Schwarzkopf 
himself asserted that ‘In the following weeks, we discovered what the [sic] 
really had in mind: using helicopter gunships to suppress rebellions in Basra 
and other cities.’22
The US Administration had repeatedly stressed the temporary nature 
of the operation. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, President Bush 
described the no-fly zone as an ‘extraordinary and temporary measure’ intended 
to provide humanitarian service for refugees and displaced persons.23
George Bush expressed the US intention ‘to turn over the 
administration of and security for these sites as soon as possible to the United 
Nations’ in a way similar to the ‘handing over of responsibility to UN forces 
along Iraq’s southern border’ with Kuwait.24 The US Administration was also 
anxious to emphasise the limited scope of the operation. This was, in part, 
motivated by the desire to preserve the allies’ victory in the Gulf war and the 
remarkably low number of casualties among the coalition forces. Another 
reason was the fear that unrestricted support for Kurds may lead to the 
establishment of an independent Kurdish political entity, a consequence the 
United States sought to avoid. Washington maintained that it was ‘not going to 
intervene militarily in Iraq’s internal affairs and risk being drawn into a
21 James A. Baker, IE, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f  Diplomacy, Revolution, 
War and Peace, 1989 -  1992, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1995, pp. 439-40
22 Norman Schwarzkopf, op. cit. note 20.
23 Javier Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage fo r  Peace, A Secretary-General''s Memoir, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 276.
24 George Bush News Conference, 16 April 1991, in Cambridge International Documents 
Series, Marc Weller, ed. op. cit. note 13, p. 717.
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Vietnam-style quagmire.’25 Bush stated that his Administration did not want to 
see any American soldier ‘shoved into a civil war in Iraq that has been going on 
for ages’. He was referring to the complexity of the Kurdish problem. He 
further stated: ‘I want to stress that this new effort, despite its scale and scope,
97is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of Iraqi Kurds.’
If ‘recognition did not mean protection’ in Bosnia, as Anthony
98Parsons proclaimed, the situation was totally the opposite in the case of the 
Kurds, efforts to protect them did not mean recognition by the international
9Qcommunity of Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet, protection did not save the Kurds from 
being exposed especially to Iraqi and Turkish forces. Turkey was allowed to 
crush the Kurds several times in the safe havens area inside Iraq. It did so in 
1992, 1995,30 and in 199931 following the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Kenya.32 Although, these operations are 
mainly directed against Turkish Kurds, they had destructive effects on Iraqi 
Kurdistan.
Could it be concluded that the Kurds had been utilised and betrayed 
by the international community in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis? The large
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid
27 Ibid.
28 Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace, UN interventions 1947-1994, Michael 
Joseph, London, 1995, p. 228.
29 For clarification o f the functions o f protection force in civil and international conflicts see 
International Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC), Symposium on Humanitarian Action and 
Peace-Keeping Operations, Report, ed. Umesh Palwankar, Geneva, 22-24 June 1994, pp. 
102-3.
30 K. Couturier, ‘Turkey Invades North Iraq to Battle Kurdish Guerrillas’ The Washington 
Post, 21 March 1995
31 Michael Theodoulou and Andrew Finkel, ‘Ankara force storms into northern Iraq’ The 
Times, 18 February 1999.
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humanitarian operation to alleviate their suffering and the rhetoric of coalition 
leaders in their support may not provide an alternative interpretation. No 
proposals for resolving the Kurdish problem were put forward. Calculations of 
regional balance were critical to the United States and Western allies as well as 
to the neighbouring countries. The relatively generous reception by Iran of Iraqi 
refugees and the uprising of the pro-Iranian Shi’ite in Southern Iraq aroused 
fears among coalition members of an Iranian hegemonic influence in the region. 
Another factor was the Turkish determination not to allow any attempt by the 
Kurds to establish political autonomy in the area.
James Baker, former US Secretary of State, observed that
Our detractors accused us of inciting the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions 
against Saddam in the days immediately following the end of the war, 
then dooming them by refusing to come to their aid, either through US 
military action or covert assistance. These are many of the same voices 
who also allege that Desert Storm was halted prematurely for political 
reasons, and that United States forces should have gone on to Baghdad 
and occupied large portions of Iraq. We never embraced as a war aim or 
a political aim the replacement of the Iraqi regime. We did, however, 
hope and believe that Saddam Hussein would not survive in power after 
such a crushing defeat. Ironically, the uprising in the north and south, 
instead of lessening his grip on power as we felt they would, contributed
32 Turkey sent, 20.000 troops in 1992, 35.000 in 1995 and 4.000 in 1999 across the Iraqi 
border into the safe areas.
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to it, as he skilfully argued to his army that these events required his 
continued leadership in order to preserve Iraq. When he managed to 
consolidate his power, Saddam scrambled our strategic calculations. The 
result was a sobering reminder that the consequences of success are often
- j o
far more intricate and unpredictable than anticipated.
The criticism was made against George Bush’s explicit encouragement during 
the Gulf war ‘for the Iraqi military and Iraqi people to take matters into their 
own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside’.34 However, it 
was the Kurds population who paid the price of the failing American strategy. 
Waiting for the ‘consequences of success’ to work in the way anticipated by the 
US Administration did not lead to the removal of Saddam Hussein from office 
and contributed to the appalling humanitarian situation in Northern Iraq in 
1991. The imposition of no-fly zone over Northern Iraq marked an early 
division in the UN and threatened the fragile post-Cold War agreement on a 
collective policy. In 1997 the former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de 
Cuellar disclosed part of his discussion with George Bush during the crisis:
President Bush had called me on April 16 to tell me of the planned 
military move into northern Iraq ... the president expressed the hope that
33 James Baker, op. cit. p 435.
34 International Herald Tribune, 16 February 1991. This could be contrasted to Woodrow 
Wilson promise to the Kurds in the 1920s when he stated that the Kurds should have 
‘absolute unmolested opportunity o f autonomous development.’; see Michael Binyon, ‘West 
blamed for broken pledges of past’ The Times, 18 February 1999. For similar promises by 
the British Government see for example David Keen, op. cit. pp. 1 - 2 .
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I would make clear publicly ... that the action being taken was entirely 
in accord with Security Council resolution 688. This I could not do. ... 
The Security Council could, in principle, have authorised the action as an 
enforcement measure, but whether agreement could have been achieved 
in the Council remains an open question. ... I said I was entirely 
sympathetic with the need but after giving the matter most careful study 
with the assistance of my legal counsel, I had concluded that resolution 
688 did not provide an adequate legal basis to deploy a peacekeeping or 
police force on Iraqi territory without the consent of the Iraqi 
Government.35
The United States and its allies did not recourse to the Security Council for 
further authorisation, because they feared that the rejection of a proposal to this 
effect might render their plan illegitimate.36 Although leaders of the coalition 
had consistently referred to relevant Security Council resolutions, they 
constantly cited the humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq as appalling, and 
creating an intolerable situation.
Some scholars indicated the ‘dramatic innovation’ constituted by the 
case of Kurds ‘in the field of human rights policy’. Many writers argued that 
Operation Provide Hope created a precedent for humanitarian intervention. In
35 Javier Perez de Cuellar, op. cit. note 23, p.275-6.
36 Thomas Franck observed that ‘Security Council consultations ... made it clear that China 
would veto any resolution to intervene with force to protect the Kurds.’ Thomas Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford and New York, 
1997, p. 236.
37 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 238.
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practice, the issues of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction did not restrict 
outside intervention in situations of human crisis during the 1990s, and the 
international community has intervened in many cases of internal conflicts for 
humanitarian reasons since 1991. Still, these changes did not acquire universal 
recognition and each state insists on the sanctity of its sovereignty. However, in 
terms of its mandate, the case of Kurds did not serve as a precedent. In Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Rwanda the United Nations intervened for humanitarian reasons, 
but forces were clearly authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to carry out their 
purposes. Hitherto, humanitarian intervention did not substitute for peace 
enforcement and the case of Kurds remained unique.
2- Somalia
Civil war erupted in Somalia in an environment of political turmoil and 
economic hardship, exacerbated by the drought and the subsequent disturbing 
famine. The political disorder ruined the authority of the central government 
and destroyed the entire institutional establishment. In the face of this crisis, the 
international community had a number of aims: the delivery of food to starving 
people; the cessation of widespread fighting; settlement of the conflict between 
the warring factions; and an undertaking of peace-building responsibilities 
through reconstruction of the economy and rehabilitation of civil society.
38 Boutros Ghali stated that ‘Civil wars are no longer civil and the carnage they inflict will not 
let the world remain indifferent. The narrow nationalism that would oppose or disregard the 
norms of a stable international order and the micro-nationalism that resists healthy economic
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On 23 January 1992, the Security Council adopted a resolution under 
Chapter VII, calling on all states to implement a general and complete embargo 
on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The 
Secretary-General launched a comprehensive plan, ‘the 100-day plan* which 
sought to achieve various humanitarian objectives. The peacekeeping force, the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM),40 was deployed to oversee 
the implementation of the plan and to assist in disarming the population and 
demobilising the irregular forces. The Secretariat invented an ‘arms for food’ 
exchange program which attempted to persuade people to give up their arms in 
return for food. However, this ambitious project which combined the tasks of 
aid provision and disarmament, failed to deprive the clans of their weapons and 
further distorted the UN humanitarian mission. Instead of surrendering their 
weapons according to the UN plan, clans used their arms to obtain food.
The experience of UNOSOM in securing the delivery of relief 
supplies to starving people attained very little success and raised the question 
whether peacekeeping operations are capable of delivering aid supplies in civil 
wars. Paul Diehl argued that ‘the peacekeeping strategy seems largely 
inappropriate to the task required in humanitarian assistance’.41 Relief convoys 
in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other parts of Somalia were repeatedly subjected 
to hostile attacks, hijacking, and looting by supporters of warlords.
or political integration can disrupt a peaceful global existence.’ UN Documents 
SC/5360/Rev.l, 31 January 1992.
39 Security Council resolution 733,23 January 1992.
40 Security Council resolution 751,24 April 1992.
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By the end of 1992, both the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council expressed the view that it was time to move from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement by authorising a coercive action in Somalia. The Secretary- 
General proposed three options to be considered by the Council:
(1) A show of force in Mogadishu by UNOSOM troops ‘to deter factions 
and other armed groups there and elsewhere in Somalia from 
withholding cooperation from UNOSOM’.
(2) A countrywide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of 
Member States authorised to do so by the Security Council.
(3) A countrywide enforcement action undertaken under United Nations 
command and control.42
On 3 December 1992 the Council adopted resolution 794 authorising the use of 
‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’. It was the first case since the Congo 
(1960) in which the Security Council had authorised the use of force in a civil 
war in Africa. The deployment of 37,000 troops under Operation Restore Hope 
was also the largest since ONUC.
The United States asked to be authorised to designate the command of 
the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in a manner similar to Korea
41 Paul F. Diehl, ‘Peacekeeping in Somalia, Cambodia, and the Former Yugoslavia’ in Roger 
E. Kanet, ed. Resolving Regional Conflicts, University o f Illinois Press, Urbana and 
Chicago, 1998, p. 159.
315
1950, but the Council rejected this request despite the fact that more than
27,000 of the troops were provided by America. In fact, the United States 
proposed sending forces to Somalia even before the adoption of a Security 
Council resolution authorising the use of force. During the five months of 
UNITAF there was improvement in the distribution of food and security in 
many parts of the Country.
When the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of 
UNOSOM II under the authority of Chapter VII43 to take over from UNITAF 
by May 1993 he stipulated that the operation should not be subject to the 
agreement of local factions. One year later Boutros Ghali reversed his 
stipulation. After a series of hostile attacks against UNOSUM II and American 
forces, including the killing of 25 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993, the 
downing of two US helicopters and the killing of 18 American troops on 3 
October, Ghali announced that UN forces would not stay longer unless local 
clans showed a readiness to cooperate with UNOSOM II.
UNOSOM II was terminated in March 1995 without achieving its 
main objectives. The withdrawal was justified by the hostility and the lack of 
co-operation on the part of the warring factions. The initial plan of UNOSOM II 
proved too ambitious and overestimated the UN ability to overcome the 
limitations inherented in its peace operations. Following the approval of his 
report, An Agenda for Peace, by the Security Council, Boutros Ghali formulated 
a comprehensive peace enforcement plan for Somalia comprising a wide range
42 The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, United Nations 
Department o f Public Information, New York, 3rd edition, 1996, p. 294.
316
of actions. The roles of UNOSOM, Ghali described, were to include the 
combat of hostile attacks, demobilisation of militiamen, delivery of food, 
national reconciliation, rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure, supportfor 
the agricultural sector, and the opening of primary schools.44 However, it 
proved impossible to accomplish such duties in the absence of an agreement 
between the major combatants. The complexity of the internal situation, the 
degree of societal antagonism, and the massive destruction caused by the 
continuing war in Somalia and similar situations, led to suggestions for a wider 
UN enforcement action, extending to an imperial solution or to treat failed 
states as UN protectorates under a new trusteeship system.45
3- Liberia
Civil war erupted in Liberia in 1990 following the overthrow of President 
Samuel Doe’s government, leaving over 150,000 dead and 750,000 refugees. 
The country was divided into three zones controlled by three main warring 
factions: the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement of 
Liberia (ULIMO).
For the first three years of the civil war in Liberia, West African 
countries assumed the roles of regional peacekeeping and mediation. As UN 
officials acknowledged, the United Nations Observer Group in Liberia
43 Security Council resolution 814,26 March 1993.
44 The Blue Helmets, op. cit. note 42.
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(UNOMIL) was the first UN peacekeeping force to join an already existing 
peacekeeping operation created by another organisation.46 UNOMIL was 
established by the Security Council in September 1993 to share peace-keeping 
responsibility with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a sub-regional organisation which played a significant role, 
through peaceful initiatives, in an attempt to find peaceful solution for the 
conflict in Liberia.47
These initiatives resulted in the signing of Yamoussoukro IV Accord 
in October 1991,48 Cotonou Peace Agreement in July 199349, Akosombo 
Agreement in 1994,50 Accra Agreement in December 1994, and Abuja 
Agreement in August 1995.51 Subsequent cease-fire agreements were 
repeatedly breached by belligerents. In the face of these violations ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) took in several incidents peace enforcement 
actions by employing coercive measures against different factions, especially 
the NPFL.52 ECOMOG was not authorised by the Security Council to take 
peace enforcement measures either under Chapter VII or Chapter VIII in the 
way that NATO was mandated by the Council under the authority of both 
Chapters in Bosnia to take all necessary measures to secure the supply of
45 Brian Urquhart, ‘Who can police the world’ New York Review o f  Books, 12 May 1994.
46 The Blue Helmets, op. cit. p. 379.
47 For evaluation and detailed analysis o f the role o f ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis see 
Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, Peacekeeping in Africa, ECOMOG in Liberia, 
Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1998.
48 UN Document S/24815, annex.
49 UN Document S/26272, annex.
50 UN Document S/1994/1174.
51 UN Document S/1995/742, annex.
52 Earl Conteh-Morgan, ‘Introduction: Adapting Peace-Making Mechanisms in an Era of 
Global Change’ in Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, eds. op. cit. note 47, p. 5.
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humanitarian assistance. However, the Secretary-General stated that ECOWAS 
was cooperating with the UN pursuant to the provisions of Chapter VIII which 
allow regional organisations to take enforcement measures.
Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council imposed a mandatory 
arms embargo on Liberia following the adoption of resolution 788 on 19 
November 1992. This measure had hardly affected the sale of arms by 
mercenaries to the country. Due to the insignificant presence of UN forces in 
Liberia, 93 officers, and because both ECOMOG and UN forces remained 
present over only 15 percent of the populated areas in the country, they were 
neither qualified to observe the peace effectively nor capable of monitoring the 
arms embargo.
4- Angola: Embargo against UNITA
Like Congo, Angola had been entangled in civil war almost immediately after 
its independence. Following the declaration of Angolan independence from 
Portugal in 1975, fighting erupted between the three liberation movements: the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union 
for the Total Independence, and the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola.54
53 Secretary-General report to the Security Council on 12 March 1993, UN Document 
S/25402.
54 For discussion on history and origins o f the struggle in Angola see Arslan Humbaraci and 
Nichole Muchink, Portugal’s African Wars, Angola, Guinea Bissao and Mozambique, 
Macmillan, 1974, pp. 119 -  132; John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1, Exile 
Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962 -1976, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1978.
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On 22 December 1988 a peaceful initiative under the auspices of the 
United Nations was approved. Two substantial agreements were signed at the 
headquarters of the United Nations by the Foreign Ministers of Cuba, Angola 
and South Africa. Under the Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba 
which came into effect on 1 April 1989, 3,000 Cuban troops started to move 
northwards as the first phase of the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops who 
based in Angola.55 The United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(UNAVEM) was created five days before the signing of the two agreements at 
the request of Cuba and Angola to oversee compliance with the bilateral 
agreement.56
In response to a request from the Angolan government to the 
Secretary-General, on 30 May 1991 the Security Council adopted resolution 
696 entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM (UNAVEM II) to verify the 
implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola (Accords de Paz), signed by
r7
the Angolan government and UNITA in Lisbon. UNITA rejected the result of 
elections held and endorsed by UN officials, in the autumn of 1992. 
Furthermore, UNITA initiated hostile military attacks against government
ro
forces and fighting intensified and spread all over the country.
55 UN Document S/20325, 1989. See Robert S. Jaster, The 1988 Peace Accord and the 
Future o f  Southwestern Africa, Adelphi Paper no. 253, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Autumn 1990.
56 Security Council resolution 626,20 December 1988.
57 Abiodun Williams, ‘Negotiations and the End o f the Angolan Civil War’ in David R. 
Smock, ed. Making War and Waging Peace, Foreign intervention in Africa, United States 
Institute o f Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 208 — 211.
58 UN Document S/24720,1992.
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On 15 September 1993, the Security Council discussed the situation 
and decided to impose a mandatory embargo against UNITA. Acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council asked all states to prevent the sale or 
supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, as well as petroleum 
products, to Angola, other than through points of entry indicated by the 
government.59 It is significant that in the Angolan crisis the Security Council 
was able to single out one faction as a target for its mandatory measures, 
without affecting the rest of the country. In previous civil war cases the Council 
had applied arms embargoes indiscriminately against warring parties. 
Impartiality was always viewed in the context of the role of UN forces in civil 
wars. In Angola, the Security Council did not employ military enforcement 
measures and the verification missions remained equitable. However, by 
excluding areas controlled by the elected government the Council did not 
preserve an impartial role in the conflict. The Council has also threatened to 
impose trade sanctions on UNITA and to restrict the travel of its personnel and 
a special committee was established by the Council for the purpose of 
monitoring the arms and oil embargo.60
The signing of Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 199461 and the 
subsequent establishment of a third UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) 
faced the same fate of the previous agreements. Angola represented an early 
frustration for UN efforts in the settlement of military conflicts. The signing of
59 Security Council resolution 864,15 September 1993.
60 Security Council resolution 864,15 September 1993.
61 UN Document S/PRST/1994/70.
62 Security Council resolution 976, 8 February 1995.
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two agreements in December 1988 was universally celebrated and considered 
by many as one of the breakthroughs of the United Nations. However, the 
success it achieved in Angola during the Cold War, had been frustrated by the 
outbreak of intensive fighting in 1992 and the spread of civil war as a syndrome 
of the early years of the post-Cold War era.
5- Rwanda (Operation Turquoise)
It is significant that both parties to the Rwandan conflict, the Hutu-dominated 
armed forces and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) jointly called 
for the UN to intervene by taking command of an international force.64 On 14 
June 1993, the parties asked that the international force oversee the 
demobilisation of the existing armed forces and the formation of a new national 
army.65 It could be argued that the UN did not respond sufficiently to the early 
demands of the conflicting parties to prevent the situation from becoming 
inflamed.66
A French initiative was eventually approved by the Security Council 
to deploy foreign forces in the area. UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali 
favoured the idea of a French-commanded multinational force, similar to the
63 G. R. Berridge, Return to the UN, Macmillan 1991, pp. 71 - 85 .
64 UN Document S/25951,15 June 1993.
65 Ibid.
66 Scretary General, Boutros Ghali, described his efforts to convince member states to send 
forces to Rwanda in a news Conference at the UN Headquarters on 25 May 1994 and 
admitted that ‘Unfortunately, let me say with great humility, I failed. It is a scandal. I am the 
first one to say it and I am ready to repeat it.’ SG/SM/5297/Rev.l.
67 Letter from France to the Secretary-General on 20 June 1994, UN Document S/1994/734, 
21 June 1994.
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American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in December 1992. He 
accepted the force’s purposes as laid down in the French proposal, namely to 
carry out a specifically humanitarian mission, not to intervene in the internal 
political conflict or seek to influence the outcome of the war, and to create 
conditions for the take-over of UNAMIR to pursue its expanded mandate by 
August 1994. The French plan was approved by the Security Council and 
resolution 929 was adopted to this effect. Acting under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, on 22 June 1994 the Security Council authorised 
member states to set up a temporary multinational operation to contribute to the 
security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk. On 
the same day French troops supported by Senegalese forces launched Operation 
Turquoise.
The mandatory arms embargo which had been imposed on Rwanda in 
May 1994 proved ineffective and weapons continued to flow to the area 
abundantly.69 Two years later the Security Council was compelled to adopt a 
resolution under Chapter VII expressing its ‘grave concern’ over repeated
70allegations of illegal arms sales to Rwanda. The Council asked the Secretary- 
General to consult with Zaire on stationing UN observers in its border area with 
Rwanda to monitor airfields and other transit points. By 18 April 1996, all 
peacekeepers had left Rwanda, ending the thirty-month mission of UNAMIR.
68 UN Document S/1994/734,21 June 1994.
69 Security Council resolution 918,17 May 1994.
70 Security Council resolution 1053,23 April 1996.
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6- Zaire
The dispute over whether the conflict was external or internal that dominated 
opinion in the case of Congo in the early 1960s, did not arise in the recent crisis. 
Thirty-six years after fighting first erupted following the independence of 
Congo, the ex-territorial regional element in eastern Zaire is obviously admitted 
by the Security Council. The resolution of 15 November 1996 explicitly
71referred to enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Security Council resolution 1080 authorised the use of all necessary 
means to accomplish the humanitarian mission of the multinational force. The 
resolution referred to the conflict in eastern Zaire as a ‘continuing deteriorating 
situation in the Great Lakes region’, stressing the regional nature of the conflict 
and the responsibility of Central African countries. The international 
community, haunted by the experience of Rwanda and its grave responsibility 
for allowing genocide to take place in 1994, responded swiftly in 1996 to avoid 
a repetition of human disaster in the region. Paris did not expect the rapid 
British reaction. John Major, then British Prime Minister, at a meeting with 
President Jacques Chirac in November 1996, declared that Britain would be 
prepared to send forces to Zaire. Contrary to the US stance in Bosnia, where it 
had protracted its reluctance to join European forces until 1995, a few days after 
his re-election President Clinton expressed readiness to send US troops to Zaire 
to serve under Canadian command. It was the first time since the Gulf war that 
major Western states including France, Britain and the United States had so
71 Security Council resolution 1080, 15 November 1996.
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quickly agreed to join forces in a multilateral action under the leadership of a 
state other than the United States, under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.
7- Bosnia
More than any other case, the Bosnian conflict provided the United Nations and 
the international community with an unprecedented range of difficult issues and 
complications.72 It constituted a comprehensive test to the capability of the 
United Nations in dealing with the complexity of the post-Cold War conflicts 
and their repercussions, after Kuwait 1990-91.
Following the death of President Josip Tito in 1980 the unity of the 
federal state in Yugoslavia had become increasingly fragile . The ethno- 
nationalistic claims of political groups74 led to the outbreak of war in Slovenia 
in June 1991, Croatia in August 1991, and Bosnia in April 1992.75 By the year 
1992 the international community recognised Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia as 
independent states.
72 Issues raised with relation to the Bosnian conflict and discussed in various contexts 
included: the nature o f conflicts, the use o f force by the UN and regional organisations, the 
relation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention, 
international recognition, protection, safe havens and no-fly zones, deterrence, delivery o f  
humanitarian aid, the relation between peace and justice, human rights, ethnicity, genocide, 
international mediation, consent, sanctions, and war crimes’ tribunal.
73 For background and useful bibliographical notes see Christopher Civic, Remaking the 
Balkans, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, pp. 29 -  62, 63 -  82, and 111 -  113; Sir Duncan 
Wilson, Tito’s Yogoslavia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
74 See, among others, Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yogoslavia: Origins, History, 
Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1984.
75 V. P. Gagnon, ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case o f Serbia’ 
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3,1994-5.
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The process of self-determination in Bosnian started when the 
Bosnian people voted in favour of independence in a referendum in December 
1991. In February 1992 the European Community (EC) recognised Bosnia as an
•  I f kindependent state, and on recommendation by the Security Council, the 
General Assembly adopted Bosnia on 22 May 1992 as a member of the United 
Nations. In two separate resolutions the Assembly granted, on the same date, 
the UN membership to Slovenia and Croatia. The declarations of independence 
provoked hostile military responses by Serbs in the three former Yugoslav
77republics and led to atrocities unprecedented since World War II. The 
international community was faced with the dilemma of stopping ethnic 
genocide and protecting the newly recognised states. Scholars provided 
different evaluations of the international recognition and its consequences for 
the Balkans. Some analysts viewed the recognition of the three Yugoslav
7 0
Republics as an internationalisation of an internal ethnic conflict. 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argued that the ‘international community, having 
recognised Bosnia should have helped to defend it and reassert government
70authority within it’. Anthony Parsons made a realistic observation that
OA
‘international recognition did not mean international protection’ in Bosnia. In 
fact, the issue of protection was crucial in the Bosnian case and for this reason
76 Security Council resolutions 753 and 754 of 18 May 1992 recommended Croatia and 
Slovenia, and resolution 755 o f 20 May 1992 recommended Bosnia for admittance to the 
UN.
77 See collection o f articles in Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski, With No Peace to Keep, 
United Nations Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia, Grainpress, London, 
1995.
78 Paul Diehl, op. cit. note 41, pp. 161-168 .
79 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian intervention in contemporary 
conflict, a reconceptualisation, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 175 and 176.
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the whole mission of the UN forces was defined by the Security Council 
resolutions as one of protection.
The conflict had almost coincided with the aftermath of the Gulf war 
and the ambitions of the international community to resolve the conflict were
Q 1
high. However, it is equally right that the international community did not pay 
enough attention to the conflict in Bosnia because it was preoccupied with too
on
many post-Cold War issues. In Slovenia, where the Serb population is very 
low, fighting was brought to an early end after an agreement signed under the
on
auspices of the EC. Regional and international efforts to resolve the conflict in 
Croatia and Bosnia proved to be unsuccessful and the war continued in the two 
regions for more than three years. Initiatives to attain peaceful solutions were 
also unsuccessful. The Vance Owen Plan failed to reach a negotiated settlement 
in 1993. The Invicible package, the EU Action Plan, and the Contact Group 
proposal also failed to bring about a peace settlement.
The efforts of the Security Council to end the fighting started at an 
early stage of the conflict. In its meeting at the ministerial level on 25 
September 1991, the Council adopted its first resolution (713) with relation to 
the conflict in Yugoslavia. The resolution imposed a mandatory and ‘complete 
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment’ to all parts of 
Yugoslavia. In February 1992 the Security Council established the United
80 Anthony Parsons, op. cit. note 28, p. 228.
81 Filippo Andretta, ‘The Bosnian War and the New World Order, Failure and Success of 
International Intervention’ Occasional Papers, Institute for Security Studies o f the Western 
European Union, Paris, 1997, pp. 1 - 3 .
82 Anthony Parsons, op. cit. note 28, pp. 222.
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Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with a mandate to create conditions of 
peace and security for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement. The use of all 
necessary means was later authorised to protect the delivery of humanitarian 
relief.
The performance of the UNPROFOR mission was widely used for 
measuring UN successes and failures in Yugoslavia and has also been used to 
judge the solvency of the UN peace enforcement system. UNPROFOR was 
described by some scholars as being trapped in a wild ethnic war between half a
fid.dozen national ethnic groups. Yasushi Akashi acknowledged this fact but he 
referred to another difficulty, that UNPROFOR was crippled by disagreement
Of
between the permanent members of the Security Council. In order to 
overcome these differences the Council had to compromise over the terms of its 
resolutions and to sacrifice the clarity of the mandate of the UN forces. It is 
argued that ambiguity in the mission’s mandate caught UNPROFOR between
Of
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, even when the mandate was 
clearly designated to accomplish a peace enforcement mission and UN troops 
were authorised to defend places declared by the Council as safe areas, the 
outcome was one of the worst human disasters. Evidently, UN forces were 
unable to fulfil their assigned mandate.
83 The EC changed to the EU on 1 November 1993 when the Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) went into effect.
84 John Halstead, ‘UN Peacekeeping: The Lessons o f Yugoslavia’ in S. Neil MacFarlane and 
Hans-George Ehrahart, eds. Peacekeeping at a Crossroad, The Canadian Peacekeeping 
Press, 1997, p. 66.
85 Yasushi Akashi, ‘Managing United Nations Peacekeeping’ in Wolfgang Biermann and 
Martin Vadset, eds. UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former 
Yugoslavia, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, 1998, pp. 132 and 133.
86 John Halstead, op. cit. note 84.
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John Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt, and Timothy Stanley suggested that 
the Security Council should carry out a combat operation against Serbia on a
o7
scale comparable to that of Desert Storm. They predicted, in 1992, ‘it would 
be ill-advised in the extreme to launch a Serbian “war” with inadequate force or 
hasty preparation. Failure would be a disaster not only for the Balkans, but for 
the whole concept of collective action by the UN to enforce peace and 
security.’88
This was presumably the ultimate result of the UN policy in Bosnia. 
Apparently, the policy of using minimum force had failed to deter Bosnian
OA
Serbs from launching more attacks against safe areas, and further raised 
doubts about the effectiveness of the UN peace enforcement regime.
Sir David Hannay rejected the idea that the UN was pursuing a policy 
of excessive caution. In his view economic sanctions against the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia were comprehensive and effective to the extent that 
compelled Milosevic to ‘break with the Bosnian Serbs’ and to support the peace 
efforts of the Contact Group.90 Anthony Parsons elaborated on this point by 
stating that ‘Sanctions may well have turned President Milosevic of Serbia from 
being the standard-bearer of Greater Serbia into a man of peace, but only after
87 John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt, and Timothy W. Stanley, To Unite Our Strength, 
Enhancing the United Nations Peace and Security System, University Press o f America, 
Lanham, New York, and London, 1992, pp. 106 and 108.
88 Ibid. pp. 108 and 109.
89 Timothy Wallace Crawford, ‘Why Minimum Force Won’t Work: Doctrine and Deterrence 
in Bosnia and Beyond’ Global Governance Lynne Rienner Publishers, vol. 4, no. 2, April -  
June 1998, pp. 2 3 5 - 2 5 4 .
90 Sir David Hannay, ‘The UN ’s Role in Bosnia assessed’, Oxford International Review, 
Spring 1996, vol. VII, no. 2, p. 9.
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200,000 deaths, 2 to 3 million people displaced and all the horrors of ethnic 
cleansing.’91
It is true that sanctions did not help the Bosnians, on the contrary it 
impeded them from getting weapons necessary for defending themselves, but in 
the end it compelled the Serbs to stop the cycle of atrocities and brought about a 
kind of peace deal. Whether a sanctions policy should bring justice to the victim 
as well as forcing the aggressor to accept and sign peace accords depends on the 
particular conflict. In 1994, the United States accepted the Contact Group peace 
plan ‘which was partly predicated on the idea that a speedy end to the conflict 
would greatly ease humanitarian suffering even though the Serbs would be
09unjustly rewarded for their aggression.’ For Filippo Andreatta the insistence to 
obtain justice had delayed the accomplishment of a peace agreement and, in the 
end, peace was attained without justice.93
In November 1995, Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs signed Dayton 
Accords under the auspices of the United States.94 This step was a culmination
91 Anthony Parsons, ‘The UN -  Peace and Security: a Balance Sheet’, in Roger Williamson, 
ed. Some Comer o f  Foreign Field, Intervention and World Order, Macmillan Press, and St. 
Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1998, p. 250.
92 John C. Hulsman, A Paradigm fo r the New World Order, A Schools-of-Thought Analysis 
o f  American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 
London and New York,1997, p.133. For comprehensive discussion on Thomas Hobbes, J.J. 
Roseue, Hedley Bull, and Martin Wight ideas on the relation between justice and order see 
Leo McCarthy, Justice, the State and International Relations, Macmillan and St. Martin’s 
Press, London and New York, 1998, pp. 78 -  91.
93 Filippo Andreatta, op. cit. note 81, p. 19. See Charles G. Boyd, Making Peace with the 
Guilty, Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5, September, 1995.
94 For pessimistic accounts o f the application and future o f Dayton Accords see John B. 
Allcock, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina After Dayton’ Cambridge Review o f  International Affairs, 
Summer -  Fall 1997, vol. XI, no. 1, pp. 68 -  80. See also a letter sent by Alija Ixetbegovic 
and Haris Silajdixic to the members o f the international Contact Group, on 21 April 1997, 
Bosnia Report, February -  May 1997, pp. 1-2.
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of the UN and EU efforts during the preceding years.95 Washington, finally, 
announced its readiness to provide ground troops for the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) which had been authorised to take over from UNPROFOR.
By December 1995 the presence of the United Nations in Bosnia was 
formally replaced by US-led NATO forces, and the UN slogan was removed 
from troops helmets and operating vehicles.96 In fact, Bosnia represented the 
first incident where the United Nations has delegated not only the command of 
forces, but the whole peace enforcement mission and mandate.
8- Haiti
Haiti had not experienced democracy in its modem history. For nearly two 
centuries, no democratic government was elected in the country. This 
compelling fact led the international community to view the election of father 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in December 1990 as the president of Haiti by 67 
percent of the Haitian electorate, as a significant historical change which should 
be preserved and protected. One year later, on 30 September 1991, Colonel 
Raul Cedras led a military coup and forced Aristide into exile. Many viewed
Q7this move as an early end to the brief experience of democracy in Haiti, but a
95 Adam Roberts, ‘Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organisation: The 
Case o f the Former Yugoslavia’ in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping fo r the New Century, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, New  
York, Boulder, and Oxford, 1998, pp. 40,41, and 54.
96 Security Council resolution 1031,15 December 1995
97 David Malone, ‘Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study’, Survival, vol. 39 
no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 127.
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determination grew in the Western hemisphere to restore the democratic 
government.
Aristide soon appeared before the Council of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 
3 October. He urged the OAS Council to take necessary measures to counter the 
military action against democracy in Haiti, pursuant to the Santiago 
Declaration, which had been signed by American states in June 1991. The OAS 
responded by calling for the reinstatement of Aristide and recommended a 
range of diplomatic and economic measures against the military authorities in 
Haiti.98
The continuing arrival of Haitian refugees to the shores of the United 
States posed a real challenge to the Administration. As a drafter of the Santiago 
Declaration, the United States was also concerned with the termination of the 
democratic process in Haiti. It wanted Haiti to serve as a ‘singular example’ 
against the success of military coups in the hemisphere, as it represented the 
first test to the commitment included in Santiago Declaration. The Pentagon 
was assigned to block the influx of refugees and to advice on the possibility of 
military intervention. The US military launched “Operation GTMO” to detain 
fleeing Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, a piece of Cuban land occupied by the 
United States. With regard to the military option Colin Powell stated that
98 Michael Reisman said that the OAS sanctions against Haiti ‘proved to have the double 
disadvantage o f being both economically destructive in Haiti and politically unsuccessful.’ W. 
Michael Reisman, ‘New Scenarios o f Threats to International Peace and Security: Developing
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My advice to Cheney was to go slow. ‘We can take over the place in an 
afternoon with a company or two of Marines’ I said. ‘But the problem is 
getting out.’ We had intervened in Haiti in 1915 for reasons that sounded 
identical to what I was hearing now-to end terror, restore stability, 
promote democracy, and protect US interests-and that occupation has 
lasted nineteen years."
The Bush Administration adhered to its policy not to intervene militarily in 
Haiti. Aristide was not a preferable choice for the United States, a leader with a 
mixed record who ‘was reputed to be anti American’ and the Administration 
‘had concerns about his erratic behaviour and human rights record.’100 But it 
would have been difficult for the US to distance itself from a legitimate 
president with 67 percent of the Haitian votes without jeopardising the whole 
democratic process.101
The United States endeavoured to involve the OAS, the UN, and the 
National Endowment for Democracy in the electoral process and later pressed 
the OAS to adopt financial measures against the military leaders in Haiti and 
asked the Security Council for the imposition of mandatory measures. However,
Legal Capacities for Adequate Responses’ in Jost Delbruck, ed. The Future o f  International 
Law Enforcement: New Scenarios -  New Law. ? Duncker, and Humblot, Berlin, 1993, p. 25.
99 Colin L. Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, A Soldier’s Way, an autobiography, Hutchinson, 
London, 1995, p. 544.
100 James Baker, op. cit. note 21, p. 601.
101 For analysis o f Aristide radical and anti-imperialist ideas see Robert Fatton Jr. ‘The Rise, 
Fall, and Resurrection o f President Aristide’ in Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti Renewed, Political 
and Economic Prospects, Brooking Institute Press, Washington, D.C. and The World Peace 
Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 140 -  146.
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the concerns of the international community over the situation in Haiti predated 
the overthrow of President Aristide.
In October 1989, France and Venezuela took the initiative to rally 
support for a free, fair, and peaceful elections in Haiti.102 Their efforts 
culminated in the formation, with Canada and the United States, of the ‘Group 
of Friends’ of the UN Secretary-General for Haiti. Nevertheless, Haitians 
themselves were aware of the importance of having international observers to 
monitor and protect the process of elections. In 1987, following the overthrow 
of Jean-Claude and the end of almost thirty years of Duvalier regime, an 
attempt to hold a presidential election was frustrated by military forces and 
resulted in killing and bloodshed. In 1990 the transitional government of 
President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot asked the United Nations to support and 
monitor the process of an election to be held before the end of the year.103 By a 
consensual resolution the General Assembly established in October 1990 the 
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti 
(ONUVEH).104
Hitherto, the interests of the United States in Haiti are apparent and so 
its immediate involvement in the crisis. It is also evident that the US sought to 
activate the OAS and the UN to adopt resolutions with relation to the situation 
in Haiti. However, states and non-state actors had willingly played pivotal roles
102 David Malone, op. cit. note 97, pp. 126 -1 2 7 .
103 The election was also observed by the OAS, the Organisation o f Eastern Caribbean 
States, delegates from the US, Canada, Venezuela, and France, Jimmy Carter’s Council o f 
Freely-Elected Heads o f Government, the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (US), and other NGOs; see Deon Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement, 
Remaking States in the Post War World, Macmillan Press, London, 1998, p. 229.
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in Haiti, by showing a consistent and unique determination to restore the 
democratically elected President to power.
On the part of the United Nations this determination was clear and had 
been demonstrated in different forms by the Secretary-General, the General 
Assembly, and the Security Council. Although there were fears that the services 
of the United Nations could be demanded in similar situations around the world 
and, despite reservations raised by some member states in different stages, the 
UN commitment to democracy in Haiti had persisted over the period of the 
crisis.105 David Malone asserted that ‘While the UN had observed elections in 
Nicaragua in 1989, working jointly with the OAS, it had done so within the 
framework of a regional peace plan in which the UN was heavily involved. 
There was concern in New York that the Haitian request could lead to a 
plethora of similar pleas from countries with democratic troubled records.’106 
However, a more serious demand was made by President Aristide when he 
addressed the Security Council meeting on 3 October 1991 asking the Council 
for assistance to restore his elected government. The Council immediately 
reacted by issuing a presidential statement calling for the restoration of the
1 (Y1legitimate Haitian government. One week later, the General Assembly passed
104 General Assembly resolution 45/2, 10 October 1990.
105 In a useful contribution to the issue o f the right o f people to democratic governments as 
an emanating international human right, Jack Donnelly argued that ‘The emerging norm of 
electoral legitimacy is unlikely to displace power interests and sovereignty equality. 
Nonetheless, states today face political costs for practices that just two decades ago were 
standard, and the dramatic upsurge in international election monitoring indicates growing 
acceptance o f an active international interest in national electoral democracy.’ See Jack 
Donnelly, ‘Human rights: a new standard of civilisation’, International Affairs, vol. 74, no.
1, January 1998, p. 19.
106 David Malone, op. cit. note 97.
107 UN Documents, S/PV.3011, 3 October 1991.
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a consensual resolution condemning the illegal replacement of ‘the
10Rconstitutional President of Haiti’ and demanded his immediate reinstatement. 
On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the 
Secretary-General to take ‘necessary measures’ to facilitate a regional solution 
of the Haitian crisis.109 Therefore, the OAS and the General Assembly 
expressed determination to support the restoration of the democratic process in 
Haiti. The measures undertaken by these bodies prepared the ground for the 
adoption of enforcement measures to resolve the crisis.
The Security Council issued its first mandatory resolution under 
Chapter VII concerning the crisis in Haiti on 16 June 1993 by imposing oil and 
arms embargoes against the country.110 Sanctions seemed to have convinced 
General Cedras to accept Mr. Dante Caputo’s, the UN Special envoy to Haiti, 
invitation to negotiate with Aristide. Two days before the embargo came into 
effect Cedras declared that he was ready to cooperate with the efforts to resolve 
the Haitian crisis through peaceful negotiation. Talks started immediately on 
Governors Island, New York City, and on 3 July 1993 an agreement was signed 
by Cedras and Aristide.
The Governors Island Agreement was based on the premise that 
Aristide is the only legitimate president of Haiti and that the present 
government is illegitimate and thus to be dissolved. This premise distinguished 
the provisions of the agreement from most peaceful accords signed under the 
auspices of the UN for the settlement of internal crises. For instance, there was
108 General Assembly resolution 46/7, 11 October 1991.
109 General Assembly resolution 47/20, 24 November 1992.
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no mention of elections or any possible political future for the present de facto 
military leaders of Haiti. Instead, the agreement provided for the return of 
President Aristide on 30 October 1993 and the early retirement of General 
Cedras.
Cedras returned from New York to oversee the transitional period and 
to prepare for the departure of his government. On 25 August he welcomed the 
appointment by Aristide of Mr. Robert Malval as a Prime Minister who was 
also ratified by the Parliament.
In response to this significant political step the Security Council 
unanimously agreed to suspend the oil and arms embargo.111 During this period, 
the Secretary-General started to deploy the United Nations Mission In Haiti
(UNMIH) pursuant to the Governors Island Agreement and the Security
11 ^
Council resolution 867. The Governors Island Agreement provided the UN 
with a framework for peaceful settlement and, from July 1993, the UN plan was 
to effect the provisions of the agreement. On 11 October 1993 the ship Harlan 
County sailed to Haiti carrying the main contingent of the peacekeeping force 
UNMIH. At its arrival in Port-au-Prince a hostile armed civilian militia 
prevented the deployment of the UN forces. This incident raised difficult issues 
in relation to the UN peacekeeping and led to a change of the UN’s course of 
action in Haiti.
As regard the issue of sanctions, the Security Council terminated the 
suspension of the embargo against Haiti and implemented further economic and
110 Security Council resolution 841,16 June 1993.
111 Security Council resolution 861, 27 August 1993.
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financial sanctions, a partial air embargo, and diplomatic measures. Resolution 
917 invoked Chapters VII and VIII authorising member states acting nationally 
or through regional arrangements to inspect outward and inward shipping and
t  I  -5
verify their cargoes and destinations. This mission was carried out by eight 
United States ships, one Canadian, one Argentinean, one Dutch, and one 
French. The twelve ships patrolled the High Seas around the Island and a team 
of technical experts was dispatched to assess the situation on the Dominican- 
Haitian borders where violations of sanctions had been repeatedly reported. The 
invoking of Chapter VIII as regard the tightening of sanctions and the 
imposition of the blockade is unique in the case of Haiti.
Operationally, the obstruction of the peacekeeping forces could be 
considered as a withdrawal of consent by the host country while the deployment 
of forces was in motion. The UN was confronted by this problem in an earlier 
case when President Nasir revoked, in May 1967, his ten years consent to the 
continuing presence of UNEF1 in Sinai. In the Cold War context, the UN 
considered Nasir’s decision as a termination of UNEF1 and started to remove 
the peacekeeping forces from the desert of Sinai. In Haiti the withdrawal of 
consent was not recognised by the UN. The Security Council decided to 
continue the mandate of UNMIH and further renewed its validity for two 
consecutive periods without the actual presence of UN forces on the ground. 
Persuasion, as a Secretary-General policy, which in 1960 succeeded in 
convincing Tshompe to withdraw his rejection to allow the deployment of
112 Security Council resolution 867,23 September 1993.
113 Security Council resolutions 917, 6 May 1994.
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ONUC in Katanga, failed to restore General Cedras’ consent for more than 
eight months. Due to this situation, the Security Council decided to move from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement.
On the part of the United States the shift of policy was described by 
the Secretary of State during the first term of Clinton’s Presidency, Warren 
Christopher
President Bush and Secretary Baker had judged that national interest did 
not justify the use of force in Haiti. ... Congressional and public opinion 
reinforced this reluctance. Nevertheless, as the situation continued to 
deteriorate that summer, with waves of refugees trying to leave the 
island, we began to explore the options relating to the threat and use of 
military force.114
Boutros Ghali recommended to the Security Council the authorisation of a 
multinational force under Chapter VII to enforce the return of the legitimate 
government.115 On 31 July 1994 the Council adopted resolution 940 asking 
member states to establish, under unified command and control, a multinational 
force and to use all necessary means to facilitate the restoration of the legitimate 
president of Haiti. However, the Council’s decision to employ coercive 
measures reflects the willingness and agreement on the part of the great powers
114 Warren Christopher, In the Stream o f History, Shaping Foreign Policy fo r  a New Era, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1998, p. 178.
115 The Blue Helmets, A Review o f United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd edition, The UN 
Department o f Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 623.
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rather than the influence of the Secretary-General’s recommendation. Boutros 
Ghali made similar suggestions in other situations but the Council did not 
proceed on his recommendations. His proposition in Burundi, for instance, of a 
major initiative under Chapter VII to resolve the deteriorating situation since 
the military coup of 21 October 1993 was turned down by the Security 
Council.116 This would reaffirm the necessity of the agreement among great 
powers, as a determining factor for the invoking of Chapter VII.
Three months later, the President of the United States declared that all 
diplomatic efforts were exhausted and warned the military leaders ‘The 
message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear. Your time is up.
1 1 7Leave now or we will force you from power.’ President Clinton announced 
that the multinational force under the command of the US General Hugh 
Shelton might soon be deployed to the area.
There was controversy within the United States over the shift in 
Washington policy towards the issue of military intervention in Haiti. With the 
Somali experience in mind ‘(n)either house of Congress had voted for an
1 i o
invasion, nor for that matter had public opinion favoured such a course.’
116 Letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, SC Document S/1996/36, 17 
January 1996; Boutros Ghali proposed the deployment, under Chapter VII o f 25.000 troops 
to Burundi, by air and sea, including attack helicopters; parachute, motorised and 
mechanised units; artillery; light tanks, and combat engineers. These are well summarised in 
James A. Barry, The Sword o f  Justice, Ethics and Coercion in International Politics, 
Praeger, Westport and London, 1998, p. 74; for discussion on the role o f  the Secretary- 
General in Burundi see Edward Newman, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to 
the New Era, A Global Peace and Security Mandate? Macmillan Press, London, and St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1998, p. 172.
117 Warren Christopher, note 114, p. 180.
118 David M. Barrett, ‘Presidential foreign policy’ in John Dumbrell, The making o f US 
foreign policy, 2nd edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1997, 
p. 64.
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However, internationally, more than 20 countries agreed to join force with the 
US by sending military contingents to the area. The multinational force finally 
arrived in Haiti, led by the US 82nd Airborne Division, after a direct military 
confrontation was averted due to an agreement brokered by the former US 
President Jimmy Carter. Aristide was reinstated and General Cedras left the 
country, though he had been granted an amnesty by the parliament.
In the case of Haiti a whole range of mandatory sanctions and military 
measures were mobilised and enforced under the authority of Chapter VII. The 
aim was to restore democracy by reinstating the elected president of Haiti. 
Throughout the crisis, the United Nations’ decisions had never compromised on 
this goal. Therefore, when the Supreme Court Judge Emaile Jonassaint was 
installed as a provisional President, the Security Council rejected both his 
installation and his announcement of an early election.119 The OAS adhered to 
its declaration of 8 October 1991 that ‘no government that may result from this
190illegal situation will be accepted’. Therefore, Aristide remained the only 
recognised President. In effect, when he returned to Haiti Arisitde only had to 
serve for 16 months, as he had spent most of his five years duration in exile.121
In this respect, the United Nations may not appear to be consistent in 
that many overthrown democratically elected leaders were imprisoned in their 
countries or banished around the world. Until 1998 more than 70 governments 
lived in exile, some of them elected by their people and many of them gained
119 Security Council Presidential statement, 11 May 1994.
120 UN Document S/23127, 9 October 1991.
121 At the end of Aristide’s 5 years Rene Preval was elected President o f Haiti.
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100  •  universal recognition. In terms of human rights abuses, violence, and tragic
atrocities, Haiti was not a priority for the United Nations. For these reasons,
member states were anxious to point out that Haiti was an aberration. When the
Council adopted mandatory measures in resolution 841 (1993), the President of
the Security Council issued a statement explaining that the adoption of the
resolution was warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and
should not be regarded as constituting a precedent. Whether Haiti will serve
as a precedent can not simply be determined by such statements. In this respect,
the study may borrow Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer’s assertion that
‘Something can be unprecedented and not set a precedent. Only later can we
know if a novel act sets a precedent.’124
Labelling the military operation in Haiti as ‘Operation Uphold
Democracy’ is significant, this study would argue, for the relation of ‘the
military’ to ‘the political’. This action will affect the theoretical discussion on
the relation between ‘the military’ and ‘the political’ as well as the conduct of
interstate bilateral relations, but its impact on the world organisation will be far
greater. When the UN, as a grantor of legitimacy and state recognition,
mobilises force to restore a democracy the consequences are expected to be
profound. The questions of consistency and devotion to democracy will
continue to challenge the ability of the UN to take actions in similar situations.
122 Stefan Talmon, Recognition o f Governments in International Law: With Particular 
Reference to Governments in Exile, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 286.
123 United Nations Peacekeeping, Information Notes, PS/DPI/24/Rev. 1 May 1994.
124 Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer, ‘Setting precedents in anarchy, military intervention 
and weapons o f mass destruction’ International Security, vol. 20 no. 4, Spring 1996, p. 85.
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Yet, Haiti provides a unique test case for determining the future of a 
democracy restored by peace enforcement measures rather than through internal 
political evolution.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Peace enforcement is the original system of the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the face of threats to peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. It represents the major improvement 
of the UN Charter on the League of Nations Covenant. These facts had widely 
been recognised,1 as the system derives its authority from an almost universal 
approval by the signatory states. However, the intentions of the founders were not 
satisfied during the Cold War and peace enforcement remained largely latent with 
no effect on various armed conflicts.
Due to inherited causes the UN was unable to take measures against 
illegitimate coercive actions carried out by big powers to secure national interests. 
Countries allied to big powers escaped mandatory measures in situations 
represented potential risks and threats to international order. Condemnation was in 
most cases the only means available for the UN. Even condemnations were 
difficult to pass through the Security Council and had to be issued by the General 
Assembly or the Secretary-General. UN Under Secretary-General, Brian Urquhart, 
observed in 1986 that ‘We in the United Nations run a resolution-producing
1 See for instance H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a P o litica l Institutions, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 5th edition 1975, pp. 14 -  40.
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factory that has now reached industrial proportions. We deluge the world with an 
enormous number of resolutions. Most of them are reasonably benevolent, but I 
really do not know what influence they have.’
In some cases, impartial and consensual means were employed, and 
peacekeeping combined with the Secretary-General good offices prevailed as the 
UN mechanism for conflict resolution. Forces of big powers were largely 
precluded from participation in peacekeeping with other national military 
contingents. Given the limitations of peacekeeping, the international community 
failed to adopt a comprehensive system for conflict resolution as an alternative to 
peace enforcement. Provisional measures and classical methods of mediation, in 
most cases, remained the only possible options.
The important lesson of the Cold War period is to know why peace 
enforcement did not work as intended, for more than forty years. The general 
contention was that the Security Council’s inability to invoke provisions of 
Chapter VII had been caused by disagreement between super-powers during the 
Cold War. This contention entails a variety of critical issues including the conflict 
of economic interests of major powers and their opposing political agenda in 
different parts of the world. During the process of decolonisation European 
countries inclined to tolerate military presence in former colonies, what would
Brian Urquhart, ‘The United Naions, Collective Security, and International 
Peacekeeping’ in Alan K Henrikson, ed. N egotiating W orld Order, the Artisanship and  
Architecture o f  G lobal Diplom acy, Scholarly Resources, Delaware, 1986, p. 59.
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otherwise have constituted a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Many 
countries remained under European rule for almost twenty years after the adoption 
of the UN Charter in 1945. Colonialism was partially responsible for impeding the 
Charter system for peace enforcement.
Yet, the Soviet Union used the veto more than any other country. During 
the first five years of the United Nations, the Soviet Union used the veto 50 times. 
Until May 1990 the number of vetoes cast by permanent members were as 
follows: France 18, China 22, United Kingdom 33, the United States 82, and the 
Soviet Union 124.
This thesis reconsiders an argument frequently referred to in the literature, 
that the use of veto prevented the adoption of effective measures by the Security 
Council. An investigation carried out by this study reveals that in many cases 
permanent members of the Council used the veto to protest against mild measures 
recommended by various draft resolutions, and they considered these measures as 
not commensurate with the gravity of such situations. When the Soviet Union 
claimed that the United States had directed its military aircraft in 1958 armed with 
atomic and hydrogen Bombs towards its frontiers, the Soviet delegation submitted 
a proposal to the Security Council suggesting specific measures for the removal of 
the threat to peace and security caused by the US action. In this respect the Soviet 
Union vetoed a US draft resolution proposed by the United States because it
3 A  letter from the Soviet Union to the President o f  the Security Council (S /3990) 18 
April 1958
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failed, according to the Soviet delegation, to meet the urgency of the situation and 
attempted to distract the attention from the US ‘aggressive invasion of the Soviet 
airspace’.4
The Soviet Union was also not satisfied with the measures recommended 
against the Franco regime during the consideration by the Security Council of a 
Polish complaint against the threatening activities of the Franco regime.5 On 13 
June 1946, the Soviet Union vetoed a draft resolution which stated that the 
Council endorses
the transmitting by the Security Council to the General Assembly of the 
evidence and reports of [the] Sub-Committee, together with the 
recommendation that, unless the Franco regime is withdrawn and the other 
conditions of political freedom set out in the declaration are, in the opinion 
of the General Assembly, fully satisfied, a resolution be passed by the 
General Assembly recommending that diplomatic relations with the Franco 
regime be terminated forthwith by each Member of the United Nations;6
The representative of the Soviet Union explained that his government rejected this 
proposal because it believed that mandatory measures under Articles 39 and 41 of
4 Security Council draft resolution (S/3995) 2 May 1958.
5 A letter from Poland to the President of the Security Council (S/34) 9 April 1946.
6 Security Council draft resolution, 39th meeting, 29 April 1946.
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Chapter VII should have been adopted by the Security Council to impose 
diplomatic sanctions against Franco regime. The Soviet Union further stressed the 
responsibility of the Security, Council not the General Assembly, to deal with 
threats to international peace.
Similar situations existed with relation to the Syrian and Lebanese Question 
in 1946,8 the RB-47 Incident in I960,9 and the situation in the Republic of Congo 
in 1960-61.10 In these cases, the Soviet Union justified its vetoes on the bases that 
the Security Council should have taken firmer actions.11
In June 1982, the United States and the United Kingdom vetoed a
17resolution with relation to the question of the Falkland Islands. The 
representative of the UK explained that his government was not satisfied with the 
wording of the draft resolution which called for a cease-fire and negotiation with 
no explicit link to the immediate and total withdrawal of all Argentine forces from
1 ‘Xthe Islands. In all these cases, the vetoing states called for effective actions and 
more precise wording in order to resolve international or internal conflicts. This
7 Ibid.
8 Security Council draft resolution, 23rd meeting, 16 February 1946.
9 Security Council draft resolution (S/4409/Rev.l) 883rd meeting, 26 July 1960.
10 Security Council draft resolution (S/4578/Rev.l) 920th meeting, 13 and 14 December 
1990.
11 One of the reasons that Western countries did not need to use the veto during the first 
two decades of the UN was that most of the draft resolutions suggested by the Eastern 
block failed to obtain the required votes.
12 Security Council draft resolution (S/15156/Rev.2.) 2373rd meeting, 4 June 1982.
13 Ibid.
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reveals that the veto was used in many cases as a means of protest at the 
ineffective solutions attempted by the Security Council.
However, it is equally true that permanent members used the veto to block 
the adoption by the Council of effective measures in situations where their 
strategic interests were at stake. The Soviet Union raised the veto to stop measures 
with respect to Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and Afghanistan. The United States 
used the veto to block the adoption of measures in the cases of South Africa, 
Israel, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Panama. However, the fact remains that the 
majority of vetoes during the Cold War were not cast to block effective measures 
by the Security Council.
An important aspect the UN system for peace enforcement lacked during 
the Cold War was the continuous negotiation by member states on its major 
provisions. The UN had rarely arranged for dialogue between member states on 
the provisions of Chapter VII during the Cold War. On 30 April 1947 
representatives of the five permanent members in the Military Staff Committee 
presented to the Security Council ‘General Principles’ governing the organisation 
of UN forces for the implementation of the UN scheme for peace enforcement.14 
The report of the Military Staff Committee was a result of a serious debate 
between the permanent members that lasted until August 1948, and elaborated on 
discussions at Dumbarton Oaks on the provisions of Chapter VII. At the end of the
14 Security Council Official Records, (S/336) 2nd year, Special Supplement, No. 1, pp. 1 -  
32.
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debate the permanent members agreed on some issues and disagreed on others. 
This result was widely viewed as a failure and led members of the Security 
Council to abandon discussions on the implementation of Chapter VII 
enforcement measures. Successive literature reiterated the argument that unless 
political unanimity is achieved it is impossible to fulfil the promise of a workable 
UN peace enforcement system.15
In the view of this thesis, these discussions attained a considerable success 
which could have been developed by further discussions. The report indicated that 
permanent members agreed on the purposes of armed forces. They also agreed that 
the Council assisted by the Military Staff Committee should determine all matters 
related to the size and composition of forces and their degree of readiness, 
command, and strategic directions. It was also agreed that the employment of 
forces for the undertaking of action pursuant to Article 42 would be solely by the 
decision of the Security Council.16 They disagreed on the size of forces 
contributed by each member compared with the contributions of other members, 
the location of forces, and the provision of passage and logistical support by
17member states. It is also important to notice that disagreement was not always 
between the East and West. There were differences between Western countries in
15 D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, A Legal Study of United Nations Practice, 
Stevens and Sons, London, 1964, pp. 17-18.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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many points and on several Articles joint texts were submitted by the Soviet 
Union with France, China, or the United States.
The triumph of the early post war years and the establishment of the UN 
largely influenced the judgement that the report of the Military Staff Committee 
was a failure. Nations who agreed on one hundred and eleven Articles of the UN 
Charter were not expected to fail in providing a detailed arrangement for the UN 
forces. However, a second look, after more than fifty years of UN practice, would 
consider the results of these negotiations as reasonable and promising.
This contention was further substantiated by the practice of the Security 
Council in the early 1990s. During the Kuwait crisis, although political agreement 
between the permanent members was unprecedented since the establishment of the 
United Nations, the Council did not invoke the provisions of Articles 43 -  47. 
When D. W. Bowett analysed the report of the Military Staff Committee of 1947, 
he concluded by stating that Tt is, therefore, a trite but evidently true statement 
that further progress cannot really be made until this political distrust has been
1 ftallayed.’ In the light of recent practice, the thesis argues that the automatic 
correlation between political agreement and the revival of the entire UN Charter 
system for peace enforcement is doubtful. However, the ultimate lesson is that 
only sustainable dialogue can ensure the development of peace enforcement.
18 D. W. Bowett, op. cit. N o te l5 , p. 18.
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At the end of the Cold War peace enforcement emerged as a major method for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Its revival had been associated in 
1990-91 with the proclamation of a New World Order and it was expected to meet 
the objectives spelled out by political leaders. In September 1990, George Bush 
stated before the Congress that the international community was moving towards a 
world ‘free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more 
secure in the quest for peace.’19 The performances of the operations in Kuwait, 
Somalia, and Bosnia were required to satisfy such standards. In Kuwait, the peace 
enforcement operation had clear objectives and it succeeded in reversing the Iraqi 
invasion. This clarity of objectives is essential for the success of the mission and it 
was only repeated in Haiti in 1994 where the aims set by the Security Council 
were also achieved. However, after the Gulf war new objectives were set out by 
resolutions 687 and 688. The enforcement policy in post-war Iraq failed to bring a 
lasting settlement and sanctions remained in place for many years. The bases of 
the no-fly zone strategy in Northern and Southern Iraq are questionable. The 
disarmament plan, the work of UNSCOM, and the subsequent Desert Fox 
operation were not less controversial.
The hopes expressed by George Bush and the UN Secretary-General in 
1992 to replicate the experience of Iraq in a civil war model in Somalia proved 
futile. Somalia was the first case of a peace enforcement mission to be explicitly
19 Text of President Bush’s Address to Joint Session of Congress, New York Times, 12 
September 1990.
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authorised by the Security Council in a civil war. The detailed peace enforcement 
plan forged by Boutros Ghali purported to deal with a diverse range of military 
and civilian issues. Such a wide approach to peace enforcement, which has been
ontermed by some writers ‘multifunctional operations’ failed to integrate the
military, diplomatic, and humanitarian objectives in a harmonised workable
strategy. The careful ‘division of labour’, which has been stipulated for the success 
01of such operations, was not achieved in Somalia. In Bosnia, the mandate was 
expanded to peace enforcement but UNPROFOR continued to function as a 
peacekeeping mission causing many contradictions between mandate and practice. 
In fact, the chances of success in peace enforcement operations are better when the 
objectives of the mission are specific, clearly defined, and adhered to.
The scope of peace enforcement activities and purposes have remarkably 
been expanded during the 1990s. Originally, the United Nations peace 
enforcement system was intended to combat any breach of the peace, threat to the 
peace, or acts of aggression. It was also assumed that measures under Chapter VII 
should only be invoked in the most serious situations and should be carefully 
executed to fulfil certain purposes. In the 1990s, the Security Council adopted a 
broad interpretation of these provisions. In various situations, the Security Council
90 Jarat Chopra, ‘United Nations Peace-Maintenance’ in Martin Ira Glassner, ed. The 
United Nations at Work, Praeger Publishers, Westport and London, 1998, p. 337.
21 Edwin M. Smith and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘UN Task-Sharing: Toward or Away from 
Global Governance?’ in Thomas G. Weiss, ed. Beyond UN Subcontracting, Task-sharing 
with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs, Macmillan Press, 
and St. Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1998, pp. 227 -  255.
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sought to combat aggression, protect human rights, restore democracy, demobilise 
armed factions, hunt warlords, and to combat international terrorism.
However, protection was a central element in Security Council peace 
enforcement resolutions. The relative success in protecting the Kurds in Northern 
Iraq led to an inaccurate judgement that UN forces could provide protection 
elsewhere. This understanding missed the fact that Operation Provide Hope was 
enacted in the aftermath of the allied victory in the Gulf. The situation in Somalia 
and Bosnia was quite different.
General Sir Michael Rose, the UN Commander in Bosnia explained the 
limitations of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia by stating that
The term ‘safe area’ is a misnomer because there’s no such thing. Nothing 
can be totally safe, and relative safety is always dependent on a number of 
factors. If one side choose to attack outward from a ‘safe area’ and the other 
side then decides to respond, as happened in Bihac, then the area cease to 
be safe. The United Nations can’t do anything about such a situation ... 
Even the name of our mission, the United Nations Protection Force, was 
misleading. We were not actually protecting anybody and in terms of 
military activity, we were trying to protect convoy runs through the
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country. Again there’s a limit to how much protection can be provided, so
22another name for our mission would have been better.
In Rwanda, the French troops designated and protected areas in accordance with 
resolution 929, but the council authorised the mission originally for a limited 
period of two month and the toll of death was already high. By analogy to 
military intervention by regional organisations, after seven weeks of military air 
attacks against Yugoslavia the Nato spokesman admitted on 6 May 1999 that air 
raids did not succeed in securing the objective of protecting the people of 
Kosovo.24 In fact, the air raids over Belgrade and Pristina killed more civilians
yc
than soldiers.
Failure to protect civilians has damaged the credibility of UN peace 
enforcement operations in the 1990s. Although, the UN was responsible for not 
acting swiftly in Rwanda and because its forces, for various reasons, did not carry 
out its mandate in Bosnia, protection proved to be a difficult task and critical 
aspect of conflict resolution. The issue of civilians’ fate combined with the 
extensive media coverage poses a new challenge to peace enforcement operations.
The difficulty of controlling conflicts in stateless countries was 
compounded by the spread of weapons among the combatants. Security Council
yy Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, (an interview), Oxford International Review, vol. 
VII, no. 1, Winter 1995, p. 39.
23 Security Council resolution 929, 22 June 1994.
24 Nine O’clock News, BBC1, 6 May 1999.
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resolutions attempted to alleviate this problem by taking local and external 
measures. Locally, peace enforcement missions were instructed to demilitarise 
warring parties and declare certain areas weapon free zones. However, 
demilitarisation became a critical issue and in Somalia, it jeopardised the 
credibility of UNOSOM II. To be able to deprive people of their weapons, UN 
missions needed to provide a substantial degree of safety and confidence in the 
area and to pursue a high degree of equality among the antagonists.
Externally, the Security Council imposed arms embargo against states and 
factions asking all countries to stop sending them weapons and military 
equipment. Almost in every case the Security Council had taken measures under 
Chapter VII arms embargo was included, and in Liberia, Angola, it was the only 
mandatory measure to be employed. The aim was to reduce the capacity of 
combatant to wage war. The only two exceptions were Libya and Haiti where an 
arms embargo were imposed to inflict political pressure on governments to 
extradite suspects in the case of Libya and to accept the restoration of the 
democratic government in the case of Haiti. However, there is no evidence that an 
arms embargo had any significant effect on the intensity of wars. In a clear 
interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Security Council did not impose 
mandatory measures; instead, countries were urged to refrain voluntarily from
25 Michael Evans and Richard Owen, ‘Bombs hit refugee convoy* The Times, 15 April 
1999.
Sudan is the only exception.
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97supplying arms to the two countries. The Security Council tried other methods to 
deal with the flow of weapons to Africa, and in November 1998 the Council 
adopted a general resolution stressing ‘the need for the international community to 
respond to the challenge of illicit arms flows to and in Africa in a comprehensive 
manner, encompassing not only the field of security but that of social and 
economic development.’28
Such a comprehensive approach affirms that an arms embargo alone is not 
enough to deal with the multidimensional problem of the flaw of weapons. More 
measures by the Security Council are required and if the Military Staff Committee 
is to be reactivated it could play a useful role in making the necessary 
arrangements as it has been authorised under Article 47 to foresee ‘the regulations 
of armament and possible disarmament.’
During the second half of the 1990s the activities of the Security Council in the 
area of peace enforcement have relatively decreased. This was viewed by some 
scholars as a reversal of the enthusiasm and willingness among member states to 
use the Security Council which had prevailed in the early 1990s. Brian Urquhart 
observed in 1999 that the cases of
27 Security Council resolution 1227,10 February 1999.
28 Security Council resolution 1209,19 November 1998
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Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti-already seem to belong 
to another era, ... Even now it is hard to recall those heady and euphoric 
days of the early post-Cold War period, when nothing seemed impossible 
and when the United Nations Security Council could agree on just about 
anything. The sky seemed to be the limit ... Of course it did not last. 
Failure and expense took their toll. Casualties in Somalia produced a U-tum 
in U.S. policy on peacekeeping operations.
Another opinion was expressed by Nigel White and Ozlem Ulgen in 1997 that
Undoubtedly, not every enforcement action has been completely successful 
... nor will they be so in the future. However, the UN’s track-record in the 
exercise of the military option is improving both in terms of 
constitutionality and effectiveness.
The record of evaluations made before the end of the Cold War, in the early post- 
Cold War period, and late in the 1990s on the viability of peace enforcement 
shows how it is difficult to make a final judgement, as many dynamics in the
9 0 Brian Urquhart, Foreword, in Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, 
Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1999, 
p. xi.
0 N. D. White and Ozlem Ulgen, ‘Security Council and the Decentralised Military 
Action: Constitutionality and Function’ Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 
XLIV, 1997, p. 413.
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international arena, as well as the achievements of operations, will continue to 
affect the development and utility of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement has its 
deficiencies as a system and in practice, it failed to resolve the conflict in two 
major cases in Somalia and Bosnia. However, there is a profound danger in acting 
unilaterally or outside the UN framework for conflict resolution. Such actions may 
lead to friction and possibly endanger international stability. This was recalled 
when the Russian defence minister, Marshal Igor Sergeyev announced during the 
first week of Nato military air attack against Belgrade, that Russia would send a 
naval reconnaissance vessel through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles into the 
Mediterranean to ‘analyse and draw the appropriate conclusions’ from the Balkans
i
situation. The possibility of confrontation over such actions was reiterated by the 
wide anti-Western demonstrations in China after the attack against Beijing’s 
embassy in Belgrade by Nato jets on 6 May 1999. However, the important 
question is why it had been possible for the Security Council to authorise the use 
of force in Bosnia while stopping short of doing so in Kosovo. Whether the reason 
is willingness on the side of Nato to act regionally, or because there are more 
Russian interests at stake than in Bosnia, the significance of the incident is that it 
represented the first use of force by Nato without Security Council authorisation 
and against the wishes of two permanent members.
<3 I Marcus Warren, ‘Russian ship to sail for Adriatic’ The Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1999. 
32 Matthew Campbell and Stephen Grey, ‘Blundering into China’ The Sunday Times, 9 
May 1999.
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Despite the growing tendency, at the end of the century, to resort to the 
unauthorised use of force, a reformed and developed system of peace enforcement 
will serve the cause of peace and stability better than the disputed proclamations 
of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘new internationalism.’ The experience of the 
1990s provides comprehensive and useful lessons for peace enforcement. One of 
these lessons is that wishful thinking of UN officials, who seek to negotiate 
peaceful settlements without preventive or coercive deployment in cases of ethnic 
cleansing and mass murder, will result in the UN losing the initiative and giving 
way to unauthorised intervention as in Kosovo, or allowing for humanitarian 
disaster and genocide as in Rwanda.
The Security Council made two innovative rebuttals in the areas of internal 
democracy and international terrorism. In the case of Haiti, the Council resolutions 
clearly authorised the undertaking of peace enforcement measures to restore 
democracy. However, as Haiti constitutes a successful attempt to re-install a 
democratically elected President it also represents a test of the UN’s consistency 
towards other similar situations in the world.
The mandatory measures imposed against Libya and Sudan in relation to 
international terrorism remain unique. However, members of the Security Council 
seem to be more willing to punish international terrorism when a credible evidence
33 Tony Blair, ‘Why the Generation of 1968 Chose to Go to War’ Newsweek, 12 April 
1999; for justification of war against Belgrade see Bill Clinton, ‘Why the allies must fight 
on’ The Sunday Times, 18 April 1999.
360
is provided, than to undertake enforcement measures to restore democracy. Most 
member states still consider the instalment of democratic government as a matter 
of domestic jurisdiction, that should be decided on by the people of the country. 
Therefore, despite the significance of the case of Haiti, the experience did not 
bring about a change in the international community’s stance, that the restoration 
of democracy or replacement of undemocratic governments is mainly an internal 
affair.
The two cases of the Iraqi Kurds in 1991 and the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 
posed a challenge to the authority of the Security Council in this decade. In the 
Case of the Kurds, the allied forces imposed the no-fly zone without seeking 
further authority from the Council and the United States and Britain continued 
their air attacks against military targets in Northern Iraq for many years.
In the case of Kosovo, Nato did not attempt to obtain the authorisation of 
the Security Council for its military strikes against Serbia. However, the strikes 
ceased in a few weeks when Serbian forces agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and 
the operation was transferred to UN peacekeeping forces under the command of 
Nato.
In situations where the Security Council was able to take enforcement 
actions the command and control of the UN forces represented a critical problem. 
The provisions of Articles 43 and 47, which govern the strategic directions and 
control of forces, remained dormant. From Korea in 1950 to Zaire in 1996, the 
United Nations always delegated the command of its forces to member states and
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in most of these cases the United States assumed the role of designating the 
command of forces. To overcome the paradox in UN practice and the obvious 
deviation from the principles of the UN Charter, in future authorised peace 
enforcement actions the relationships between the authority of the Security 
Council and the power of permanent members needs to be clearly defined. Three 
options may be pointed out in this respect.
First, the revival of the United Nations mechanism for peace enforcement; 
this would require the conclusion of agreements between the Security Council and 
member states in order to undertake necessary measures for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Subsequently, the Military Staff Committee 
should be responsible for the strategic direction of armed forces and questions 
related to the command of such forces.
Second, there would be an amendment of the United Nations Charter to 
allow for new regulations, an option which always seen difficult to attain.
Third, there would be a policy of the adoption of a contemporary formula 
of power delegation, through which the United Nations could delegate the 
command of forces and the execution of its enforcement measures to a member 
state, a group of member states, or a regional organisation.
It is necessary to reach an agreed formula on the structure of UN forces. As 
long as disagreement on questions of command, control, and strategic directions of 
UN force persists, a system of power delegation must be agreed to, but core
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permanent and small UN military units should be established and the political 
objectives of the operation should be observed by the Security Council.
The principle of true representation, which assume that members of the 
Security Council are delegated to act on behalf of the international community, 
has increasingly been obscured and breached by permanent members. To preserve 
the UN’s credibility, members of the Security Council should carry out these 
duties in the area of peace enforcement on the understanding that they act on 
behalf of UN member states and not in the interests of their governments only, as 
clearly stipulated by Article 24 of the Charter.
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